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Advising the President
Congressmen are always advising Presidents to get rid of Presidential
advisers. That is one of the most constant threads that runs through
American history and Presidents ordinarily do not pay attention ..
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1817 President James Monroe dispatched former U.S. Attorney General
Caesar A. Rodney, Baltimore lawyer Theodorick Bland, and Chief Clerk of the
State Department John Graham to South America, in anticipation of possible
diplomatic recognition of the former Spanish colonies. Later that year,
President Monroe told Congress that he had appointed "three distinguished
citizens" as commissioners
[t]o obtain correct information on every subject in which the United
States are interested; to inspire just sentiments in all persons in
authority, on either side, of our friendly disposition so far as it may
comport with an impartial neutrality, and to secure proper respect to
our commerce in every port and from every flag ....
Only after the commission departed did the President request an appropriation
of $30,000 to pay for the trip.
Congress was not immediately persuaded of either the wisdom or the
legality of the President's act. Speaker of the House Henry Clay claimed that
the President had "made these appointments without the authority of the
Constitution, or of any law recognizing them" and the "constitutional point it
involved ... made it obnoxious." 3 Congress ultimately acquiesced in the
President's request. Nonetheless, it refused to appropriate the money for the
particular mission, lest it be "supposed that the persons sent by the President
were official characters ... [whose] appointments should be submitted to the
Senate," rather than mere "agents appointed under the discretion of the
Executive to acquire information. ''" Instead, Congress appropriated $30,000
to a contingent fund, leaving to the President's discretion the occasion for its
use.
5
In January 1993 President Bill Clinton appointed a Task Force on Health
Care Reform, which comprised six members of the Cabinet, senior White
1. President's News Conference, 1963 PUB. PAPERS 375 (John F. Kennedy. May 8. 1963).
2. James Monroe, First Annual Message, in 2 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF TIlE PRESIDENTS 1817. at
583 (James D. Richardson ed., New York. Bureau of National Literature. Inc. 1897).
3. 32 ANNALS OF CONG. 1466 (1818).
4. Id. at 1652 (statement of Rep. Forsyth).
5. Id. The commissioners returned in so much disagreement over their findings that they were unable
to prepare a joint report. See id. at 1967-2316 (report of Caesar A. Rodney): see also HARRY AMMON.
JAMES MONROE: THE QUEST FOR NATIONAL IDENTITY 428-29 (1971); WILUAAM P. CRESSON. JAMES
MONROE 301 (Archon Books 1971) (1946); HENRY M. WRISTON. EXECUTIVE AGENTS IN AMERICAN
FOREIGN RELATIONS 220-22, 416-19 (1929).
1994]
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House officials, and the First Lady, who served as chair.6 Of this group, only
the First Lady received no federal salary and held no office cognizable under
the laws of the United States.7
Shortly thereafter, various associations sought a preliminary injunction to
compel the Task Force to make its meetings public. Under the terms of the
Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA), 8 an advisory body that includes at
least one person who is not a full-time federal officer or employee must
conduct public meetings and open its records to public inspection. The
plaintiffs claimed that the President, by formally seeking the views of the First
Lady, brought the Task Force within the purview of the Act. While the district
court held FACA unconstitutional, the court of appeals ruled that the First
Lady was a full-time federal employee and thereby avoided the application of
the Act.9
This Article examines the tensions between Congress, the judiciary, and
the President over presidential use of advisory committees.'0 It argues that
courts, in attempting to avoid difficult constitutional questions, have misread
FACA. Properly construed, FACA violates separation of powers by limiting
the terms on which the President can acquire information from
nongovernmental advisory committees. Part II places the debate over FACA
in context by exploring the extensive history of presidential reliance on outside
advisers. From George Washington to Bill Clinton, presidents have appointed,
with or without prior authorization from Congress, informal observers or
advisers like James Monroe's "commissioners." Holding no official advisory
position in the federal government, these advisers are simply private citizens
called upon by the President to offer their views and assistance on particular
matters.
Although presidents have long regarded it as their prerogative to appoint
and consult outside advisers, Congress has not reacted consistently to such
presidential practices, at times questioning presidential authority or restricting
the President's spending, and at other times acquiescing by agreeing to fund
the President's committees or ignoring the practice altogether. With FACA,
Congress for the first time enacted nonspending restrictions on the President's
6. President's Remarks on Health Care Reform, 29 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 96 (Jan. 25, 1993).
7. Cf 3 U.S.C. § 105(e) (1988) (authorizing assistance and services to President's spouse for helping
in discharge of President's duties and responsibilities).
8. Federal Advisory Committee Act, Pub. L. No. 92-463, 86 Stat. 770 (1972) (codified at 5 U.S.C.
app. at 1175 (1988)).
9. Association of Am. Physicians & Surgeons, Inc. v. Clinton, 997 F.2d 898 (D.C. Cir. 1993), rev'g
813 F. Supp. 82 (D.D.C. 1993).
10. The terms "commission," "advisory committee," and "presidential advisory committee" have a
variety of definitions. See George B. Galloway, Presidential Commissions, I EDITORIAL REs. REP. 351,
351-52 (1931). I use the term "advisory committee" in a way that is generally consistent with the Federal
Advisory Committee Act, which defines "advisory committee" as "any committee, board, commission,
council, conference, panel, task force, or other similar group" that provides "advice or recommendations"
to the President, and excludes such bodies that also exercise operational functions. See Federal Advisory
Committee Act §§ 3(2), 9(b).
(Vol. 104: 51
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use of advisory committees. Passed in 1972, FACA established guidelines for
the composition and conduct of advisory committees. It governs their charters
and duration, and it requires committees-whether created by Congress,
established by the President, or "utilized" by the President (although neither
created by Congress nor established by the President)-to open their meetings
and records to the public. FACA represented a significant change in the
uncertain historical balance between Congress and the President over his use
of advisory committees.
In Public Citizen i. United States Department of Justice," the Supreme
Court altered the balance again, this time ostensibly in favor of the President.
The Court held that when the President consulted with the American Bar
Association's (ABA) Standing Committee on the Federal Judiciary, a
committee neither established nor funded by the federal government, he did not
"utilize" the committee within the meaning of FACA. Ignoring the record of
interbranch conflict and selectively citing FACAs legislative history, the Court
narrowly interpreted FACA's scope to avoid addressing its implications for the
separation of powers. The Court in Public Citizen was, as Part III
demonstrates, quite wrong in its reading of the Act. Congress intended to test
the outer reaches of its authority by extending FACA to advisory committees
neither established nor funded by the federal government. Although the Court's
decision relieved, at least temporarily, some of the tension between Congress
and the President over his use of advisory committees, it did so at the expense
of constitutional and statutory clarity.
The Court's obfuscation in Public Citizen leaves us with the question with
which we began: What powers does the President have to consult with outside
advisers? And if Congress decides to control that relationship, can its efforts
extend beyond simple control of the purse? I explore these difficult questions
in Part IV. I conclude that the President does have the power to consult with
outside advisers, and that FACA unconstitutionally infringes upon that power.
FACA fails to draw a distinction between congressionally created advisory
committees and presidentially created advisory committees, and assumes
congressional authority to control both. Thus, where Congress might have the
power to compel consultation, in FACA Congress seized the power to forbid
it; where Congress might have the power to expand the sources of information
available to the President, in FACA Congress seized the power to restrict it.
FACA constrains the President's power to consult with advisory committees
he has established or utilized, including those that are funded privately. FACA
therefore allows the President to acquire information from nongovernmental
advisory committees only on Congress' terms. In the process, FACA exceeds
the powers of Congress and diminishes long-recognized presidential powers.
I. 491 U.S. 440 (1989).
1994]
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II. CONGRESS AND PRESIDENTIAL ADVISORY CoMM1TTEES:
A HISTORY OF LEGISLATION
A. Presidential Advisory Committees: Their Use and Abuse
Presidents of the United States have long recognized the need for outside
advisers. Unlike Congress, which has established a formal mechanism to hear
the advice of experts and receive the views of private citizens, and unlike the
federal courts, which engage in an even more formal hearing process, the
executive branch must employ less systematic means of obtaining views from
the private sector.12 Presidents have frequently either constituted a group of
outside persons-an advisory committee-or looked to a preexisting group for
advice on domestic and foreign matters. 3 These groups are not part of the
formal structure of our government. Typically occupying little or no
government office space, they have no authority to bind the government. As
President Herbert Hoover stated, advisory committees "are not for executive
action (for which they are anathema), but are one of the sound processes for
the search, production, and distribution of the truth."' 14 Yet advisory
committees have served and continue to serve prominent public functions, from
Hoover's National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement (the
Wickersham Commission), established to advise on the enforcement of
Prohibition-era laws; Roosevelt's commission to investigate the attack on Pearl
Harbor (the Roberts Commission); Johnson's Commission on the Assassination
of President Kennedy (the Warren Commission); Johnson's National Advisory
Commission on Civil Disorders (the Kerner Commission); Reagan's Special
Review Board on the role of the National Security Council in the Iran-Contra
12. Delegates to the Constitutional Convention unsuccessfully proposed the creation of a privy council
as a permanent advisory body to the President. The task of the privy council would have been to "advise
[the President] in the matters respecting the execution of his office, which he shall think proper to lay
before them; but their advice shall not conclude him, nor affect his responsibility for the measures which
he shall adopt." I THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 257 (photo. reprint 1987) (J. Elliot ed., 1836) [hereinafter ELLIOr'S DEBATES];
see also NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 REPORTED BY JAMES MADISON 60.
481 (W.W. Norton & Co. 1987) (1893). James Wilson opposed such a council, "which oftener serves to
cover, than prevent malpractices." I THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 97 (Max
Farrand ed., 1911) [hereinafter FARRAND].
13. At the end of fiscal year 1992, the President, in an annual report prepared by the General Services
Administration (GSA), reported some 1141 executive branch advisory committees. More than 70% were
established by congressional initiative; of these, Congress directed the President to establish 439, and
authorized the President to establish and consult with another 360. Federal agencies established 407 of the
existing advisory committees, and 24 were established at the express direction of the President. The GSA
classified only 57 as "presidential advisory committees." GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION, TWENTY-
FIRST ANNUAL REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT ON FEDERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEES 8, 12 (1993) [hereinafter
TWENTY-FIRST ANNUAL REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT].
14. Letter from Herbert Hoover to W.C. Thompson (Jan. 1930), quoted in Galloway, supra note 10,
at 357.
[Vol. 104: 51
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Affair (the Tower Commission); Bush's National Education Goals Panel on the
future of American education; to Clinton's Health Care Task Force.' 5
Presidential advisory committees are generally created in one of four
ways. 6 First, Congress creates advisory committees for the President. 7
Second, Congress may authorize or direct the President to establish an advisory
committee; the President then establishes the committee in response to the
authorization.' 8 Third, the President may create an advisory committee on his
own initiative and announce its formation by executive order, proclamation, or
press release.' 9 Fourth, the President may request that private citizens or
15. President's Inaugural Address, 1929 PUB. PAPERS 4 (Mar. 8, 1929) (Wickersham Commission).
Exec. Order No. 8983, 6 Fed. Reg. 6569 (1941) (Roberts Commission); Exec. Order No. 11.130. 3 C F R
795 (Comp. 1963) (Warren Commission); Exec. Order No. 11.365. 3 C.F.R. 310 (Comp 1967) (Kerner
Commission); Exec. Order No. 12,575, 51 Fed. Reg. 43.718 (1986) (Tower Commission). Joint Statement.
1990 PUB. PAPERS 1078 (July 31, 1990) (National Education Goals Panel): President's Remarks on Health
Care Reform, supra note 6, at 96 (Health Care Task Force).
Congress subsequently codified the creation of three of these commissions established by exccti',e
order the Wickersham Commission, Pub. L. No. 70-1034. 45 Stat. 1613 (1929); the Roberts Commission.
Pub. L. No. 77-370, 55 Stat. 853 (1941); and the Warren Commission. Pub. L. No. 88-202. 77 Stat 362
(1963). The D.C. Circuit held that the Health Care Task Force. chaired by the First Lady, was not an
advisory committee within the meaning of FACA, although its subgroups were subject to FACA
Association of Am. Physicians & Surgeons, Inc. v. Clinton. 997 F.2d 898. 915-16 (D C Cir 1993). see
infra notes 216-23 and accompanying text.
16. See generally CARL M. MARCY. PRESIDENTIAL CoMMissioNs 7-16 (1945). TERREN'CE R
TUTCHINGS, RHETORIC AND REALITY: PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSIONS AND TIE MAKING or PuBLIC POLICY
17-21 (1979) (discussing circumstances surrounding creation of commissions); Tito. tMs R WOLANIN.
PRESIDENTIAL ADVISORY COMMISSIONS 54-72 (1975) (explaining how presidents create commissions)
17. E.g., Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990. Pub. L. No 101-510. §§ 2901-2926,
104 Stat. 1485, 1808-24 (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 2687 (1988 & Supp iV 1992)) icreating
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission); Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987. Pub
L. No. 100-203, § 2101, 101 Stat. 1330, 1330-33 (creating National Economic Commission) Although the
Base Closure Commission was created by statute and the commissioners were appointed by and with the
advice and consent of the Senate, the Commission was announced as a presidential commission. 56 Fed
Reg. 12,712 (1991). and is listed as a presidential advisory committee. TWENTY-FIRST ANNLAL REPORT
OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 13, at 41.
At times the President is the unwilling recipient of an advisory committee. E.g.. Pub L No 90-100.
81 Stat. 253 (1967) (creating Commission on Obscenity and Pornography); see WOLNI,. supra note 16.
at 58. President Nixon publicly rejected the Commission's findings. See Statement About the Report of the
Commission on Obscenity and Pornography. 1970 PUB. PAPERS 940 (Oct. 24. 1970).
18. E.g., 19 U.S.C. § 2155(b)-(c) (1988) (authorizing formation of Advisory Committee for Trade
Policy and Negotiations and its various policy and sector advisory committees). The President delegated
his authority under the law to the Secretary of Commerce and the U.S. Trade Representative. and they
established the advisory committee by joint announcement. 45 Fed. Reg. 14.090(1980). see also 15 U S C
§ 5511 (b) (Supp. IV 1992) (directing establishment of High-Performance Computing Advisory Committee)
The High-Performance Computing Advisory Committee has not been established, although the Clinton
Administration has indicated its intention to establish one. 58 Fed. Reg. 49.025. 49.028 (1993)
On occasion Congress has given the President general authority to create advisory committees to assist
in particular areas. See 22 U.S.C. § 502 (1988) (authorizing advisory committees generally to assist in Inter-
American relations); id. § 2103(e) (authorizing committees generally to advise on health sciences). td
§ 2456(d) (authorizing advisory committees generally to support foreign study programs)
19. E.g., Exec. Order No. 12,878. 58 Fed. Reg. 59.343 (1993) (creating Bipartsan Commission on
Entitlement Reform); Exec. Order No. 12.864, 58 Fed. Reg. 48.773 (1993) (creating U S Advisory Council
on the National Information Infrastructure); Joint Statement. supra note 15. at 1078 (creating National
Education Goals Panel); President's Remarks on Health Care Reform. supra note 6. at 96 (creating
President's Task Force on National Health Reform by press release). As noted, the status of the Task Force
is uncertain. See supra note 15. There is no apparent legal distinction between an advisory committee
created by executive order and one created by a press release. Cf WOLANI. supra note 16. at 63-64
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bodies form an advisory committee, or he may use committees already
established privately.2
0
Advisory committees serve various purposes.2' The obvious and publicly
invoked justification for advisory committees is the government's genuine need
for information or advice, which the committees can provide at relatively little
cost to the government. In addition, advisory committees serve a civic
republican function by broadening the field from which the government seeks
policy advice. 2  As Professor Herring noted more than fifty years ago, "the
broadening of administrative authority is an indication that the legislative body
has reached the periphery of its own competence. The advisory committee
provides a means of introducing the opinion of the governed at a highly
strategic point .... [and] brings bureaucracy into closer accord with those it
must govern.
23
The government also uses advisory committees to legitimize agency
viewpoints. An agency decisionmaker may have reached a tentative or even a
firm conclusion about a particular matter, and may look to an advisory
committee to validate that conclusion.24 Politically, the agency's decision will
not be salable without some outside, "neutral" support.25 Thus, "[wihat the
(noting that advisory committees created by executive order are more likely to be funded by presidential
resources, while advisory committees announced by press release tend to be funded by agency resources).
20. Because their formation lacks the ceremony of a statute, executive order, or press release, these
advisory committees are difficult to identify. E.g., The Voices for States and Localities, 13 NAT'L J. 2228.
2228 (1981) (noting that National Governors' Association first convened in response to request from
Theodore Roosevelt). The National Governors' Association participates in a presidential advisory
committee, the National Education Goals Panel. Joint Statement, supra note 15: see also infra notes 121-57
and accompanying text (discussing ABA Standing Committee on the Federal Judiciary); infra note 79 and
accompanying text (discussing Business Advisory Council and Advisory Council on Federal Reports).
21. See generally WOLANIN, supra note 16, at 115-28; David S. Brown, The Management of Advisory
Committees: An Assignment for the '70's, 32 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 334 (1972).
22. See Manes Specter, Involving Clients and the Public in Federal Administration Through Advisory
Committees, in FEDERAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO MANAGEMENT 16, 29 (David S. Brown ed., 1971); Nicholas
A. Ashford, Advisory Committees in OSHA and EPA: Their Use in Regulatory Decisionmaking, Sc!. TECII.
& HUM. VALUES, Winter 1984, at 72, 73; see also Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for
the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1511, 1554-55 (1992).
23. E. PENDLETON HERRING, PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 349 (1936); see
RICHARD A. WEGMAN, THE UTILIZATION AND MANAGEMENT OF FEDERAL ADVISORY COMMITEES 31
(1983); W.F. WILLOUGHBY, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 171-72 (1927).
24. See FRANK POPPER, TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSIONS 13 (1970);
Specter, supra note 22, at 28; see also MARCY, supra note 16, at 39-40 (describing National Commission
on Law Observance and Enforcement (Wickersham Commission) as "unmitigated failure" in part because
of perception of presidential tampering); Thomas E. Cronin & Norman C. Thomas, Federal Advisory
Processes: Advice and Discontent, SCIENCE, Feb. 26, 1971, at 771, 771-72; Jason DeParle, Advise and
Forget, WASH. MONTHLY, May 1983, at 41, 41 (quoting unnamed staffer) ("'Most of the members [of a
particular advisory committee) would have recommended higher funding than the president wanted, and
when the president appoints you, you don't want to turn around and kick him in the butt."').
25. See HERRING, supra note 23, at 356; MARCY, supra note 16, at 25 ("[CommissionsI will not
achieve a reputation as fact-finders if the President requests 'an impartial report in favor of' his pet
projects."); WILLOUGHBY, supra note 23, at 174.
Commentators have suggested that some advisory committees are, in effect, "captured" by the body
or person appointing them. "When 'experts' are employed they are likely consciously or unconsciously to
reflect to some extent the position of their employer so far as that position is known." MARCY, supra note
16, at 82; see also T.B. Priest et al., Corporate Advice: Large Corporations and Federal Advisory
HeinOnline -- 104 Yale L.J. 58 1994-1995
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Government basically wants from advisory committees is not 'expert' advice,
although occasionally this is a factor, but support."2' 6 Conversely, the decision
will not be viable unless the agency can show the support of the key parties
that will be affected; participation is an effective means of securing key party
support, and may also dampen criticism from those within the sector
represented on the committee."' In addition, government decisionmakers may
feel the need to report to the public on a particular matter, but are unwilling
or unable to commit the agency resources to an investigation.2' Any action
that the advisory committee might call for would not be immediate, and would
possibly involve seeking legislation or other authority.
Finally, presidential advisory committees may serve purely political ends,
as vehicles for communicating with Congress and the people, building support
for proposals, or masking the government's unwillingness to act. The
appointment of an advisory committee may help the government convey
dangerous or unpopular views to the public.2 9 The advisory committee
educates and talks to the public, not only providing advice to the government,
but also deflecting any criticism from the government. The responsibility
for making a decision is transferred to the advisory committee, and the
committee's advice is then adopted wholesale by the President or by
Congress. 31 The creation of a committee, like hearings held before Congress,
may also help the government give the public the impression that something
is being done, while it avoids having to take action. Thus, the appointment of
a committee buys the decisionmaker time and defuses a politically troublesome
matter by deferring it until it fades from the public's memory or more
immediate concerns subsume it.
32
In both their informational and political uses, advisor), committees perform
many of the same functions as congressional committees." They serve as
"special sources of information" that "amplify in their field of study the regular
supply of information to the President, which comes to him in his combined
Committees, SOC. SCI. Q., Mar. 1984. at 100, 101.
On advisory committee dynamics. see generally SOCIOLOGY AND PUBLIC POLICY TIlE CASE OF
PRESIDENITIAL COMMISSIONS (Mirra Komarovsky ed.. 1975) (describing and evaluating case studies of four
presidential commissions).
26. HAROLD SEIDMAN, POLITICS. POS MON. AND POWER: TtiE DYNAMICS OF FEDERAL ORGANrATIO%
239 (1970); see also Lyman Bryson. Notes on a TheorY of Advice. 66 POL SCl. Q. 321. 323 (1951)
27. Cf. Raymond Streat, Governiment Consultation ith Industry. 37 Pl.' ADMIN I. I (1959)
28. See DAVID FLITNER, JR.. THE POLITICS OF PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSIONS 23-28 (1986); WOLANIN.
supra note 16, at 15-20 (referring to function of these committmees as -'window dressing").
29. See POPPER, supra note 24, at 10-11; Specter. supra note 22. at 28.
30. See Mark P. Petracca. Federal AdvisorY Committees. Interest Groups, and the Administrative State.
13 CONGRESS & PRES. 83, 84-85 (1986); see also Nancy K. Smith. Presidential Task Force Operation
During the Johnson Administration, 15 PRES. STUD. Q. 320. 320-21 (1985).
3 1. See Natalie Hanlon, Military Base Closings: A Study of Government Bs- Commission. 62 U COLO
L. REV. 331, 331 (1991).
32. MARCY, supra note 16, at 43-44; WOLANIN. supra note 16. at 23-24. see also DeParle. supra note
24, at 43 (citing examples from Truman and Johnson Administrations)
33. CONG. GLOBE, 27th Cong., 2d Sess. app. at 370 (1842) (statement of Rep Wisc)
19941
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roles as Chief Executive, Commander-in-Chief[,] ... constitutional participant
in the legislative process, leader of his party, and prominent public leader."34
B. A History of Regulation of Presidential Advisory Committees
Advisory committees are not a uniquely twentieth-century 5 or American
phenomenon.36 Theodore Roosevelt, who advocated the use of commissions
as "the marriage of the new scientific principles of management and
conservation," 3  is generally considered to be the father of the modern
presidential advisory commission.38 Herbert Hoover extolled commissions as
a means of "mak[ing] the fullest use of the best brains and the best judgment
and the best leadership in our country,"39 and both Woodrow Wilson and
34. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, TEMPORARY PRESIDENTIAL ADVISORY COMMISSIONS 3
(1952) [hereinafter TEMPORARY PRESIDENTIAL ADVISORY COMMISSIONS].
35. The first use of a presidential advisory committee appears to be the commission sent by President
Washington to negotiate peace with the leaders of the Whiskey Rebellion. See, e.g., FLITNER, supra note
28, at 7-8; CONG. GLOBE, 27th Cong., 2d Sess. 482 (1842) (statement of Rep. Cushing). But see WOLANIN,
supra note 16, at 5 (arguing that group sent to end Whiskey Rebellion "bears only a slight resemblance
to presidential advisory commissions appointed to analyze broad questions of public policy"). On August
7, 1794, Washington sent Attorney General William Bradford, U.S. Senator James Ross, and Pennsylvania
Supreme Court Justice Jasper Yeates to negotiate with the insurgents. "The commissioners were empowered
to grant an amnesty for all past criminal behavior in return for assurances that 'the laws be no longer
obstructed in their execution .... .- THOMAS P. SLAUGHTER, THE WHISKEY REBELLION: FRONTIER
EPILOGUE TO THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 196 (1986). The peace commission reported to a committee of
Pennsylvanians that it had the power to promise that the President would not pursue charges of treason,
would issue a general pardon, and would allow state courts to handle suits based on the revenue laws. As
to the last condition, "it is to be understood, that of this [the President] must be the judge, and that he does
not mean by this determination to impair any power vested in the Executive of the United States." H.M.
BRACKENRIDGE, HISTORY OF THE WESTERN INSURRECTION 203 (Pittsburgh, W.S. Haven 1859). The
commissioners submitted a report to the President on September 24, 1794, suggesting that military force
would be necessary. 6 THE DIARIES OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 175-76 (Donald Jackson & Dorothy "lvohig
eds., 1976). After the Whiskey Rebellion, Congress moved quickly to ratify expenditures for the
negotiations, for which no appropriations had been made. Abraham D. Sofaer, The Presidency, War and
Foreign Affairs: Practice Under the Framers, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1976, at 12, 16.
36. See Streat, supra note 27, at I (commenting on extensive British experience with advisory
commissions); see also John A. Fairlie, Advisory Committees in British Administration. 20 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 812 (1926); Fritz M. Marx, Commissions ofInquiry in Germany, 30 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 1134 (1936);
W. Harrison Moore, Executive Commissions of Inquiry, 13 COLUM. L. REV. 500 (1913).
37. Mark Greenberg & Rachel Flick, The New Bipartisan Commissions, J. CONTEMP. STUD., Fall 1983,
at 3, 7. In 1923, the President of the American Political Science Association spoke glowingly of advisory
commissions as a "neglected ... opportunit[y][,] ... the possibilities of which have not been clearly
perceived." Harry A. Garfield, Recent Political Developments: Progress or Change?, 18 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 1, 2 (1924).
38. WOLANIN, supra note 16, at 5. The term "presidential advisory committee," as I will use it,
includes advisory committees that either report to the President or report to a close presidential adviser on
a matter of immediate concern to the President. The term thus encompasses advisory committees established
or authorized by Congress and those created or recognized by the President under his own authority. See
supra notes 16-20 and accompanying text. I mainly focus on those created under the President's own
authority, although I will discuss the constitutional status of those advisory committees that Congress
establishes directly or authorizes the President to establish in order to advise him. See infra notes 248-59
and accompanying text. While this latter group may include advisory committees that report to the
President, the initiative for their creation or use by the President lies with Congress. See also TEMPORARY
PRESIDENTIAL ADVISORY COMMISSIONS, supra note 34, at 1-2.
39. President's Address to the Gridiron Club, 1929 PUB. PAPERS 472 (Dec. 14, 1929).
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Franklin Roosevelt made extensive wartime use of industry advisory
committees as a corporate-government partnership.' ° Many of Roosevelt's
committees survived the end of World War II, and their continued existence
led, quite directly, to the passage of FACA.
In the post-World War II period, presidents increasingly have consulted
advisory committees on everything from dam construction, to education policy,
to health care, to airline industry reform, to sports policy. Presidents have
charged advisory committees with conducting investigations, making
recommendations in anticipation of future legislation, and advising on the
discharge of specific responsibilities.
1. The Act of 1842 and Early Appointments of Presidential
Advisory Committees
Cataloguing presidential advisory committees is almost impossible. No
systematic study of early presidential advisory committees has been conducted.
Henry Clay declared in 1842 that presidential advisory committees had clearly
"grown into use long since in the Executive Department" and "no doubt in this
instance mere precedent had been followed."' It was not until 1842 that
Congress attempted to control the practice.
In 1841 President John Tyler appointed three private citizens to investigate
allegations of corruption at the customshouse in New York. The Secretary of
the Treasury advised the commissioners:
The President considers it his duty, under and by virtue of the
provision of the Constitution which requires him to see that the laws
be faithfully executed, to inquire into and ascertain the best means
within his power of correcting the evils which have been found to
exist in this branch of the Executive administration ....
For this purpose he has appointed you a commission of
examination and inquiry .... ."
40. See Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-421, 56 Stat. 23 (1942) (mandating
government consultation with industry advisory committees); Army Appropriation Act. Pub. L No. 64-242.
39 Stat. 649 (1916) (creating Council of National Defense and its advisory commission); Cumce N.
Hitchcock, The War Industries Board: Its Development. Organization. and Functions. 26 J. POL Ecos.
545, 548-49 (1918).
The National Industrial Recovery Act, Pub. L. No. 73-67. §§ 2-3. 48 Stat. 195. 195-96 (1933).
authorized the President to approve industry codes of competition. The petroleum and poultry industies
established industry advisory committees to recommend codes to the President. The Supreme Court struck
down those provisions in Schechter Poultry Co. v. United States. 295 U.S. 495 (1935). and Panama
Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
41. CONG. GLOBE, 27th Cong., 2d Sess. 231 (1842).
42. Id. at 475 (quoting Letter from T. Ewing, Secretary of Treasury. to George Poindexter and Alfred
Kelley (May 10, 1841)). For background on the general corruption at the customshouse. see LEONARD D
WHITE, THE JACKSONIANS: A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY. 1829-1861. at 424-30 (1954)
1994]
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On February 7, 1842, the House of Representatives adopted a resolution
requesting that the President explain "under what authority" he had created the
commission, how much money the commission received, and "out of what
fund" the commission would be paid. 3 The President answered the question
about authority, but avoided the more difficult question of funding:
I have to state that the authority for instituting the commission ... is
the authority vested in the President of the United States "to take care
that the laws be faithfully executed; and to give to Congress from
time to time information on the state of the Union; and to recommend
to their consideration such measures as he shall judge necessary and
expedient."
The Representatives' views of presidential authority are noteworthy. Under
one view, the President had to receive an affirmative grant of power from
Congress in order to make the appointments; the "Take Care" Clause operated
on express legislative enactments. 5 On the other hand, Representative
Cushing argued that the President's "Take Care" power was an independent
grant of authority and implied the power necessary to its execution:
The clause requiring the President to see to the execution of the laws,
and to give information to Congress of the state of the Union, was
imperative on the President, and constituted an obligation, by the
omission of which he violated the Constitution and his oath of office,
and was liable for impeachment; and if the Constitution or laws did
not set forth the manner in which a duty was to be performed, it was
for the President to decide upon it.
46
43. CONG. GLOBE, 27th Cong., 2d Sess. 214 (1842). Although the House questioned the President's
appointment power and his authority to pay the expenses of the commission out of funds appropriated for
other purposes, its underlying concern was that the commission's report on corruption at the customshouse
would implicate prominent New Englanders and fuel the antiprotection tariff movement, to the benefit of
the Southern states. See, e.g., id. at 482 (statement of Rep. Cushing); id. (statement of Rep. Underwood).
Congress evidently knew of the commission at the time of its creation, but did not object. Id. at 476
(statement of Rep. Proffit). One of the House's concerns was the cost of printing the report, which by one
account was 400 pages long. Id. at 456 (statement of Rep. Cushing); id. at 460-61 (statement of Rep.
Adams); id. at 477 (statement of Rep. Stanly); id. app. at 371 (statement of Rep. Wise); see also H.R. REP.
No. 669, 27th Cong., 2d Sess. (1842) (reprinting report of George Poindexter); H.R. DOC. No. 212, 27th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1842) (reprinting report of Alfred Kelley and William Steuart); H.R. Doc. No. 213, 27th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1842); H.R. Doc. No. 230, 27th Cong., 2d Sess. (1842).
44. CONG. GLOBE, 27th Cong., 2d Sess. 229 (1842) (quoting Letter from President John "Pyler to
House of Representatives (Feb. 9, 1842) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3)).
45. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 27th Cong., 2d Sess. 477 (statement of Rep. Stanly); id. at 483 (statement
of Rep. Everett).
46. Id. at 482 (statement of Rep. Cushing); see also id. app. at 370 (statement of Rep. Wise)
(defending practice as necessary to President's power to recommend legislation); id. at 475, 481-82
(statements of Reps. Johnson, Cushing, and Adams) (reciting examples of arguably unauthorized
appointments of presidential agents during terms of Washington, Jefferson, Madison, Monroe, Jackson, Van
Buren, and Harrison).
[Vol. 104:51
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Congress ultimately responded only to the matter of the President's
authority to pay the commission. In August 1842 Congress forbade the
President to "pay any account or charge whatever, growing out of, or in any
way connected with, any commission or inquiry, except courts-martial or
courts of inquiry in the military or naval service" unless Congress had made
"special appropriations ... by law to pay such accounts and charges. " "
The Attorney General concluded that the Act of August 26, 1842, could
not constrain the President's power to appoint investigatory commissioners
since that power "result[ed] from the obligation of the executive department
of the government 'to take care that the laws be faithfully executed.' "
Congress had, however, "indirectly limit[ed] the exercise of this power by
refusing appropriations to sustain it ... thus paralyz[ing] a function which it
is not competent to destroy."' 9 There was no formal resolution of the debate.
2. The Tawney Amendment and the Coming of Age of Presidential
Advisor, Conunittees
On January 19, 1909, President Roosevelt created a Council of Fine Arts
by executive order, and directed that future plans for federal buildings,
grounds, and statuaries "be submitted to the Council ... and [that] their advice
[be] followed. '50 At the same time, Roosevelt wrote to a representative of the
American Institute of Architects recommending that the Institute "secure the
enactment of a law giving permanent effect to what I am directing to be done.
The course you advocate, and which I approve, should not be permissive with
the executive; it should be made mandatory upon him by act of Congress."'"
47. Act of August 26, 1842, ch. 202. § 25. 5 Stat. 533.
Congress may also have had in mind an incident occurmng in 1839. In that year the Postmaster
General sent George Plitt to Europe as a special agent of the Post Office to collect information on mail
arrangements. OFFICES CREATED WITHOUT AUTHORITY OF LAw. H.R. REP. No, 487, 27th Cong. 2d Sess
5 (1842). His report was printed by the Senate in 1841. S. Doc. No. 156. 26th Cong.. 2d Sess 18.4 1) The
following year the House of Representatives adopted a resolution requesting the Postmaster "to inform the
Committee on Public Expenditures by what authority George Plitt was sent to Europe what was the
amount paid to said Plitt, and out of what fund the payment was made." OFFICES CREATED Wmiot-r
AUTHORITY OF LAw, supra, at 1. The Postmaster responded that he presumed that his predecessor had
appointed Plitt under the general authority of the laws creating the Post Office. Id. The committee reported
that it remained "at a loss to perceive ... any authority conferred on the Postmaster General If [hel
has the power to send one agent to travel through Europe. he may send twenty or fifty hi- at 4-5 The
Committee concluded, "if abuses of this character are suffered to pass uncorrected, that thousands of dollars
must be wasted, and the power of Executive officers fearfully increased " Id. at 5.
48. 4 Op. Att'y Gen. 248 (1843). The Attorney General advised departments that the, could designate
agents or commissioners, but any compensation would have to come from Congress. See 4 Op Att'y Gen
106, 106-07 (1842). In a subsequent opinion, the Attorney General evidently changed his views, he advised
the Secretary of the Interior that the Act worked an implied repeal of the Secretary's statutory poswer to
appoint such agents. 5 Op. Att'y Gen. 378 (185 1).
49. 4 Op. Att'y Gen. 248 (1843).
50. Exec. Order No. 1010 (Jan. 19. 1909). reprinted in PRESIDEnTIAL EXECLTIVE ORDERS. JtL E 26.
1845-JUNE 26, 1936 (1980).
51. 43 CONG. REC. 2918 (1909) (quoting Letter from President Theodore Rooseselt to Glenn Browsn
(Jan. 19, 1909)).
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Congress reacted swiftly, but not as Roosevelt had suggested. Instead, the
House introduced an amendment to the Sundry Civil Appropriations Bill that
would have prohibited appropriations to "members of the so-called Council of
Fine Arts," because "such a body should be created by the legislative body and
not by the executive., 52 On February 25, Representative Tawney, Chairman
of the House Appropriations Committee, introduced a much broader
amendment forbidding the use of appropriated funds for the "compensation or
expenses of any commission, council, or board" unless Congress had
authorized its creation. 3 Tawney referred to the "great number of
commissions ... working under authority for the executive department
alone. 54 When Representative Parsons pointed out that council members
served without pay and argued that the government ought to take advantage of
their voluntary services,55 Tawney reminded him that the law already
prohibited government officials from "the acceptance of voluntary service, 56
and that the real effect of the amendment was to prohibit the use of
government employees in support of voluntary committees:
The voluntary commissions gather a lot of general data all over
the United States which is absolutely valueless in the form in which
it is obtained, and then it is dumped into the department, and the time
of the employees is used for the purpose of working out in detail and
tabulating and classifying the information and data that is thus
52. Id. at 2918-19 (statement of Rep. Fitzgerald). Representative Tawney questioned whether the real
objection to the Council was that it served in more than an advisory capacity. Id. at 2919-20 (statement
of Rep. Tawney). No one picked up on Tawney's point.
53. Id. at 3119; see also REPORT OF THE COUNTRY LIFE COMMISSION, S. Doc. No. 705, 60th Cong.,
2d Sess. 7 (1909); COMMISSION ON COUNTRY LIFE, S. Doc. NO. 734, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1909)
(discussing President's request for $25,000 appropriation). Congress refused to appropriate the money, and
the report was published by the Spokane, Washington, Chamber of Commerce. THEODORE ROOSEVELT,
THEODORE ROOSEVELT: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 430-32 (1913).
54. 43 CONG. REC. 3119 (1909). The Tawney Amendment may have been motivated by the creation
of the Keep Commission, see Harvey C. Mansfield, Reorganizing the Federal Executive Branch: The Limits
ofInstitutionalization, in THE INSTITUTIONALIZED PRESIDENCY 35, 61-63 (Norman C. Thomas & Hans W.
Baade eds., 1972), the Country Life Commission, see FLITNER, supra note 28, at 13, and the Council on
Fine Arts, see Norman N. Gill, Permanent Advisory Committees in the Federal Government, 2 J. POL. 411,
417 n.9 (1940). In subsequent debates in the Senate, Senator Aldrich attributed the Tawney Amendment
to commissions, such as the Inland Waterways Commission, which were made up in whole or in part of
non-executive branch personnel. 45 CONG. REC. 2493 (1910).
55. 43 CONG. REC. 3119-20 (1909). Roosevelt also created, inter alia, the Inland waterways
Commission, the National Conservation Commission, the Country Life Commission, and the Commission
on Public Lands. Service on these commissions was voluntary, "but much of their personnel was made up
of regular government employees." MARCY, supra note 16, at 18. Roosevelt requested $25,000 for
compensation of nongovernmental personnel working on the Keep Commission, but ultimately received
only $5000. The Commission's principals were salaried government employees, although they performed
their work on their own time, without additional compensation. Id. at 19, 79; Oscar Kraines, The President
Versus Congress: The Keep Commission, 1905-1909, First Comprehensive Presidential Inquiry into
Administration, 23 W. POL. Q. 5. 51 (1970). See generally Harold T. Pinkett, The Keep Commission.
1905-1909: A Rooseveltian Effort for Administrative Reform. 52 J. AM. HIST. 297 (1965).
56. 43 CONG. REC. 3120 (1909). Tawney was referring to the Anti-Deficiency Act, ch. 1484, 33 Stat.
1214, 1257 (1905) (current version at 31 U.S.C. §§ 1341-42 (1988)); see Kate Stith, Congress' Power of
the Purse, 97 YALE LJ. 1343, 1370-73 (1988).
[Vol. 104: 51
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obtained, and imposes upon the department and upon the clerks an
extra burden.57
The "Tawney Amendment" was enacted with the Sundry Civil
Appropriations Act on the last day of Roosevelt's term.58 Roosevelt signed
the bill, but in his own mind the provision was unenforceable: "Congress
cannot prevent the President from seeking advice. Any future President can do
as I have done, and ask disinterested men who desire to serve the people to
give this service free to the people through these commissions."" In the view
of the Attorney General, the Tawney Amendment affected only "commissions
or boards constituted without authority of law,"O but the Attorney General
did not comment on the question raised during the Tyler Administration: Is a
commission or board appointed under the President's own constitutional
authority "constituted by authority of law"?
President William Howard Taft succeeded Roosevelt in 1910 and, against
the background of the Tawney Amendment, secured funding for what would
become the Taft Commission on Economy and Efficiency, to propose changes
in the administration of the executive branch.6' Once again, the question of
the President's authority to appoint and finance such commissions arose. On
the question of appointment, the Senate was divided as to whether the
President possessed authority under the Recommendation Clause62 or the
Opinions Clause63 to appoint a commission on government efficiency, even
57. 43 CONG. REC. 3120 (1909).
58. Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 299. § 9. 5 Stat. 1027 (current version at 31 U.S C § 1346 (1988)). It
provides, in part:
Public money and appropriations are not available to pay--(A) the pay or expenses of a
commission, council, board, or similar group... ; (B) expenses related to the work or the
results of work or action of that group; or (C) for the detail or cost of personal services of an
officer or employee from an executive agency in connection with that group
31 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1) (1988). This section does not apply, however, to "commissions, councils, boards.
or similar groups authorized by law." Id. § 1346(c)(I). The Office of Legal Counsel has cited a related
provision, 31 U.S.C. § 1347, as evidence that the President has limited authority to create executive
agencies. See Limitations on Presidential Power to Create a New Executive Branch Entity to Receive and
Administer Funds Under Foreign Aid Legislation, 9 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 76. 78 n. 1(1985) Ihereinafter
Limitations on Presidential Power).
59. ROOSEVELT, supra note 53, at 431 (quoting portion of his memorandum to Congress)
60. 27 Op. Att'y Gen. 300 (1909); see 27 Op. Att'y Gen. 406. 407 (1909). The Attorney General
subsequently concluded that the Tawney Amendment did not reach advisory panels appointed to advise the
Secretary of Agriculture in the enforcement of the Food and Drugs Act. interagency committees, or boards
previously authorized. See 27 Op. Att'y Gen. 300 (1909): 27 Op. Att'y Gen. 308 (1909). 27 Op. Att'y Gen
406 (1909). The "binding effect" of the Tawney Amendment "was largely avoided by the sensible ruling
that the authorization need not be explicit." Arthur W. Macmahon. Responsibility and Representativeness
in Advisory Relations, in PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND DEIMOCRACY 185. 203 (Roscoe C. Martin ed.
1965).
61. See Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 384.36 Stat. 703: see also Kmines. supra note 55. at 43. Mansfield.
supra note 54, at 49-52.
62. U.S. CONST. art. 11. § 3. cl. I ("He shall from time to time give to the Congress Information of
the State of the Union, and recommend to their Consideration such Measures as he shall judge necessary
and expedient ....").
63. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. cl. I ("The President ... may require the Opinion. in writing. of the
principal Officer in each of the executive Departments. upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their
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a commission composed entirely of executive branch employees.' But the
senators agreed that even if the President had the power to appoint
commissions without express authorization, he lacked the authority to pay for
such commissions.65
By contrast, the House was not concerned with the President's appointment
power (a matter of special concern to the Senate), but rather with the
President's authority to fund a commission in the absence of appropriations,
a matter over which it had original jurisdiction. Members of the House went
so far as to reject an argument of necessity, contending that without proper
appropriations, the President could not even carry out his duties as Commander
in Chief.66
Congress ultimately appropriated $100,000 "[t]o enable the President, by
the employment of accountants and experts from official and private life" to
"inquire into the methods of transacting the public business of the
respective Office .... ").
64. See 45 CONG. REC. 2161-63 (1910) (statements of Sens. Money, Beveridge, and Newlands); id.
at 2492 (statement of Sen. Root).
65. As Senator Newlands noted:
Some may think that Mr. Roosevelt was a little too active in appointing commissions for the
purpose of inquiring into various matters relating to economics and sociology, but undoubtedly
he had the power to do it. The only power that he lacked was to pay for such services out of
the National Treasury. That power he could not exercise without the sanction of Congress,
Id. at 2491; see also id. at 2493 (statements of Sens. Newlands and Aldrich).
In 1930 the House passed a joint resolution providing for a commission to study U.S. policies in
Haiti. The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations was in favor of such a commission, but reported the
resolution out of committee with a recommendation to strike the language authorizing appointment of the
commission:
MR. BORAH. The committee was unanimously of the opinion that the President had
authority to appoint the commission without the authority coming from the Congress. We
therefore concluded to authorize the appropriation necessary to cover the expenses of the
commission.
MR. McKELLAR .... [I]s it the opinion of the committee that the President has a right
to appoint any commission he sees fit to appoint, just so the money is authorized? Has he the
unlimited right to appoint commissions without the Constitution giving him the power to do so?
MR. BORAH. I think he has a right to appoint a commission or an agent to make any
investigation he desires to have made .... That has been the practice.
MR. McKELLAR. It has been done, but I doubt both the wisdom and the right to do it.
MR. BORAH. The wisdom is one thing, but I have no doubt about the President's right
or authority to appoint agents to gather information or assist him in the study of conditions.
MR. McKELLAR. What is the use of Congress establishing executive offices, then? Why
should we take the trouble to legislate to establish executive offices, if the President has the
right to constitute as many officials as he desires, and in such form, either commission form or
any other form, as he desires?
MR. BLAINE .... I have no doubt but that the President can appoint a commission. He
can appoint an agent to make any investigation he desires to have made. The thing that brings
into power, into action, that commission or that agent is the wherewithal with which to operate.
Of course, the President can appoint an agent, who may navigate the globe at the expense of
the President or at the expense of his agent. Congress cannot object. But it does not follow that
Congress should make an appropriation every time the President wants to appoint an agent or
a commission to tell him what he ought to do.
72 CONG. REc. 2137-38 (1930); see also 69 CONG. REc. 1769-82 (1928) (discussing extensively the
President's authority to appoint and fund commission on sinking of submarine S-4).
66. See 45 CONG. REC. 6752 (1910) (statement of Rep. Fitzgerald).
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Government" for the purpose of "recommend[ing] to Congress what changes
in law may be necessary."6 7 Conspicuously absent was any reference to a
commission or to the President's authority to appoint persons from "official
and private life." In effect, Congress ceded to the President the authority to
appoint the members of a presidential commission. The pattern was set.'
When Franklin Roosevelt appointed his Committee on Administrative
Management in 1936, he informed Congress by means of a letter to the Vice
President and the Speaker of the House. Congress appropriated funds without
imposing any other conditions, except to demand a copy of the report.'
3. The Russell Amendment and the Financing of Presidential
Advisory Committees
In 1944 Congress added yet another spending restriction. President
Roosevelt, largely as part of the war effort, had created a number of agencies
by executive order.70 As part of the Independent Offices Appropriation
Act,7' Congress adopted the "Russell Amendment," which provided that "no
part of any appropriation or fund ... shall be allotted or made available to, or
used to pay the expenses of, any agency or instrumentality including those
established by Executive order" beyond one year after its creation.7 ! The
provision's author, Senator Russell, argued that the provision was necessary
"to retain in the Congress the power of legislating and creating bureaus and
departments of the Government. '73 At the time, Congress, in consultation
with the Comptroller General, confessed that it did not know how far the
Russell Amendment extended, and although the listing did not include advisory
67. Act of June 25, 1910. ch. 384, 36 Stat. 703.
68. Succeeding presidents invoked similar defenses for the use of commissions as ncce r, to the
execution of other constitutional powers. As Calvin Coolidge put it:
The use of fact-finding commissions is again being cnticized Sonic people arc born sith
a complete set of ready-made opinions. Facts do not affect them. But no excutise. fromn firm
selectman to President, can know everything necessary to discharge his office or be able to
learn it from official sources. He must call on some body which can gather the information
Public duty requires it.
Quoted in FLITNER, supra note 28, at 9 (citations omitted).
Hoover justified his appointments because "[bly the Constitution [the Pr-sidentl must recommend to
Congress such measures as he shall deem necessary and expedient, and he is required to linally pass upon
every act of Congress." This required, he said. the "fullest use of the best brains and best judgment and
the best leadership in our country ... [in) cooperation with voluntary organizations " President's Address.
to the Gridiron Club, supra note 39, at 472 (Dec. 14. 1929); see also Gallowa), supra note 10, at 356
(noting that Hoover used commissions because he was reluctant to "'inform Congress on the state of the
Union without careful prior study of the pertinent facts")
69. Act of June 22, 1936. ch. 689, 49 Stat. 1600.
70. See 90 CONG. REC. 5184-85 (1944) (listing agencies), see also WOt.Ad.%. supra note 16. at 66
71. Independent Offices Appropriation Act of 1945. ch. 286. 58 Stat. 361 (1944) Icurrent %erston at
31 U.S.C. § 1347 (1988)).
72. Id. at 387.
73. 90 CONG. REC. 3059 (1944); see also id. at 3060--61. 3063. The legislation uas aimed at the Fair
Employment Practice Committee.
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committees, the amendment was certainly broad enough to cover presidential
advisory committees.74
The Russell Amendment, like the Tawney Amendment and the Act of
1842, was a spending restriction. Once again Congress did not challenge
directly the President's authority to appoint nonstatutory commissions, only to
finance such commissions once appointed. The Russell Amendment, like the
other acts, remains a part of the U.S. Code, but none of its provisions has ever
been judicially invoked.75 Whether or not Theodore Roosevelt surmised
correctly that such provisions were unenforceable, the fact remains that they
have never been enforced.
Even so, there is reason to believe that these restrictions have forced
presidents funding advisory committees created on their own initiative to go
through Congress, to use their own discretionary funds, 76 or to seek outside
funding.77 Since the passage of these acts, Congress has generally been
74. Id. at 5184-85 (reprinting Letter from Comptroller General Lindsay C. Warren to Rep. James M.
Fitzpatrick (May 31, 1944)); see also id. at 3059 (remarks of Sen. Russell). Senator Russell was apparently
concerned that nonstatutory commissions such as the Committee on Fair Employment Practice had
operational functions-that is, the "power to issue orders affecting the lives and business of the American
people." Id.
75. See Advisory Committees-Application of the Russell Amendment, 3 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 263
(1979).
76. The principal sources available to the President are the Emergency Fund and the Special Projects
Fund, 3 U.S.C. § 108(a) (1988), which have proven useful when Congress was reluctant to fund the
President's advisory committees. See TEMPORARY PRESIDENTIAL ADVISORY COMMISSIONS, supra note 34,
at 18; WOLANIN, supra note 16, at 67-68 & nn.54, 55; Alan L. Dean, Ad Hoc Commissions for Policy
Formation?, in THE PRESIDENTIAL ADVISORY SYSTEM 101, 108-09 (Thomas E. Cronin & Sanford D.
Greenberg eds., 1969).
President Roosevelt, for instance, funded the Roberts Commission investigation into the attack on
Pearl Harbor from the Emergency Fund for the President. "Had this money not been available, it is
conceivable that the President might have had to designate the investigation as a 'relief project,' rely upon
a court of inquiry, stretch the words of some other appropriation act[,] ... ask Congress for a special
authorization, or give up the idea of a presidential investigation." MARCY, supra note 16, at 92 (footnote
omitted).
77. There is a lengthy executive practice of establishing advisory committees and then funding them
partially or entirely through private funding. See MARCY, supra note 16, at 18; TEMPORARY PRESIDENTIAL
ADVISORY COMMISSIONS, supra note 34, at 16; Dean, supra note 76, at 108. For example, of the 20
committees created by President Hoover, 13 cost the government nothing or "virtually nothing." The
expenses of three commissions-the White House Conference on Child Health and Protection, the White
House Conference on Home Building and Ownership, and the Advisory Committee on Illiteracy-were paid
by private contributors. White House Statement on Committees and Commissions, 1932-1933 Pun. PAPERS
173-78 (Apr. 24, 1932); see also MARCY, supra note 16, at 75-76; Galloway, supra note 10, at 359.
President Truman's Hoover Commission was at least partially supported by private funds. The
Commission's far-reaching recommendations on reorganization of the executive branch were well received,
and a "Citizens' Committee" was formed, using private funds, to promote those recommendations. Dean,
supra note 76, at 108; Mansfield, supra note 54, at 55-56. Of the Commission's 277 proposals, "the
Citizens' Committee was able to count over 100 of these targets, little ones and big ones together, as battle
trophies." Id. at 56.
Postwar presidents have also looked to private funding. President Eisenhower's National Commission
on Goals, established in 1960, was apparently funded entirely from foundation grants. WOLANIN, supra note
16, at 70 & n.69. The National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (the Kerner Commission) and the
National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, both established during the Johnson
Administration, were partially supported by private funds. Id. at 267 n.70. Finally, President Reagan's
Private Sector Survey on Cost Control was funded by the Department of Commerce, but its staff had to
be paid from private funding. Exec. Order No. 12,369, § 3(e), 3 C.F.R. 190 (Comp. 1983); see also
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inclined to fund presidential commissions. But even when Congress has not
been so disposed, "a determined chief executive can usually find the means of
supporting any commission that he feels to be needed.""'T Additionally,
presidents have encouraged private entities to establish and fund private
advisory bodies as a means of avoiding congressional scrutiny.7" Although
information on advisory committees established outside the government is
difficult to find, and incomplete and anecdotal even when found, the executive
branch has used a number of nongovernmental advisory committees and has
even encouraged their creation.80
National Anti-Hunger Coalition v. Executive Comm. of the President's Private Sector Survey on Cost
Control, 557 F. Supp. 524 (D.D.C.). aff'd. 711 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.). amended. 566 F. Supp 1515 (DD C
1983).
78. Dean, supra note 76, at 109. But see WOLANIN. supra note 16. at 68 (noting that President Truman
created no advisory committees during 1948 or 1949. when Congress had cut his emergency funds)
79. Particularly noteworthy among these are the Business Advisory Council (BAC) and the Adsisory
Council on Federal Reports (ACFR). The influential BAC was established in 1933 in cooperation with the
Department of Commerce. See ANTITRUST SUBCOMM. OF THE COMM. ON TIlE JUDICIARY. 84"1i CONG.
1ST SESS., REPORT ON THE BUSINESS ADVISORY COUNCIL 7. II. 27-33 (Comm. Print 1955) [hereinafter
ANTITRUST SUBCOMM.]; Kim McQuaid, The Business Advisory Council of the Department of Commerce.
1933-1961: A Study in Corporate/Government Relations. I RES. ECON HIST 171 (1976). Hobart Rowcn.
America's Most Private Club. HARPER'S. Sept. 1960. reprinted it US Govt lnformation Policies and
Practices-Public Access to Information Front E.recutitve Branch Advisory Groups (Pt. 9). Hearings Before
a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Gov't Operations. 92d Cong.. 2d Sess 3729. 3744 (1972) [hereinafter
U.S. Gov't Information Policies Hearings]. The BAC was terminated on December 4. 1972. shortly after
passage of FACA. See ENCYCLOPEDIA OF GOVERNME.N-TAL ADVISORY ORGANIZATIONs 37 (Linda E.
Sullivan & Anthony T. Kruzas eds., 1975). It severed its official ties with the Department of Commerce
in 1961 in order to avoid Executive Order No. 11.007. 3 C.FR. 182 (Supp. 1962) See Advisory
Committees: Oversight Hearings Before the Subcomin. on Budgeting. Management. und E.tpendatures of
the Senate Comm. on Gov't Operations, 93d Cong.. I st Sess. 83 (1974) thereinafter Adisors Committees
Hearings on Budgeting) (statement of William H. Rodgen.. Jr).
Similarly, the ACFR was organized in 1942 at the request of the Bureau of the Budget to ad~ssc it
on simplifying government reporting and statistical programs. Private business organization% and trade
associations organized, financed, and appointed members to the Council. Advisorv Committees Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Intergovernmental Relations of the Senate Comm. on Go% 't Operations. 91st
Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 36-47 (1970) (Letter from Advisory Council Chairman Charles Stessart to Sen
Edmund Muskie (Oct. 22, 1970)) [hereinafter Advtsorv Committees- Hearings Before Intergovernmental
Relationsl; THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL WASTES INVEN'ORY. H R REP No 1717.
91st Cong., 2d Sess. 19-20 (1970); see also E. Winslow Turner. Advisory' Committees Tihe Fifth Branch
of Government, I BUREAUCRAT 142. 146 (1972): Robert W Dietsch. The Invisible Bureaucrac%. NEw'
REPUBLIC, Feb. 20, 1971, at 19, 20.
80. Examples of nongovernmental advisory committees include the American Industries Hcalth
Council, see Michael H. Cardozo, The Federal Advisory Conmmttee Act its Operation. 33 AD%1iN L REV
1, 23-26 (1981), the Government Borrowing Committee of the American Bankers A5,sociation and the
Government Fiscal Policy Committee of the Securities Industry Association. see Petracca. supra note 30.
at 108 n.3 (advising Department of Treasury), the Illuminating Engineering Society. see Advisors
Committees: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Gov't Operations. 92d Cong.. I st Sess
24 (1971) (statement of Sen. Metcalf) (advising government agencies on lighting standards for new
buildings), the National Alliance of Businessmen. see Presidential Advisors Comnittees learings Before
a Subcomm- of the House Comm. on Gov't Operations. 91st Cong.. 2d Sea. 71 (1970) [hereinafter
PresidentialAdvisory Committees] (nonprofit organization announced by President). the National Committee
on Uniform Traffic Control Devices. see Brian C. Murphy. Implementation of the Federal Advisors
Committee Act: An Overview, 9 GOV'T PUBLICATIONS REV. 3. 7 (1982). the National Petroleum Council.
see Metcalf v. National Petroleum Council, 553 F.2d 176. 177 & n.13 (D.C Cir 1977) (although privately
funded, Department of Interior considered it an advisory committee), the President's Advisory Committee
on Political Refugees, see MARCY. supra note 16. at 75-76 (created informally by invitation of President
Roosevelt to major religious groups in order to act as liaison between government and private organizations
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4. Executive Order No. 11,007 and Postwar Presidential
Advisory Committees
The advent of World War II and the Korean conflict, and the urgency of
the war mobilization effort, brought about new cooperation between
government and industry. With the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, 81
Congress mandated government consultation with industry advisory committees
to encourage cooperation in stabilizing prices.
The consultations spawned concerns that the government was actually
fostering conditions conducive to antitrust violations.82 In the Defense
Production Act of 1950,83 for example, Congress authorized the President "to
consult with representatives of industry, business, financing, agriculture, labor,
and other interests, with a view to encouraging the making by such persons
with the approval of the President of voluntary agreements and programs" in
furtherance of the war effort.8 Additionally, the Act provided that acts or
omissions "requested by the President pursuant to a voluntary agreement or
program approved" under the Act would not constitute violations of the
antitrust laws or the Federal Trade Commission Act.85
In response to these acts, "[t]housands of industry advisory committee
meetings [were] held by the various defense agencies,"86 thus making it
"inevitable" that antitrust concerns would be raised.87 The Department of
Justice (DOJ) issued a series of letters advising Cabinet members and the
administrators of various agencies of the DOJ's concerns over the industry
advisory committees.88 The DOJ recommended that, "in order to minimize the
dealing with German refugees), the Social Science Research Council, see IVOC's and Government Advisory
Groups: Hearings Before the Antitrust Subcomm. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 84th Cong., Ist
Sess., pt. 3, at 482 (1955) (hereinafter WOC'sl (voluntarily prepared reports for Bureau of the Census), and
the U.S. Food Administration, see FEDERAL COMMISSIONS, COMMITrEES AND BOARDS, S. Doc. No, 174,
71st Cong., 2d Sess. 65 (1930) (first organized on voluntary basis and later authorized by statute and
established by executive order).
81. Pub. L. No. 77-421, 56 Stat. 23.
82. Richard 0. Levine, The Federal Advisory Committee Act, 10 HARV. J. ON LEGiS. 217, 220 (1973);
Macmahon, supra note 60, at 193-94; see also Hitchcock, supra note 40, at 553 (discussing industry
advisory boards created during World War I, suggesting that "the spirit of the Sherman Law was shattered
time after time in the interest of efficiency").
83. Pub. L. No. 81-774, 64 Stat. 798 (1950) (current version at 50 U.S.C. §§ 2061-2169 (1988)).
84. Id. § 708(a), 64 Stat. at 818.
85. Id. § 708(b), 64 Stat. at 818. The Defense Production Act now provides that, subject to certain
conditions, the Act does not "convey to any person any immunity from civil or criminal liability, or...
create defenses to actions, under the antitrust laws." 50 U.S.C. § 2158(a) (1988).
86. SUBCOMMrrEE ON STUDY OF MONOPOLY POWER OF THE COMM. ON THE JUDICARY: TtilE
MOBILIZATION PROGRAM, H.R. REP. No. 1217, 82d Cong., Ist Sess. 93 (1951) [hereinafter MOBILIZATION
PROGRAM].
87. Id. at 6. Representative Fountain subsequently alleged that individual members of certain advisory
committees had been indicted for conspiracy to fix prices. 103 CONG. REC. 11,259 (1957).
88. This was not the first time the DOJ offered such advice. In 1941 Attorney General Robert Jackson
had advised the Office of Production Management and the Office of Price Administration and Civilian
Supply that some acts being taken under the aegis of those offices, if done by private parties, would
probably violate antitrust laws. He concluded that if the committees were formed at the request of those
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possibility of violation of the antitrust laws," the departments and agencies
should observe the following rules: (1) obtain statutory authorization for
creating an advisory committee; (2) require that a full-time government official
formulate an agenda; (3) have meetings called, held, and chaired by a
government official; (4) keep records of the full minutes of each advisory
committee meeting; and (5) function purely in an advisory capacity."9
The Eighty-fourth Congress held extensive hearings on the antitrust
implications of advisory committees and the general use of "without
compensation" (or "WOC") employees in the federal government.' Congress
discussed the DOJ's informal "guidelines" for industry advisory committees
and the possibility of President Eisenhower issuing an executive order
governing the use of industry advisory committees.9' In 1957 the House
reported a bill "to provide standards for the establishment and utilization of
advisory committees," thus ensuring "minimum basic administrative
control. 92 The bill contained the same guidelines informally promulgated by
the DOJ letters of the early 1950's.93 Unlike the DOJ efforts, however, the
bill extended the guidelines from "industry advisory committees to all advisory
offices and confined themselves to a purely advisory capacity, the DOJ would not siew the actions as
violating the antitrust laws. Department of Justice Press Release (Apr 29. 1941) (releasing copies of letters
sent from Attorney General Jackson to John Lord O'Bnan and Leon Henderson). reprinted in WVOCs.
supra note 80, at 584-85.
Attorney General Francis Biddle issued quite a different statement tn 1944 He stated that the DOJ
had no objection to the formation of an advisor' committee to the State Department and the Petroleum
Administration for War, and indeed claimed that "Ithe Department of Justice has never taken the position
that consultation by any industry committee with the government violates the antitrust law % - He concluded
that "laldvisory committees representing private interests are one %aluable source of inforosation and ads icc.
but provision should be made so that any group which feels that its interests are being neglected may
present its grievances or suggestions to the Government." Department of Justice Press Release iApr 26.
1944), reprinted in WOC's, supra note 80. at 585-86; see also IVOC's. supra, at 2222-23 (discussing
advice given by Attorney General on formation of National Petroleum Council in 1946)
89. Letter from Deputy Attorney General Peyton Ford to N anous secretaries and agency administrators
(Oct. 19, 1950), reprinted in VOCs. supra note 80. at 586-87. see also WOC's. supra, at 22-2-23. id
at 587-92, 596-97, 599 (reprinting various letters from Justice Department officials repeating these
guidelines); MOBILIZATION PROGRAM. supra note 86. at 171-90 (statement of Assistant Attorney General
H.G. Morison).
90. See. e.g., WOC's, supra note 80.
91. See id. at 543-613. 2213-36 (statements of Assistant Attorney General Stanle) N Barnes. id- at
944-1035 (statement and questioning of Walter White. Executive Director of BAC and Department of
Commerce); id. at 2165 (statement of Assistant Attorney General Stanley N Barnes. indicating that
Antitrust Division was working on draft executive order on advisory groups)
92. H.R. REP. No. 576, 85th Cong., Ist Sess. I (1957) (report accompan)ing It R 7390). see also
Amendment to the Administrative Expense Act of 1946: Hearings Before a Subcomm of the House Comm.
on Gov't Operations on H.R. 3378, 85th Cong.. Ist Sess. (1957) Ihereinafter Amendment to the
Administrative Expense Act]; Levine. supra note 82. at 221; Henr), H. Pemtt. Jr. & James A Wilkinson.
Open Advisory Committees and the Political Process: The Federal Advisors Comnuttee Act After Tlho
Years, 63 GEO. L.J. 725, 731 (1975).
93. See supra text accompanying notes 88-89; H.R. 7390. 85th Cong.. Ist Scs (1957). H R R:P. No
576, supra note 92, at 5-7. A prior bill, H.R. 3378. 85th Cong.. Ist Sess. (1957). contained the DOJ
requirements almost verbatim.
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committees ... of every kind and complexion. 94 This provision occasioned
a minority report deeming the bill a
straightjacket regulation of the free exchange of ideas between
government executives and their advisers from the public at large
which would not only make the discharge of executive responsibilities
much more difficult, but would dry up one of the most important
aspects of the citizens' rights to confer with their Government.95
The Eisenhower Administration opposed the bill. The DOJ concluded that
the advisory process depended on the "integrity and good judgment" of the
executive branch and that any legislation would "straitjacket" the executive.96
The Bureau of the Budget protested that the bill failed to "permit any
differentiation between various types of advisory groups," and might be so
burdensome as "to inhibit effective use of advisory groups. 97 Meanwhile,
representatives questioned the executive's power to appoint advisory
committees on its own authority, and continued to link Congress' own
authority with the appropriations process. Members of the House suggested
that the reforms were necessary because the Tawney Amendment had become
ineffectual.98
The bill never passed the Senate. Instead, the Senate Government
Operations Committee requested that the Bureau of the Budget review the
advisory committee system and report back to the Committee. In February
1959 the Bureau issued a directive incorporating many of the requirements of
the bill, which in turn Congress had taken from the DOJ guidelines. 99
In 1962 President Kennedy issued Executive Order No. 11,007, formally
applying the DOJ guidelines to all federal agency and department advisory
94. H.R. REP. No. 576, supra note 92, at 13.
95. Id. at 14 (minority report) (quoting ANTITRUST SUBcOMM., supra note 79, at 34-35). According
to the minority, "the report ... does violence to the right of government to consult and advise with citizens
and citizen groups in private .... If a Government official asks a private citizen to submit a
recommendation or to render advice, that fact does not make the private citizen into a Government
employee ...." ANTITRUST SUBCOMM., supra note 79, at 37.
96. Amendment to the Administrative Expense Act, supra note 92, at 30 (Letter from Deputy Attorney
General William P. Rogers to Rep. William L. Dawson (Mar. 27, 1957)).
97. Id. at 31 (Letter from Budget Director Percival F. Brundage to Rep. William L. Dawson (Mar. 27.
1957)).
In a letter to the House Government Operations Committee, the Secretary of Commerce noted that
H.R. 3378 went far beyond the DOJ guidelines by applying those guidelines to nonindustry advisory
committees, where there was little or no risk of antitrust violations. Id. at 95-98 (Letter from Secretary
Sinclair Weeks to Rep. William L. Dawson (Apr. 29, 1957)).
98. Id. at 18; see also id. at 18-21 (discussing need for statutory authority to create advisory
committees); H.R. REP. No. 576, supra note 92, at 5-6 (suggesting that agencies might rely on "implied
authority" to create advisory committees); Amendment to the Administrative Expense Act, supra note 92,
at 20.
99. See Presidential Advisory Committees, supra note 80, at 29 (statement of Rep. Dante B. Fascell);
id. at 41 (statement of Comptroller General Elmer Staats); see also Levine, supra note 82, at 221; Perritt
& Wilkinson, supra note 92, at 731.
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committees.I The executive order provided "uniform standards for the
departments and agencies of the government to follow in forming and using
advisory committees in order that such committees shall function at all times
in consonance with the antitrust and conflict of interest laws."'0 ' It also
covered advisory committees "formed" by the government and any similar
group "that is not formed by a department or agency, but only during any
period when it is being utilized by a department or agency in the same manner
as a government-formed advisory committee."'i 2 Significantly, however.
Executive Order No. 11,007 did not apply to committees advising the
President; rather, the order was to provide uniform standards only for "the
departments and agencies.'
10 3
C. Passage of the Federal Advisory Conunittee Act
In the late 1960's, amid widespread claims that the executive branch had
failed to enforce Executive Order No. 11,007,'04 Congress showed renewed
interest in advisory committees. But in contrast to the concerns of the
1950's-antitrust and conflict of interest-these hearings focused on the non-
representative nature of the advisory committees, and the need to open their
proceedings and reports to the public.0 5 Congress also felt an institutional
threat from the sheer number and pervasive influence of advisory committees.
The Senate noted:
[A] system of advisory committees ... has grown up over the
years ... as a fifth arm of the Government, existing alongside the
executive, legislative, judicial and regulatory arms. There is a growing
100. Exec. Order No. 11,007. 3 C.F.R. 182 (Supp. 1962).
101. Id.
102. Id. § 2(a). The order excluded from its coverage advisory committees composed entirely of
representatives of State and local agencies or certain nonprofit organizations. Id. § 9(b) The executive order
also specially defined the term "industry advisory committee." making various distinctions in applying the
DOJ guidelines to different groups. For example, industry advisory committees were required to keep a
verbatim transcript of their proceedings while other advisory committees merely had to maintain minutes
Id. § 6(c), (d). Industry advisory committees were also required to be "'reasonably representative" of the
industry, geographical area, or product(s) the committee purported to represent Id- § 5
In 1964 the Bureau of the Budget issued a directive implementing Executive Order No 11.007
Bureau of the Budget Circular No. A-63 (Mar. 2. 1964). reprinted in CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCHl SERVICE,
95TH CONG., 2D SESS., FEDERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ACT- SouRCE BOOK. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY.
TEXTS, AND OTHER DOCUMENTS, PREPARED FOR THE SUBCOMM. ON ENERGY. NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION,
AND FEDERAL SERVICES OF THE COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS. UNITED STATES SENATE 111-15
(1978) [hereinafter SOURCE BOOK].
103. Exec. Order No. 11.007, para. 3; see Public Citizen v United States Dep't of Justice. 491 U S
440, 458 (1989).
104. See COMMITrEE ON GoV'T OPERATIONS. THE ROLE AND EFFECTIVE.NESs OF FEDERAL ADVISORY
COMNr-rEES, H.R. REP. No. 1731, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 8-10 (1970).
105. See Advisory Committees: Hearings Before the SUbcomm. on Intergovenrnental Relations of the
Senate Comm. on Govt Operations on S. 1637. S. 1964. and S. 2064. 92d Cong.. Ist Sess.. pt 1. at 1-2
(1971) [hereinafter Advisory Committees on S. 16371 (opening statement of Sen. Mettalf)
1994]
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awareness that an invitation to advise can by subtle steps confer the
power to regulate and legislate.
* * . Any delegation of [the power to make governmental
decisions] to persons or committees not invested with executive
authority is a derogation of our constitutional system."
Both the House and the Senate held extensive hearings on advisory
committees, albeit concerning different problems.'0 7 The House Special
Studies Subcommittee focused on the number of advisory committees
duplicative of committee functions and expenditures-concerns related to
federal spending for unnecessary advice. Shortly after the release of the House
Committee's report, Representative Monagan sponsored H.R. 4383, which
ultimately became the Federal Advisory Committee Act.0 8 The bill generally
tracked Executive Order No. 11,007 and the DOJ antitrust guidelines, with one
exception: It explicitly placed presidential advisory committees within the
legislation's purview.'39 The House Report on H.R. 4383 explained:
The words "any committee ... established by the President, or
established by one or more agencies" are meant to include those
committees which may have been organized before their advice was
sought by the President or any agency, but which are used by the
President or any agency in the same way as an advisory committee
formed by the President himself or the agency itself. It would be
contrary to the purpose and intent of this bill if a committee, such as
the Advisory Council on Federal Reports ... were to be exempted
from the provisions of this bill.
... A Presidential advisory committee need not be created by the
President .... If an advisory committee, however created, does render
advice to the President, the President must take the steps
prescribed ... to assure that the advice is properly evaluated." 0°
On the Senate side, the Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Relations had
conducted hearings on the imbalance in the viewpoints of the members of the
Advisory Council on Federal Reports."' A compromise bill, S. 3529, was
106. S. REP. No. 1098, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 13-14 (1972) (quoting Rep. Monagan).
107. Advisory Committees on S. 1637, supra note 105, pts. 1-3; Advisory Committees: Hearings Before
Intergovernmental Relations, supra note 79, pts. 1-3; Presidential Advisory Committees, supra note 80, pts.
1-2; H.R. REP. No. 1731, supra note 104.
108. H.R. 4383, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. § 3(2), (3) (1971), reprinted in SOUR E BOOK, supra note 102,
at 261.
109. Id.
I 10. H.R. REP. No. 1017, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 4, 5 (1972). The reference to the Advisory Council on
Federal Reports was significant because that Council was neither appointed by the President nor funded
by Congress. See supra note 79 and accompanying text. The Report itself explained that the Advisory
Council on Federal Reports was "organized by several national business organizations at the request of the
Office of Management and Budget." H.R. REP. NO. 1017, supra, at 6 (footnote omitted),
I 1. Advisory Committees: Hearings Before Intergovernmental Relations, supra note 79.
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unanimously reported by the Government Operations Committee. Like H.R.
4383, it tracked Executive Order No. 11,007 and included within its scope any
advisory or presidential advisory committee or similar group "established or
organized under any statute or by the President."" 2 The report accompanying
S. 3529 emphasized that the Senate intended to reach advisory committees,
even if they were not established or funded by the government." 3 In the
floor debates, the bill's sponsor, Senator Metcalf, faulted executive branch
attempts to regulate advisory committees for "not provid[ing] for coverage of
Presidential committees or committees not appointed by the President but
which advise him ...."
The Administration attempted to derail the legislation. The Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) had taken the position that the legislation was
unnecessary, and that the executive branch was addressing the criticisms of its
self-enforcement efforts. The OMB repeatedly promised that it would issue a
new directive." 5 Finally, following passage by the House of H.R. 4383 and
introduction of S. 3529, President Nixon issued Executive Order No. 11,671,
revoking Executive Order No. 11,007 and promulgating new rules for the
regulation of advisory committees." 6 The order maintained the distinction
between "advisory committees" and "industry advisory committees," but also
covered "presidential advisory committees." Like S. 3529 and Executive Order
No. 11,007, Executive Order No. 11,671 covered advisory committees
established by departments and agency officers, as well as committees "not
established by a department or agency, but only for such period when it is
being utilized by a department or agency in the same manner as a government-
established advisory committee.""'''
Senator Metcalf criticized the new executive order as no substitute for
"comprehensive legislation" and took the order as evidence "that as a matter
112. S. 3529, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. § 3(l) (1972). reprinted in SOURCE BOOK. supra note 102. at 173
113. The report stated:
What kind of committees would this bring into coverage under the legislation" The intention
is to interpret the words "established" and "organized" in their most liberal sense, so that when
an officer brings together a group by formal or informal means. by contract or other
arrangement, and whether or not Federal money is expended, to obtain advice and information.
such group is covered by the provisions of this bill. Examples of such groups are the Advisory
Council on Federal Reports, the National Industral Pollution Control Council. the National
Petroleum Council, advisory councils to the National Institutes of Health. and committees of
the national academies where they are utilized and officially recognized as advisory to the
President, to an agency, or to a Governmental official.
S. REP. No. 1098, supra note 106, at 8.
114. 118 CONG. REC. 30,278 (1972).
115. See H.R. REP. No. 1017, supra note I10. at 7-8.
116. Exec. Order No. 11,671, 3 C.FR. 388 (1973).
117. Id. § 1(6)(B). The executive order made other minor changes while "retainlingl the anti-trust
provisions of the earlier order." Levine. supra note 82. at 224: see U.S. Gov't Information Polictes
Hearings, supra note 79, at 3432-33 (statement of OMB Associate Director Frank Carlucci) The
Administration continued to oppose the legislation because it would "unnecessarily restict( I the President's
flexibility in what is basically a management area." Id. at 3440.
19941
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of basic policy and orderly government, a congressional mandate is required
with respect to Federal advisory committees.""'  The House and Senate
quickly agreed to compromise legislation, and in October 1972, President
Nixon signed FACA and promptly revoked Executive Order No. 11,671.119
Unlike Congresses before it, the Congress that enacted FACA did not
question its own constitutional authority to regulate presidential advisory
committees. Indeed, FACA went far beyond any prior proposals. Rather than
restricting the President's spending on advisory committees, a restriction that,
history showed, a President could circumvent, Congress pulled within its
control all advisory committees, of whatever origin or funding. Repeated
references to the privately appointed, privately funded Advisory Council on
Federal Reports showed that Congress intended to press its authority to the
limit.20 Inevitably, for the President to maintain control over his own
advisory committees, the Court would have to mediate the conflict with
Congress.
Ill. THE SUPREME COURT AND PRESIDENTIAL ADVISORY COMMITTEES:
PUBLIC CITIZEN V. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
A. FACA and the ABA's Standing Committee on the Federal Judiciary
In 1946 the American Bar Association created a Standing Committee on
the Federal Judiciary in order "to exert a direct influence on the selection of
specific persons as federal judges."' 2 The Standing Committee was to serve
an "evaluative function," offering the Bar's view of the qualifications of
persons under consideration for the U.S. Supreme Court, courts of appeals,
district courts, and the Court of International Trade. 122 Senate Republicans
saw the ABA's Standing Committee as a response to Democratic control of the
judiciary, "the perfect instrument through which [they] could attempt inroads
on the nominations."'123 Unable to block outright a nomination, "Senate
118. 118 CONG. REC. 30,278-79 (1972); see also id. at 30,280 (statement of Sen. Roth) (praising
executive order as "an important step" but claiming need for "general mandate for reform from Congress"
and regulation of presidential advisory committees); WEGMAN, supra note 23, at 147-50.
119. Exec. Order No. 11,686, 3 C.F.R. 394 (Comp. 1971-1975).
120. One issue Congress did not expressly address was whether, by enacting FACA, Congress intended
to authorize the President to create advisory committees. Section 9(a) provides that "fn]o advisory
committee shall be established unless such establishment is--(I) specifically authorized by statute or by
the President." Federal Advisory Committee Act § 9(a) (emphasis added). This section might suggest that
Congress recognized the President's inherent authority to appoint advisory committees. The question of
appointment authority was, of course, a focal point of the earlier debates. See supra notes 41-69 and
accompanying text.
121. Joel B. Grossman, The Role of the American Bar Association in the Selection of Federal Judges:
Episodic Involvement to Institutionalized Power, 17 VAND. L. REV. 785, 796 (1964).
122. AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, THE ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY: WftAT
IT IS AND How IT WORKS 1 (1991).
123. Grossman, supra note 121, at 799.
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Republicans could use the adverse recommendations of the ABA and local bar
groups either to justify occasional rejections of confirmation or to persuade the
President to nominate 'more acceptable' persons."' 24 The DOJ formalized the
process in 1952 by "inaugurat[ing] a system of consultation with the
Committee on the Federal Judiciary to obtain its views before a final decision
on any nomination was made."'" Thus, the Standing Committee became an
integral part of the nomination process.
Shortly after passage of FACA, the DOJ considered whether it "utilized"
the Standing Committee as an advisory committee. In February 1974 Attorney
General William Saxbe advised the Chairman of the ABA's Standing
Committee on the Federal Judiciary, John Sutro, that it was the DOJ's view
that FACA applied to the Standing Committee, and he offered the DOJ's
assistance in chartering the Committee. He suggested that if the ABA objected
to abiding by FACA, it might approach Congress about an exemption.' In
May 1974 a Deputy Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Legal
Counsel (OLC), Mary Lawton, advised a public forum that objection to
FACA's open-meeting requirement was a problem:
[T]here is resistance in interesting quarters. The Act applies to
advisory committees both created and utilized by the government. One
committee utilized by the Department of Justice is the American Bar
Association's Committee on Judicial Selection and Qualification, you
know where they rate the judges. The good American Bar Association
was not happy to be informed that they're covered by the Advisory
Committee Act. In fact, they're still screaming as far as I know. But
that's the way we read the Act.
127
By October 1974 the DOJ had backed down. In a second letter to the
Chairman of the Standing Committee, the Attorney General acknowledged that
the ABA considered FACA "such an infringement upon the independence and
prerogatives of the Committee that you would find it necessary to terminate
ABA participation in the process of advising the President on judicial
124. Id.
125. Id. at 804.
126. Letter from William B. Saxbe, Attorney General. to John A. Sutro. Chairman of Standing
Committee on the Federal Judiciary (Feb. 25, 1974) (on file with author): see also Memorandum from
Office of Legal Counsel, Application of the Federal Advisory Committee Act to the American Bar
Association Standing Committee on the Federal Judiciary (May 23. 1973) (on file with author);
Memorandum from Robert G. Dixon, Jr.. Assistant Attorney General. Office of Legal Counsel. Summary
Statement of View that the Federal Advisory Committee Act Applies to the ABA Standing Committee on
Federal Judiciary (Feb. 25, 1974) (on file with author), Memorandum from Leon Ulman. Acting Assistant
Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel. to Jonathan C. Rose. Associate Deputy Attorney General (June
21, 1974) (on file with author).
127. To Amend tie Federal Advisory Committee Act-PL 92-463: Hearings Before the Subcomn.
on Reports, Accounting, and Management of the Senate Conun. on Gov'r Operations. 94th Cong.. 2d Sess.
152 (1976) [hereinafter To Amend FACA Hearingsl (citation omitted).
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appointments."1 28 The Attorney General wrote that "in light of [the ABA's]
position .... [t]he prospect of depriving the President of the valuable advice
of your organization with respect to the exercise of his appointive power"
forced the DOJ "to consider a legal point we had hoped it would be
unnecessary to reach-the possible unconstitutionality of the legislation as
applied to this particular Presidential function."'129 The Attorney General
opined that Congress could not "significantly limit or restrict the manner in
which and conditions under which the President may seek and receive advice
with respect to [judicial nominations].' 130  The DOJ had found the
constitutionality of FACA "so questionable" that the legislation "should be
interpreted to avoid serious constitutional doubt."' 31 He advised the ABA that
the DOJ would proceed on the assumption that FACA did not apply to the
Standing Committee.
Later that same year, the OLC, under the signature of Assistant Attorney
General Antonin Scalia, issued, a memorandum questioning FACA's
constitutionality. The OLC conceded that Congress probably had power under
the Necessary and Proper Clause to regulate advisory committees created or
funded by Congress. But there was no justification for congressional regulation
of "private committees utilized by the Government for advice without any form
of compensation ... (e.g., the ABA Committee on the Federal Judiciary)...
on matters entrusted solely to [the President]."'32 The OLC believed there
existed an "implied power to seek and obtain advice from whomever the
President deemed necessary in order to faithfully execute the laws."'133 Thus,
"whether it be a Presidential Advisor, not subject to congressional
confirmation, a private individual like David Rockefeller, or a private
committee of persons like David Rockefeller, the President must have the
freedom to seek out whom he wishes for advice,"'4 lest FACA's
requirements cause the would-be adviser to "decline to become involved in an
advisory capacity with the President, thus limiting the President's ability to
inform himself."'' 35 Although the Scalia memorandum did not reverse the
128. Letter from William B. Saxbe, Attorney General, to William R. Smith, Jr., Chairman of Standing
Committee on Federal Judiciary 1 (Oct. 9, 1974) (on file with author).
129. Id.
130. Id. at 2.
131. Id. at I.
132. Memorandum from Antonin Scalia, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel,
Constitutionality of the Federal Advisory Committee Act 3-4 (Dec. 1, 1974) (on file with author); see also
Laurence H. Silberman, The American Bar Association and Judicial Nominations, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1092, 1093-94 (1991) (discussing circumstances surrounding request for OLC opinion).
133. Scalia, supra note 132, at 6.
134. Id. at 7.
135. Id, at 5. In 1977 Congress did list a "Committee on Selection of Federal Judicial Officers,"
created by Executive Order No. 11,992, 3 C.F.R. 124 (Comp. 1978), as an advisory committee to the DOJ,
although it did not list a similar committee, the United States Circuit Judge Nominating Commission,
created by Executive Order No. 11,972, 3 C.F.R. 96 (Comp. 1978). SUBCOMMITTEE ON REPORTS,
ACCOUNTING AND MANAGEMENT OF THE COMM. ON GOV'T AFFAIRS, 95TH CONG., IST Suss., TilE
PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY COMMITrEE REDUCTION PROGRAM 12 (Comm. Print 1977) [hereinafter
[Vol. 104: 51
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OLC's prior view that FACA applied to the Standing Committee. subsequent
opinions made clear that that was its import.
1 6
In 1986 the Washington Legal Foundation (WLF) filed suit against the
American Bar Association and its Standing Committee on the Federal
Judiciary. 137 The WLF alleged that the ABA Standing Committee had failed
to comply with FACA because the Standing Committee's membership was not
balanced (section 5(b)); it had not filed a charter (section 9(c)); and the
Committee had not provided public notice of its meetings (section 10(a)),
opened its meetings to the public (section 10(a)), made its records available to
the public (section 10(b)), kept detailed minutes (section 10(c)), or designated
a federal official to call and attend its Committee meetings (section 10(e))."'
The district court, terming the question of FACA's constitutionality
,serious" 139 if it applied to the Standing Committee, held that the suit could
only be brought against the government agency utilizing the advisory
committee. The court characterized FACA as not regulating advisory
committees per se, but regulating government use of the advisory committee,
and reported that it could find no case in which a court had permitted suit
against a "private, pre-existing group that has not been established, appointed,
and financed by the government."' 40 The court concluded that "[i]f the Act
regulates the Government's use of the advisory committee and not the
committee itself, it follows that the proper defendant in a suit brought to
enforce the Act is the Government, not the advisory committee 'utilized' by
the Government."' 141 Accordingly, the appropriate remedy for violation of
FACA would be to "requir[e] the government either to cease its undertakings
with the advisory committee or to ensure that the advisory committee is
brought into compliance with the Act."' 42 The court reasoned, "FACA
[otherwise] would effectively become a vehicle for forcing private
organizations to turn over files or open meetings to other private parties."''
PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY COMM. REDUCnON PROGRAM). President Reagan abolished both committees in
1981. Exec. Order No. 12,305, 3 C.F.R. 150 (1982).
136. See History of Appointments to the Supreme Court. 4B Op. Off. Legal Counsel 457. 473 n 54
(1980). In a 1988 memorandum the OLC simply repeated the government's position in the ongoing
litigation that "the American Bar Association Standing Committee on Federal Judiciary is not 'utilized' by
the President and therefore not subject to FACA." Disclosure of Advisory Committee Deliberative
Materials, 12 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 87 n.1 (1988). The Solicitor General in Public Citizen took the
position that "FACA [did] not apply to the President's reliance on private organizations for advice - Brief
for Federal Appellee at 1, Public Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice. 491 U.S 440 (1989) (Nos
88-429, 88-494).
137. Washington Legal Found. v. American Bar Ass'n Standing Comm. on the Fed. Judiciary. 648
F. Supp. 1353 (D.D.C. 1986).
138. Id. at 1355-56.
139. Id. at 1356.
140. Id. at 1361.
141. Id. at 1359.
142. Id. at 1360.
143. Id.
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The WLF filed a second suit against the DOJ, requesting that, to the extent
the DOJ continued to seek the judicial ratings of the ABA Standing
Committee, the DOJ ensure the Committee's compliance with FACA.144 This
time the district court held that Congress intended FACA to have broad
application and that the ABA Standing Committee "fit[) squarely within [the
General Service Administration's (GSA)] definition" of a "utilized
committee."' 145 Considering whether FACA's application to the ABA
Standing Committee would violate the separation of powers, the court
concluded that FACA would intrude on the President's "freedom to investigate,
to be informed, to evaluate, and to consult during the nomination process," and
the court entered judgment for the DOJ. 46
On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's judgment but
on very different grounds. 47 Deeming the term "utilized" to be ambiguous,
the Court held that the ABA Standing Committee was not an advisory
committee "utilized" by the President within the meaning of section 3(2) of
FACA. Turning to the legislative history, the Court concluded that Congress
intended to reach advisory committees established by the government and those
"closely tied to[] the Federal Government, and thus enjoying quasi-public
status." 48 Since Congress "did not indicate any desire to bring all private
advisory committees within FACA's terms,"'' 49 and Executive Order No.
11,007 evidently did not cover the Standing Committee, Congress "probably"
did not intend FACA to apply to the Standing Committee.' 50 Finding it a
"close question," the Court deferred to the rule that, where possible, it should
construe statutes to avoid constitutional problems. Applying FACA to the
144. Washington Legal Found. v. United States Dep't of Justice, 691 F. Supp. 483 (D.D.C. 1988).
aff'd sub nom. Public Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440 (1989). Public Citizen
intervened on the side of the plaintiffs. In their suit against the DOJ, the plaintiffs abandoned their
complaint about the lack of balance in the composition of the Standing Committee. 691 F. Supp. at 485
n.5. The district court commented that while § 5(b)-(c) requires balanced viewpoints for advisory
committees established by Congress, the President, and federal agencies, it is silent on the composition of
utilized committees. Id.
145. Id. at 488. The Administrator of the GSA is charged with "prescrib[ing] administrative guidelines
and management controls applicable to advisory committees" and with "provid[ing] advice, assistance, and
guidance to advisory committees to improve their performance." Federal Advisory Committee Act § 7(c).
The Administrator provided:
Utilized... means a committee or other group composed in whole or in part of other than full-
time officers or employees of the Federal Government with an established existence outside the
agency seeking its advice which the President or agency official(s) adopts, such as through
institutional arrangements, as a preferred source from which to obtain advice or
recommendations on a specific issue or policy within the scope of his or her responsibilities in
the same manner as that individual would obtain advice or recommendations from an
established advisory committee.
41 C.FR. § 101-6.1003 (1993).
146. 691 F. Supp. at 493, 496.
147. Public Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440 (1989).
148. Id. at 461.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 467.
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Standing Committee's activities would "undeniabl[y]" raise "formidable
constitutional difficulties." '
Justice Kennedy, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor,
concurred in the judgment. Justice Kennedy would have affirmed the district
court on the ground that FACA did apply to the Standing Committee, but as
applied, violated the separation of powers. 5 2 Justice Kennedy pointed out
that although FACA might be unconstitutional as applied to the Standing
Committee, this did not "render a straightforward application of the language
absurd, so as to allow us to conclude that the statute does not apply."'" He
then discussed why FACA encroached on the President's power to nominate
judges. Justice Kennedy found that when the Court dealt with powers within
the general "grant to the President of the 'Executive [plower,"' the Court
employed "something of a balancing approach, asking whether the statute at
issue prevents the President 'from accomplishing [his] constitutionally assigned
functions. '"1 54 But when the Court dealt with encroachment on powers that
"explicit text commits" to the President, the Court "refused to tolerate any
intrusion."'' 55 Here, the balance between the President and Congress was
"struck by the Constitution itself."' 56 The concurring Justices concluded:
"The mere fact that FACA would regulate so as to interfere with the manner
in which the President obtains information necessary to discharge his duty
assigned under the Constitution to nominate federal judges is enough to
invalidate the Act."' 15
7
B. Confounding Plain Text: "Woolly" Verbs
The Court began by acknowledging that the President and the DOJ
undoubtedly "utilized" the ABA Standing Committee "in one common sense
of the term."'' 58 But the Court thought "utilize" was "a woolly verb, its
contours left undefined by the statute itself."'59 Read literally, FACA would
apply to "any group of two or more persons, or at least any formal
organization, from which the President or an executive agency seeks
advice. '' 6l The Court pointed out that a literal reading might subject the
151. Id. at 465-66.
152. See id. at 469 (Kennedy, J.. concurring). Justice Scalia did not partcipate, probably because of
the opinion he had issued as Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Legal Counsel. See Alan B
Morrison, A Non-Power Looks at Separation of Powers, 79 GEO. LJ. 281, 294 n.83 (1990)
153. Public Citizen, 491 U.S. at 472 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
154. Id. at 484 (quoting Morrison v. Olson. 487 U.S. 654. 695 (1988)) (ctation omitted)
155. Id. at 485.
156. Id. at 486.
157. Id. at 488-89.
158. Public Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440. 452 (1989)
159. Id.
160. Id.; see Natural Resources Defense Council v. Hemngton. 637 F Supp. 116. 118-19 (D D C
1986) (stating that if applied literally, FACA would cover "virtually any convocation of two or more
persons"); Nader v. Baroody, 396 F. Supp. 1231. 1232 (D.D.C. 1975) (stating that FACA is so vague that
19941
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NAACP to FACA's purview if the President solicited its views on
appointments to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC); or
the American Legion, if the President sought its views on military policy; or
even the President's own political party, when the President consulted with it
in selecting the Cabinet. From this, the Court reasoned that resort to the plain
language of the statute was insufficient because the literal application would
"'compel an odd result."""'
Although the Act's definitions are "broad [and] imprecise" and FACA is
"not a model of draftsmanship," 62 the Court failed to use the linguistic,
structural, and historical tools available to it. In its definition of "advisory
committee," Congress obviously intended to reach every permutation of the
idea of a group.63 While this definition is broad, it is not without some
limits, since individual members of a committee may be polled as individuals
and not as a committee."
Congress intended to regulate two different kinds of committees:
committees established by Congress or the President and those utilized by the
President. The bulk are those "established" by Congress or the President. The
second class of committees presents the tough question: what are "utilized"
committees? By including both "established" and "utilized" committees,
Congress indicated that "utilized" committees meant something other than
those established by the federal government. The point is significant.
Committees are established by the federal government for the purpose of
advising the executive. By law, custom, and definition, advisory committees
cannot exercise operational functions of the government; 65 to the extent that
a federally established entity does anything other than advise, it is something
other than an advisory committee.' 66 In other words, the sole purpose of
it would include a "less formal conference of two or more non-government persons who advise the
President"), vacated as moot, No. 75-1969 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 10, 1977).
161. 491 U.S. at 454 (quoting Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 509 (1989)).
162. Nader, 396 F. Supp. at 1232; see also National Anti-Hunger Coalition v. Executive Comm. of
the President's Private Sector Survey on Cost Control, 557 F. Supp. 524, 530 (D.D.C.), aff'd, 711 F.2d
1071 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
163. See Federal Advisory Committee Act § 3(2). Reference to the executive branch "establishing and
utilizing" advisory committees appeared as early as 1957. See Amendment to the Administrative Expense
Act, supra note 92, at 22 (regarding scope of authority granted in statute to use advisory committees,
"establishing and utilizing ... would cover the whole field"). The phrase was prominent, of course, in
Executive Order No. 11,007.
164. See 41 C.F.R. § 101-6.1004(i) (1993); see also Herrington, 637 F. Supp. at 116 (holding that
group of six individuals whose views were sought was not advisory committee); Application of Federal
Advisory Committee Act to Board of Department of Justice Journal, 14 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 70 (1990)
(prelim. print) (ruling that board subject to FACA if its deliberative views were sought, but not if opinions
of its individual members were solicited).
165. Federal Advisory Committee Act § 9(b); Exec. Order No. 11,007, § 4, 3 C.F.R. 182, 183 (Supp.
1962); see H.R. REP. No. 1017, supra note 110, at 4.
166. See Public Citizen v. Commission on the Bicentennial of the U.S. Constitution, 622 F. Supp. 753,
758 (D.D.C. 1985) (holding that FACA did not apply to Bicentennial Commission where its duties were
primarily operational); HLI Lordship Indus., Inc. v. Committee for Purchase from the Blind & Other
Severely Handicapped, 615 F. Supp. 970, 978 (E.D. Va. 1985) (holding that FACA did not apply to
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federally established advisory committees is to advise the President. Advisory
committees utilized by the President, by contrast, need not have been
established for the sole purpose of advising the President. They may have other
functions, including operational functions outside of the government. In the
best sense of the term "utilized,"'167 committees utilized by the federal
government are committees that have or could have an existence outside of
their service as advisers to the federal government.
The Act readily confirms this interpretation of "utilized." First, in section
3, the definitions section, Congress excluded any committee composed entirely
of full-time federal officers or employees. That Congress believed it was
necessary to exclude committees of full-time federal employees indicates that
Congress knew that without the exclusion, such committees would be subject
to the Act.'68
Second, in section 4, the exemptions section, Congress exempted advisory
committees "established or utilized" by the Central Intelligence Agency and the
Federal Reserve System, as well as "any local civic group whose primary
function is that of rendering a public service with respect to a federal program,
or any State or local committee, council, board, commission, or similar group
established to advise or make recommendations to State or local officials or
agencies. ' 69 Congress believed that, absent the exemption, FACA extended
to such groups. Local civic groups are not groups established by the federal
government, but are groups established for some other purpose. Congress could
only believe it had to exempt these groups 7  because it viewed them as
groups that might be utilized by the federal government. Congress did not deny
that some local civic groups would provide advice to the President or federal
committee whose primary responsibilities were operational). rev'd on oilier grounds. 791 F 2d 1136 t4th
Cir. 1986); see also Hunt v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n. 468 F Supp. 817. 822 IN D Okla I. ayf'd. 611
F.2d 332 (10th Cir. 1979), ceri. denied, 445 U.S. 906 (1980); Wolfe v. Wcmbergcr. 403 F Supp 238. 241
(D.D.C. 1975); 57 Comp. Gen. 51 (1977) (commenting that National Commission on Observancc ot
International Women's Year not subject to FACA because of operational functions)
167. [S]ome words at some times and others at all times can be shown to be unnecesa,
Utilize is one of the second class. The occasions when use will not do art so rare
to be inexistent for the workaday writer, and the bad habit of resorting to the longer
word becomes incurable. If a nuance must be found to distinguish betscn the pair.
it lies in the stronger suggestion utilze gtves of turning an object or a inaterial to
purposes it was not meant for.
WILSON FOLLETr, MODERN AMERICAN USAGE 221-22 (1966)
168. S. REP. No. 1098, supra note 106. at 7-8; H.R. REP. No. 1017. supra note 110. at 3-4. see also
Allan J. Stein. FOJA and FACA: Freedom of Information in the "Fifth Branch"'. 27 ADti'. L RtV 31.
63 (1975).
169. Federal Advisory Committee Act § 4(c) (emphasis added).
170. The difference between an exclusion and an exemption is well illustrated in the Freedom of
Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1988) (FOIA). FOIA would not require the release of a memorandum
from a close adviser to the President on a matter of national security because the White House Office is
excluded from FOIA's coverage. Id. § 552(f); see Kissinger s Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Prexs.
445 U.S. 136, 156 (1980); Meyer v. Bush. 981 F.2d 1288 (D.C. Cir. 1993). National Sec. Archivc
Archivist of the United States. 909 F.2d 541 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Rushforth v Council of Economic Advisers.
762 F.2d 1038 (D.C. Cir. 1985). If the same document were transmitted to the OMB. it ,% ould be subject
to disclosure unless exempted by FOIA. which it might well be under section 552(b) I)
1994]
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agencies, but decided that such groups should be exempted if their "primary
function" is rendering a public service. 7'
The Court rejected its own "plain language" interpretation of FACA
because of the possibility that FACA would apply to a President's casual
contacts with the NAACP or the American Legion. But the Court's analysis
lacked any historical perspective on its own parade of horribles. The lower
courts had already struggled with virtually the same question and had largely,
though not consistently, concluded that FACA extended to regularly constituted
groups established outside the federal government,7 2 and to ad hoc groups
consulting with federal officers, even for a single meeting.'73 Courts
sometimes expressed reservations about potential separation-of-powers and
171. Section 9 of the Act also draws a clear distinction between established and utilized committees.
See Stein, supra note 168, at 63-64; compare Federal Advisory Committee Act § 9(a) (stating that no
advisory committee shall be established unless authorized by statute, the President, or an agency head) with
id. § 9(b) (stating that advisory committees shall be utilized for advisory functions only).
172. Center for Auto Safety v. Cox, 580 F.2d 689 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (holding that FACA applies to
meetings of members of American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials (AASHTO)
to discuss proposed regulations). AASHTO-a nonprofit, privately incorporated organization, established
in 1914-was made up of representatives of state and federal highway and transportation departments,
AASHTO was financed by dues assessed to its members. The Department of Transportation paid dues of
$5319 in 1976. Id. at 690. Following the Court's decision in Public Citizen, the district court ruled that
AASHTO was not subject to the Act. Center for Auto Safety v. Federal Highway Admin., No. 89-1045,
1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13733 (D.D.C. Oct. 12, 1990); cf Benjamin Vandegrift & Alan Rosenblatt, The
Federal Advisory Committee Act: Its Impact on Informal Contacts with the Staffs of Administrative
Agencies, 41 BUS. LAW. 1281, 1281 (1986) (suggesting that ABA's Federal Regulation of Securities
Committee is covered by FACA when it meets with Securities and Exchange Commission staff).
173. See, e.g., National Nutritional Foods Ass'n v. Califano, 603 F.2d 327, 336 (2d Cir. 1979)
(concluding that FACA covers single meeting between Food and Drug Administration (FDA) officials and
ad hoc group of five physicians); Natural Resources Defense Council v. Edwards, 2 Gov't Doc. Servs.
§ 82,070 (D.D.C. Sept. 8, 1981) (holding that FACA covers single meeting of Secretary of Energy with
various industry representatives); Food Chem. News, Inc. v. Davis, 378 F Supp. 1048 (D.D.C. 1974)
(holding that FACA covers two informal meetings by Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms officials with ad hoc
committee of representatives of distilled spirits industry); Aviation Consumer Action Project v. Yohe, Civ.
No. 707-73 (D.D.C. June 24, 1974) (holding that FACA covers single meeting between Civil Aeronautics
Board officials and industry representatives), described in Perritt & Wilkinson, supra note 92, at 729 n.26.
But see Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. Department of Health, Edue. & Welfare, 409 F. Supp.
473 (D.D.C. 1976) (holding that FACA does not cover meetings between FDA officials and Cosmetics,
Toiletry and Fragrance Associations to consider group's proposals), aff'd mem., 551 F.2d 466 (D.C. Cir.
1977); Nader v. Baroody, 396 F. Supp. 1231 (D.D.C. 1975) (holding that FACA does not cover biweekly
meetings between various private sector groups and White House Office of Public Liaison because meetings
were unstructured and informal), appeal vacated as moot, No. 75-1969 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 10, 1977); Center
for Auto Safety v. Morton, Civ. No. 74-1566 (D.D.C. June 6, 1975) (concluding that FACA does not cover
single meeting with auto industry representatives), cited and described in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 102,
at 344; see also Association of Am. Physicians & Surgeons, Inc. v. Clinton, 997 F2d 898, 915 (D.C. Cir.
1993) (rejecting idea that FACA covers "episodic meetings") (dictum); Natural Resources Defense Council
v. Environmental Protection Agency, 806 F. Supp. 275, 277 (D.D.C. 1992) (holding that Governor's Forum
advising EPA was not an advisory committee).
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First Amendment concerns. 7 The DOJ and the commentaries had also noted
the problems.1
75
There are considerable reasons why the NAACP and the American
Legion176 should be treated differently from the ABA Standing Committee.
The latter has enjoyed a special, regular, and formal relationship of advice and
confidence with the President for well over thirty years. As the ABA itself
stated, the Standing Committee "has been consulted by every President
concerning almost every judicial appointment since 1952."'" Prior to the
Reagan Administration, the ABA Standing Committee was "actively utilized
and consulted in the pre-nomination stage."'7 8 Tentative ratings from the
ABA "could be used by Justice officials in negotiations with senators and
other officials of the President's party. At times they influenced the Justice
officials' final selection."' 79
174. In Center for Auto Safety, 580 F.2d at 694. the court stated that it saw no First Amendment
problems in applying FACA's open meeting requirements to meetings between AASHTO and the
Department of Transportation officials. The court, however. did not address whether the § 10 requitrements
that an advisory committee open its files and have agency officials approve the agenda and be present at
the meetings posed any First Amendment concerns.
In Consumers Union, the court held that FACA did not apply to meetings between the FDA and
cosmetics industry officials and that it would not reach the First Amendment claims. 409 F Supp. at 477
n.7. The court in Nader found that, if FACA applied to White House officials* meetings with ad hoc
groups, the Act might "impinge on the effective discharge of the President's powers." thereby "raislingl
the most serious questions under our tripartite form of government." Nader. 396 F Supp- at 1234 & n.5.
175. To Amend FACA Hearings, supra note 127. at 152 (statement of Mary Lawton. Deputy Asst.
Attorney General, DOJ): WEGMAN. supra note 23. at 144-47: Cardozo. supra note 80. at 20-28; David
B. Marblestone, The Relationship Benveen the Government in the Sunshine Act and the Federal Advisory
Committee Act, 36 FED. BJ. 65, 72-73 (1977) Ihereinafter Marblestone. The Relationship Between the
Sunshine Act and FACA]; David B. Marblestone. The Coverage of the Federal Advisor, Committee Act.
35 FED. BJ. 119, 129-32 (1976) (hereinafter Marblestone. The Coverage of FACAI; Jerry W Markham.
The Federal Advisory Committee Act, 35 U. PITT. L. REv. 557. 575 (1974); Murphy. supra note 80. at 5-7
176. Even under the early cases, it is not clear if the NAACP and American Legion would have been
considered advisory committees utilized by the President. For example. if the President -,ought the views
of individual members of those groups rather than seeking the recommendation of the NAACP qua the
NAACP and the American Legion qua the American Legion. then FACA would not have applied See, e g,
Natural Resources Defense Council v. Herrington. 637 F Supp. 116 (D.D.C, 1986) There is reason to
question the continuing validity of the early decisions regarding ad hoc meetings. If the President called
the head of the NAACP for his thoughts on potential EEOC nominations. FACA would not co% er the phone
call. See 41 C.F.R. § 101-6.1004 (1993): Cardozo. supra note 80. at 26-28.
177. AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, supra note 122. at 2. "The ABA has lobbied more pervasively, and
perhaps more persuasively, with respect to judicial nominations than any other private interest group
Not content, however, merely to influence the process from outside the government, the ABA meticulously
has developed a special institutionalized relationship with the executive branch." William G Ross.
Participation by the Public in the Federal Judicial Selection Process. 43 VAND. L. REV I. 35 (1990). see
also R. Townsend Davis, Jr., Note, Thie American Bar Association and Judicial Nominees Advice Without
Consent?, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 550, 551-52 & n.18 (1989).
178. Sheldon Goldman, Reaganizing the Judiciary: 77Te First Term Appointments. 68 JUDICATURE 313.
316 (1985). See generally Silberman, supra note 132. For background on the role of the Standing
Committee during the Reagan and Bush years. see TERRY EASTLAND. ENERGY IN TilE ExECt'nVE TtiE
CASE FOR THE STRONG PRESIDENCY 261-65 (1992).
179. Goldman, supra note 178. at 315. The Reagan Administration abandoned the practice of
consulting the ABA Standing Committee on various potential nominees at the prenommation stage It
instead consulted with the Standing Committee only after a nominee had been selected. Id
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Whatever the potential problems when the President informally consults
with outside groups, the executive's relationship to the ABA is anything but
informal. It would be difficult to conceive of a formally constituted committee
that better described a "committee ... utilized by the President ... in the
interest of obtaining advice or recommendations . . . ."' Whether used as
a source of advice, as a tool for pushing a nomination that might otherwise
fail, or as a foil for avoiding a particular choice, the ABA Standing Committee
fits well within the classic descriptions of advisory committees and their
political uses.
C. Revising the Past
Having rejected the plain language of FACA as a basis for its decision, the
Court resorted to the legislative history in search for a workable definition of
"utilized." It identified Executive Order No. 11,007 as the probable source of
the term."" Without any evidence as to the actual or intended scope of the
executive order, however, the Court focused on the fact that "no President or
Justice Department official applied [Executive Order No. 11,007] to the ABA
Committee." 82 From this the Court concluded that FACA also did not cover
the ABA Standing Committee.'
8 3
This was another extraordinary leap by the Court. First, as the Court
pointed out, one of the reasons for FACA was Congress' unhappiness with the
lack of executive enforcement of Executive Order No. 11,007.V  Even had
the executive branch compiled a comprehensive listing of advisory committees
covered by the executive order, the absence of the ABA Standing Committee
from the list would have proven little, since agency heads could waive the
order's requirements.' 85
Second, the Court overlooked an exemption for "any advisory committee
composed wholly of representatives of State or local agencies or charitable,
180. Federal Advisory Committee Act § 3(2).
181. See Public Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 456-57 (1989): Exec. Order
No. 11,007, § 2(a), 3 C.F.R. 182, 182 (Supp. 1962) (covering advisory committees "not formed by a
department or agency, but only during any period when it is being utilized ... in the same manner as a
Government-formed advisory committee").
182. 491 U.S. at 457.
183. The Court failed to note that Executive Order No. 11,671, which was issued in June 1972 and
superseded Executive Order No. 11,007, would likely have covered the ABA Standing Committee. See
Exec. Order No. 11,671, § 1(6), 3 C.F.R. 388 (1973). In testimony before the House in June 1972, the new
executive order was praised for recognizing the need to cover the "utilized" committees, and both H.R.
4383 (which had already passed the House) and S. 3529 were criticized for omitting the term. See, e.g.,
U.S. Gov't Information Policies Hearings, supra note 79, at 3725-29 (statement of Peter J. Petkas, Esq.).
184. 491 U.S. at 459; see H.R. REP. No. 1731, supra note 104, at 9-10; see also H.R. REP. No. 1017,
supra note 110, at 7.
185. See Exec. Order No. 11,007, § 6(0. Moreover, the sheer number of advisory committees-some
1800 at the time FACA became law in 1972, H.R. REP. No. 1731, supra note 104, at 14 -15--calls into
question how seriously the lack of evidence of presidential intent to cover any particular committee should
be taken. I am not aware of evidence of executive intent to cover any specific committee.
[Vol. 104: 51
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religious, educational, civic, social welfare, or other similar nonprofit
organizations" found in Executive Order No. 11,007, but not found in
FACA.' 86 It is possible that the executive order exempted the ABA Standing
Committee. While we may never know whether the issue was raised while the
order was still in force, similar questions were addressed to Congress,"" and
have been raised in more recent litigation.t"'
Third, even assuming that Executive Order No. 11,007 covered the ABA
Standing Committee, the fact that the President had not enforced the order
against the Standing Committee proved only that there were essential
differences between executive orders and acts of Congress. Executive Order
No. 11,007 required self-policing, while FACA was judicially enforceable.
When an executive order relates to executive branch management, the
President may make ad hoc exceptions to the executive order at his discretion,
and may do so without explanation.' 9
The Court then turned to the House and Senate reports. In the House
report it could find no reference to the ABA Standing Committee, and "no
indication" that a "purely private group," one "not formed by the Executive"
and that "accept[s] no public funds," was within the terms of Executive Order
No. 11,007.'90 Yet the House had stated that it intended to include "those
186. Exec. Order No. 11,007, § 9; see Marblestone. The Coverage of FACA. supra note 175. at 130
n.61 (noting that FACA is broader than executive order because it omitted these exemptions)
187. See U.S. Gov't Information Policies Hearings. supra note 79. at 3755-56 (disussing potential
scope of similar exemption in Exec. Order No. 11.671).
188. Cf. Association of the Bar v. Commissioner, 858 F.2d 876 (2d Cir 1988). cert- dented. 490 U S
1030 (1989) (holding that Association of the Bar of the City of New York was not qualified for 501(c)(3
tax exemption because of actions rating judicial candidates, but was qualified for 501(c)(61 eemption as
business league); Ross, supra note 177, at 78-82.
189. "Most executive orders deal with either technical admnitstrati.e functions or the internal
organization of the executive branch. These orders affect private parties only indirectly. if at all " John E
Noyes, Executive Orders, Presidential Intent. and Private Rights of Action. 59 TEX L REV 837. 839
(1981) (footnote omitted); see also HOUSE COMM. ON Go\'T OPERATIONS. 85"1 CoNG, IST" SESS.
EXECurnVE ORDERS AND PROCLAMATIONS: A STUDY 01- A USE OF PRESID-wnAL PO'.RS (Comm Print
1957).
190. Public Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice. 491 U S 440. 460 (19891 In a lengthy footnote
and response to Justice Kennedy, the Court made a similar point with respect to the General SeN.ice
Administration's (GSA) construction of FACA. The Court inferred from the absence of the ABA Standing
Committee in the GSA's annual report that the GSA did not consider FACA to apply to the Standing
Committee; it declared that the GSA's regulations were owed "dimmnished deference" because they vere
not a "contemporaneous construction" of FACA. Id. at 463-65 n. 12. Since the GSA depended on self-
enforcement by the committees or self-policing by the agencies, it is unlikely that any group that harbored
doubts about the applicability of FACA would volunteer for chanering and registration with the GSA
Further, the GSA did not have any tools available to ensure the chartering of committees that were utilized.
but not established, by an agency. See Kit Gage & Samuel S. Epstein. The Federal Advisorn Committee
System: An Assessment, 7 ENVTL. L. 50,001, 50,002-03 (1977) ("Despite the Act's seemingly broad
coverage, there remain numerous committees which claim exemption or are exempted by statute from the
Act .... Sometimes groups which directly advise the govermient refuse to ackno% ledge that they are
federal advisory committees until forced to do so through litigation."); see also Association of Am
Physicians & Surgeons, Inc. v. Clinton, 997 F.2d 898. 908 n.9 (D.C Cir 1993) (recounting example of
advisory committee created by President Ford but not acknowledged as subject to FACA until Carter
Administration).
If the Court were really interested in "'contemporaneous construction." it could hae looked to the
DOJ and the OMB. The DOJ had not only given its opinion on the application of FACA to the ABA
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committees which may have been organized before their advice was sought by
the President or any agency, but which are used by the President or any
agency in the same way as an advisory committee formed by the President
himself or the agency itself."'' Referring to the Senate report, the Court
acknowledged that some privately funded groups might be covered, but the
Court again found no "desire [by the Senate] to bring all private advisory
committees within FACA's terms."' 92 The Court asserted that the Senate's
examples of covered committees-the Advisory Council on Federal Reports,
the National Industrial Pollution Control Council, the National Petroleum
Council, the committees advising the National Institutes of Health, and certain
committees of the national academies-were "groups organized by, or closely
tied to, the Federal Government and thus enjoying quasi-public status."' 93
Comparing the "quasi-public" Advisory Council on Federal Reports with
the ABA Standing Committee is devastating to the Court's conclusion. The
Advisory Council on Federal Reports was organized not by the federal
government, but rather "by several national business organizations at the
request of the Bureau of the Budget (now the OMB),"' 94 and it was
appointed and funded by industry. t95 Congress knew the Advisory Council
was purely private in its organization, appointment, and funding, and it still
expected the Advisory Council would be subject to FACA. While the Advisory
Council was indisputably "closely tied" to the OMB, the ABA Standing
Standing Committee, but together with the OMB had issued the original guidelines for implementing
FACA. The guidelines provided that committees advising an official or agency, "though not established
for that purpose, are covered by the Act .... For example, the Act would apply to an already existing
organization of scholars enlisted by an agency to provide advice on a continuing basis." Advisory
Committee Management, OMB Circular A-63, reprinted in 38 Fed. Reg. 2306, 2307 (1973). The OMB
listed three nonfederal groups, including the Business Advisory Council on Federal Reports, as advisory
to it. To Amend FACA Hearings, supra note 127, at 75 (statement of James T. Lynn).
191. H.R. REP. No. 1017, supra note I10, at4.
192. 491 U.S. at 461 (emphasis added). The point is insignificant because the House and Senate
reports mentioned virtually no advisory committees, public or private. Id. at 475 (Kennedy, J., concurring);
118 CONG. REC. 31,421 (1972) (statement of Rep. Holifield) ("We had quite a bit of trouble finding out
how many [advisory committees] there were, and we are not sure that 3,200 covers it altogether...
[FACA] will go a long way toward getting a proper inventory .... ).
193. 491 U.S. at 461 (quoting S. REP. No. 1098, supra note 106, at 8). With respect to the National
Industrial Pollution Control Council, see generally William H. Rodgers, Jr., The'National Industrial
Pollution Control Council: Advise or Collude?, 13 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 719 (1972); Henry J.
Steck, Private Influence on Environmental Policy: The Case of the National Industrial Pollution Control
Council, 5 ENVTL. L. 241 (1975); Richard H.K. Victor, NIPCC: The Advisory Council Approach, 8 J.
CONTEMP. Bus. 57 (1979).
194. H.R. REP. No. 1017, supra note I10, at 6; see Cardozo, supra note 80, at 20. Congress was
concerned with the "lack of balanced representation of different points of view" on the Advisory Council
and thought the Advisory Council's composition "would be prohibited" by what is now the Federal
Advisory Committee Act § 5(b). H.R. REP. NO. 1717, supra note 79, at 19. The Advisory Council on
Federal Reports was finally terminated by the OMB in a zero-based review of all federal advisory
committees conducted in 1977. PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY COMM. REDUCTION PROGRAM, supra note 135,
at 69.
195. H.R. REP. No. 1717, supra note 79, at 19; see also S. REP. No. 1098, supra note 106, at 16
("[There is] substantial merit in opening advisory committee deliberations and documentation to the public,
particularly with respect to business advisory bodies, where the potential for special interest pleading and
abuse [is] more apparent.").
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Committee was similarly tied to the DOJ. Nothing in the formation or funding
of the Advisory Council on Federal Reports made it any more "closely tied"
to the government or "amenable" to management by agency officials than the
ABA Standing Committee, yet the Court obviously was not prepared to
concede that the ABA Standing Committee was "quasi-public."
The unanswered question in Public Citizen is why Congress added the
term "utilized" in conference. What did the term add to the bill to which the
House and Senate were prepared to agree, and why was it added so late in the
process? The Court's inadequate response was that there was "no indication
that the modification was significant."'6 The Court stated that Congress'
"initial restricted focus on advisory committees established by the Federal
Government... was retained rather than enlarged by the Conference
Committee."'' 9 7 The Court was mistaken. The legislative history clearly
reveals that Congress intended the addition to be significant. The term
"utilized" was added in conference precisely to ensure that the Act would
cover privately established and funded groups, such as the Advisory Council
on Federal Reports.
In late June 1972, after the House had passed H.R. 4383, and after the
President had issued Executive Order No. 11,671 (superseding Executive Order
No. 11,007), but before the Senate adopted S. 3529, public interest lawyers
testifying before a subcommittee of the House Government Operations
Committee criticized the bills for not expressly covering utilized committees.
Attorney Peter Petkas of the Corporate Accountability Research Group told the
subcommittee that both H.R. 4383 (passed by the House on May 9, 1972) and
S. 3529 (under consideration) contained "several problems." First among his
concerns was that
[c]ommittees utilized but not established by an agency (or the
President) are not included within the definition of either type of
"advisory committee" [in S. 35291. The definitions turn on whether
or not the committee was "established ... by the President or any
officer of the Government." The administration has already acquiesced
in the need for this broader definition by including the utilization
concept in its new Executive order [No. 11,671 ]. It has dealt with the
problem of over-inclusiveness by limiting the applicability of the
requirements of the order to "utilized-but-not-established" committees
to the period of utilization. It is important in this context to recall that
the advisory committees of the OMB, those organized under the aegis
of the Business Advisory Council on Federal Reports, are "utilized"
but not established by OMB.198
196. 491 U.S. at 462.
197. ld.
198. U.S. Govt Information Policies Hearings. supra note 79. at 3725 (emphasis added). see also id
at 3727 (recommending that Executive Order No. 11.671 define -utilized"). Other %sourccs gave similar
testimony. Id. at 3681-83 (statement of David Calfee).
19941
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This was apparently the last hearing held on FACA-related matters before the
Senate acted in September 1972. June would already have been too late for the
House to revise its own bill, and with presidential and congressional elections
ahead, the House had little opportunity to suggest changes to the Senate until
the conference. The "utilized" change was held over for the conference, which
"adopt[ed] the House definition of 'advisory committee' with
modification."' 99
Ignoring this legislative history, the Court concluded that Congress added
the term "utilized" to ensure that the term "established" was applied in a
"generous sense" so as to encompass advisory committees established by the
quasi-public National Academy of Sciences "for" federal agencies.2' As
evidence, the Court quoted the conference report's explanation of section 4:
"'The Act does not apply to persons or organizations which have contractual
relationships with Federal agencies nor to advisory committees not directly
established by or for such agencies."'2 ' The passage quoted by the Court
was undoubtedly a pivotal paragraph in the conference report. Unfortunately,
standing alone, it obscured far more than the term "utilized," which it
purported to illuminate.
At first glance, the passage did seem to support the proposition that FACA
does not apply to (1) organizations with federal contracts, and (2) advisory
committees not established immediately by or for an agency. Both propositions
would have been novel; the former because the Act says nothing about groups
with contracts, and the latter because this would have taken away from the bill
everything the term "utilized" would have added. If the Court was correct, then
why did Congress even bother to add the term "utilized"? More simply, why
didn't Congress simply define "advisory committee" to mean committees
established "by or for" an agency, since such language might have picked up
the Advisory Council on Federal Reports without bringing into question some
other groups?
The answer appears in Lombardo v. Handler,202 an early FACA decision
involving the National Academy of Sciences. In Lombardo, the plaintiff
claimed that the Academy and its Committee on Motor Vehicle Emissions
were advisory to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), in violation of
FACA. The district court held that the Academy was not an "agency" subject
to FACA, and that its committee was not established or utilized by the EPA.
The Academy, which the Supreme Court characterized as "quasi-public" in
199. EXECUTIVE BRANCH ADVISORY COMMITrEES, H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 1403, 92d Cong., 2d Sess.
9 (1972); see 118 CONG. REC. 31,420-21 (1972) (statement of Rep. Monagan).
200. Public Citizen, 491 U.S. at 462.
201. Id. at 462 (quoting H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1403, supra note 199, at 10).
202. 397 F. Supp. 792 (D.D.C. 1975), aff'd mem., 546 F.2d 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431
U.S. 932 (1977).
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Public Citizen, °3 bore little resemblance to a public body. It had contracts
with the federal government, but also had contracts with nonfederal entities,
did not receive federal appropriations, and was not subject to the civil service
laws or similar restrictions.2°
The district court in Lombardo pointed out that there had been some initial
confusion between the House and the Senate over whether institutions with
federal contracts would be considered advisory committees. The legislative
history of the original bill in the House had provided that -[t]he term advisory
committee does not include any contractor or consultant." '' 5 The Senate
history had provided, however, that the bill covered "a group [organized] by
formal or informal means, by contract or other arrangement . . . . Examples of
such groups are the ... committees of the national academies ..... ,' The
district court concluded that this apparent conflict was resolved in conference.
Yet, in context, the inartful statement in the conference report made it clear
that FACA applied neither to entities with federal contracts-specifically the
National Academy of Sciences-nor to advisory committees not directly
established for an agency by an entity having a contract. The statement did not
affect the scope of FACA except with respect to entities advising the
government under a contract. An exchange on the floor of the House shortly
after the conference confirmed this understanding:
MR. HORTON. Am I correct in the understanding that this bill
does not apply to such organizations as the National Academy of
Sciences and its various committees which make studies and submit
reports to Federal agencies on request?
MR. HOLIFIELD. The gentleman is quite correct. If he will refer
to the joint explanatory statement of the committee of conference at
page 10, the first full paragraph, it states as follows:
The Act does not apply to persons or organizations which
have contractual relationships with Federal agencies nor to
advisory committees not directly established by or for such
agencies.
As the gentleman knows, the National Academy of Sciences was
founded by Congress and, therefore, it comes under that category.
MR. HORTON. So, it would be excluded?
203. 491 U.S. at 462. Ironically, the House charactenzed the National Academy of Scienccs as "'semi-
private." H.R. REP. No. 1731. supra note 104. at 15. The Academy was incorporated by Act of Congress
in 1863. An Act to Incorporate the National Academy of Sciences. ch. III. 12 Statr 806 (1863) It is
insignificant that Congress chartered the Academy because. prior to 1870. Congress exercised exclusive
control over all acts of incorporation in the District of Columbia. See Act to Provide for the Creation of
Corporations in the District of Columbia. ch. 80. § 3. 16 Stat. 98. 101 (1870); Lombardo. 397 F Supp at
794.
204. 397 F. Supp. at 794-95 & n.10.
205. H.R. REP. No. 1017. supra note I10. at 4.
206. S. REP. No. 1098, supra note 106. at 8.
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MR. HOLIFIELD. That is correct." 7
In sum, the Court in Public Citizen confused what for the conference were
two separate questions: First, how could Congress ensure that FACA would
cover utilized groups such as the Advisory Council on Federal Reports?
Second, how could Congress avoid covering groups with federal contracts,
such as the groups formed by the National Academy of Sciences? The
conference addressed the first question directly by adding the term "utilized"
in section 3. It addressed the second question obliquely by including language
in the conference report to the effect that section 4 would exempt the National
Academy of Sciences. Disregarding the legislative history on these points, the
Supreme Court concluded that FACA applies to "groups formed indirectly by
quasi-public organizations such as the National Academy of Sciences '208 and
that FACA does not cover "private groups," which would include the Advisory
Council on Federal Reports. 2' 9  The Court's conclusions concerning
Congress' intentions are almost 180 degrees off.
D. Concluding Thoughts on Public Citizen
In the last analysis, the Court told us that the driving force behind Public
Citizen is neither the need to protect the ABA Standing Committee from
federal regulation, nor the need to safeguard the executive's constitutional
207. 118 CONG. REC. 31,421 (1972). The counsel to the Senate Committce on Government Operations,
E. Winslow Turner, explained at a FACA oversight hearing:
On that particular point, as to the Academy, because I happened to be around when some
of that legislative history was taking place it was generally accepted as legislative intent at the
Conference on the Advisory Committee Act that the National Academy of Sciences, when it
meets as a group down the street to discuss things within itself and to develop whatever reports
come to it, is in no different a category than the National Association of Manufacturers or the
U.S. Chambers of Commerce. It is a private organization talking to itself. But when the
National Academy of Sciences, by a contractural [sic] relationship, advises the Federal
Government, it is in the capacity of a consultant, and subject to appropriate laws, not the
Federal Advisory Committee Act.
If it advises the Federal Government directly in any other way, it is covered under the
Federal Advisory Committee Act. It is elcar in legislative history ....
Advisory Committees: Hearings on Budgeting, supra note 79, at 89; see also Gage & Epstein, supra note
190, at 50,003-04 (quoting Letter from Robert E. Dixon, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, Department of
Justice, to Peter B. Hutt, Assistant General Counsel, Department of Health, Education & Welfare (Nov. 23,
1973)) (suggesting that FACA excluded National Academy of Sciences as general matter).
In a post-passage meeting "the Staff Director of the House Government Operations Committee stated
that one reason for putting in the Conference Report ... the language that the 'Act does not apply to,..
advisory committees not directly established by or for such [federal] agencies' was to exclude the ABA
Committee from the Act's coverage." The OLC rejected the statement as "not sufficient to overcome the
language of the statute." Office of Legal Counsel, Application of the Federal Advisory Committee Act to
the American Bar Association Standing Committee on the Federal Judiciary 6 n.5 (May 23, 1973) (on file
with author).
208. Public Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 462 (1989). Of course, the
Academy or an advisory committee created by the Academy would not be subject to FACA when acting
in a private capacity.
209. Id. at 462.
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prerogatives, but simply the need to preserve a rule of construction: The Court
will construe a statute to avoid constitutional problems unless such a
construction is contrary to Congress' interest.2 '0 This rule, the Court
reassured us, recognizes Congress as a coequal branch, bound by and sworn
to uphold the Constitution. According to the Court, respect for Congress and
Congress' constitutional judgment required the Court to search the legislative
history for a much-reduced role for the "woolly verb," utilized. Out of respect
for Congress, the Court treated a well-considered administrative construction
as undeserving of consideration on its own merits, relegating it to a single
footnote. For its efforts at divining Congress' intent from the legislative
history, the Court demonstrated that it indeed possessed nothing more than a
"nodding acquaintance with FACA's purposes."2 "' In the end, the Court
made a shambles of the Act, quite unnecessarily.
The Court's stated rationale was to avoid construing FACA in such a way
as to subject it to constitutional challenge, a policy rooted in the separation of
powers and the respect the Court owes Congress. Nominally, the majority's
solution protected presidential turf from congressional encroachment, while
respecting Congress' knowledge of constitutional contours. In the end, the
Court served neither the executive nor Congress. The executive was fully
shielded from Congress by the Constitution. If FACA was constitutional, then
intervention by the Court was unnecessary; if FACA's application encroached
on ground reserved to the executive, then the Constitution demanded the
Court's assistance. But the executive did not need the Court's heavy-handed
construction to save it from congressional encroachment. In the process of
saving the executive from Congress, the Court trampled the deference that it
ordinarily gives executive agencies construing congressional acts. The net
result is that the executive ceded territory, not to Congress, but to the Court.
Congress suffered at the hands of the Court's feigned deference. What the
Court did has left Congress less sure of what it must say in order to have the
Court take it seriously. After Public Citizen, Congress will be less confident
in its ability to use ordinary terms and to have its acts enforced, and it will be
even less sure of the usefulness of its legislative reports. Moreover, the Court
took from Congress the initiative to amend FACA. In 1989 Congress was well
aware of the problems in FACA; knowing the Court would decide Public
Citizen, Congress was prepared to move forward on clarifying
amendments.1 2 Congress is entitled to press its authority to the outermost
210. Public Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice. 491 U.S. 440. 466 (1989) (citing Edward J.
DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council. 485 U.S. 568. 575 (1988)).
211. Id. at 452-53.
212. See. e.g., Federal Advisory Commttee Act Amendments of 1989: Hearing Before the Senate
Comm. on Gov't Affairs, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. (1989); Federal Advisory Committee Act and the
President's AIDS Commission: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Gov't Affairs, 100th Cong.. Ist Sess
(1987); see also Mary K. Palladino, Ensuring Coverage, Balance. Openness and Ethical Conduct for
Advisory Committee Members Under the Federal Advisory Committee Act. 5 ADMIN. LJ. 231 (1991)
1994]
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reaches of the Constitution, and it is entitled to know precisely where those
boundaries are. Congress has demonstrated its willingness to experiment with
novel and aggressive government reforms. Sometimes it has been
successful, 213 and sometimes its efforts have pushed the extent of its
constitutional powers too far.214 But Congress is more informed as a result
of these cases. Given the development of constitutional law since FACA's
passage in 1972, and particularly given the resurgence of formalism in the
Court's decisions, it could not have been clear to Congress that FACA's
application to the ABA Standing Committee was "absurd."
In FACA Congress had pressed its power over presidential advisory
committees far beyond anything any prior Congress had suggested. Congress
invited conflict with the executive, and the Court simply refused to arbitrate.
The Court's contrived construction of FACA did nothing to define the
boundaries for Congress. As Justice Kennedy pointed out, an unconstitutional
application does not make the application absurd.2t 5 As did the executive,
Congress suffered in Public Citizen, but the costs imposed on it did not
originate with the executive, but with the Court. Ultimately, the Court revealed
itself to be an inept participant in what has been a constitutionally sophisticated
debate between the President and Congress.
E. Public Citizen Redux: Association of American Physicians &
Surgeons, Inc. v. Clinton
These concerns resurface in the D.C. Circuit's opinion in Association of
American Physicians & Surgeons, Inc. v. Clinton.2t6 The case arose when the
President appointed a Task Force on National Health Care Reform (Task
Force) chaired by the First Lady, and charged it with conducting public
hearings and submitting draft legislation to the President within one hundred
days.217
Various associations, claiming that the First Lady was not a federal
employee, and that the Task Force was therefore a federal advisory committee,
sought access to the Task Force's meetings. When the White House declined,
the associations filed suit. The district court found that the First Lady was not
(arguing in favor of proposed amendments); Michelle Nuszkiewicz, Note, Tiventy Years of the Federal
Advisory Committee Act: It's 7ime for Some Changes, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 957 (1992).
213. E.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989) (upholding constitutionality of federal
sentencing guidelines); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (upholding constitutionality of Ethics in
Government Act of 1978 (independent counsel law)).
214. E.g., Metropolitan Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, I ll S.
Ct. 2298 (1991); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983); Buckley
v. Valeo, 424 U.S. I (1976).
215. 491 U.S. at 472 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
216. 997 F.2d 898 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
217. The Task Force comprised six Cabinet members, the Director of the OMB, the Chairman of the
Council of Economic Advisers, three White House officials, and the First Lady. Id. at 900-01.
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a federal employee, and concluded that FACA violated the President's power
to recommend to Congress "such Measures as he shall judge necessary and
expedient. 218
The D.C. Circuit reversed, solely on the question of whether the First
Lady's presence brought the Task Force within FACA. Acknowledging that
"the question whether Mrs. Clinton's membership on the Task Force triggers
FACA is not an easy one," the court commented that Public Citizen constituted
"an extremely strained construction of the word 'utilized' in order to avoid the
constitutional question. '219 The court stated that it too would be guided by
"whether the government's constitutional argument in this case is a powerful
one."220  The court considered potential interference with the President's
express power to recommend legislation and his implied power to "discuss
matters confidentially, '22' and concluded that "interfering with a President's
ability to seek advice directly from private citizens as a group, intermixed, or
not, with government officials ... raise[d] Article II concerns" such that the
court would treat the First Lady as a full-time officer or employee of the
government under FACA. 22
Association of American Physicians perpetuates and compounds the
manifest errors of Public Citizen. As in Public Citizen, the D.C. Circuit
formulated its statutory construction on the basis of whether a particular
construction brought about the right constitutional result. In the process, the
court did not avoid the constitutional question, but, finding FACA
constitutionally infirm, reasoned backward to alter its view of what FACA
meant, thereby making its constitutional discussion dicta. The court renders its
interpretive powers irrelevant when it makes construction of terms such as
218. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3; see Association of Am. Physicians & Surgeons. Inc % Clinton. 813 F
Supp. 82, 86-88, 90-93 (D.D.C.), rev'd, 997 F.2d 898 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
219. 997 F.2d at 906.
220. Id.; see 813 F. Supp. at 86 ("ITIhe court believes there was little ambiguit) in the sord "utiltc'
prior to the Supreme Court's holding in Public Citizen .... ")
Commenting on both Public Citizen and Association ofAmerican Phystcians. a distnct court observed
that the Court avoided the constitutional questions "by adroit semantics and near-clar% o) ant discernment
of legislative intent." The majorities "incurred stem approbation from concurrng brethren %%ho %%erc Iess
squeamish." Northwest Forest Resource Council v. Espy. 846 F. Supp. 1009. 1014 (D D C 1994)
221. 997 F.2d at 909.
222. Id. at 910-1I; see Conflict of Interest-Status of an Informal Presidential Ad% isor as a "Special
Government Employee", I Op. Off. Legal Counsel 20. 22-23 (1977) (suggesting that. although First Lady
was not special government employee merely because she regularly discussed go%emmental matters with
President, her chairing meetings of government employees might be "engaging in a go ernmental function"
for conflict-of-interest purposes).
In Judge Buckley's view, the position urged by the government and adopted by the majority began
with "an assumption that Public Citizen's result could not have been reached through genuine
interpretation ... and endled] with the conclusion that Public Citizen authorizes courts to avoid
constitutional issues by ascribing implausible meanings to the most unambiguous language " 997 F2d at
917 (Buckley, J., concurring). Judge Buckley would have found that the First Lady was not a full-time
government employee, that the Task Force was subject to FACA. but that applying FACA to the Task
Force would violate presidential privilege. Id. at 920-25.
1994]
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"full-time officers or employees" turn on debates over unrelated terms in
Article II, the removal power, or presidential privilege.
Whether or not Congress in 1972 understood how far its constitutional
powers extended, it surely thought it knew how far it had cast FACA. 22 '3 As
Association of American Physicians demonstrates, Congress should have no
such confidence today.
IV. BEYOND PUBLIC CITIZEN: PRESIDENTIAL ADVISORY COMMITTEES AND
THE SEPARATION OF POWERS
In his enduring concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer,224 Justice Jackson describes a Constitution that "contemplates that
practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable government," a
government in which "Presidential powers are not fixed but fluctuate,
depending upon their disjunction or conjunction with those of Congress. 21
In his oversimplified scheme, when the President and Congress act
consonantly, the only question under the Constitution is one of power in the
government itself. But in the absence of a congressional grant or denial of
authority, there exists a "zone of twilight" in which the distribution of power
is uncertain and the President acts solely on his own constitutional authority.
Finally, when the President acts contrary to the will of Congress, his power is
at its "lowest ebb," and the President relies on his own authority less whatever
claim Congress has to concurrent or exclusive control of the matter.226
Presidential control of advisory committees has operated largely in the
zone of twilight in which presidential power is confirmed more often by
congressional inattention or resignation than by congressional approval. The
passage of FACA, by which Congress asserted control of both congressionally
created advisory committees and presidentially created advisory committees,
shifted the historical relationship between the President and Congress from one
of congressional inattention or resignation to one of clear assertion of
congressional power. Presidential control of advisory committees no longer
operates in the zone of twilight. The President's power is now at its lowest
ebb; he must rely solely on his own constitutional authority.
227
The jockeying for control of the advisory committee whip handle does not
rival the raw exercise of power apparent in the seizure of Youngstown's steel
mills. Though the drama may be missing, the matter of control of advisory
223. Congress was prepared to remedy any deficiencies in FACA through legislation. See 813 F. Supp.
at 89-90 n.12 (discussing remedial legislation that would have defined President's spouse as full-time
employee for purposes of FACA).
224. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
225. Id. at 635 (Jackson, J.. concurring).
226. Id. at 635-38.
227. See id.
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committees has proven sufficiently enduring to merit inquiry into the nature
and relationship of the President's and Congress' respective claims to control
of presidential advisory committees. Advisory relationships bespeak an intimate
inquiry into the constitutional working of presidential decisionmaking; unlike
assertions of presidential power over the domestic and external affairs of the
United States, presidential claims of control of advisory committees focus
exclusively on the internal workings of the executive branch. Since the
President remains accountable for any decision based on advice, and Congress
has the means to discover for itself the substance of the advice, the argument
between Congress and the President is one over control of the process by
which advisory committees advise the President.
In this Part I discuss the textual bases for the President's and Congress'
claims to control of presidential advisory committees. I begin with a discussion
of the President's claim to the right to appoint and consult with advisory
committees free from interference, a claim he must win in the absence of
congressional authorization. I then discuss sources of Congress' power to enact
restrictions such as FACA. Questioning Congress' power is not a mere
academic exercise. It is a means of testing Congress' claims against the
President's claim to exclusivity or primacy in the control of his own advisory
committees.
A. Presidential Authority over Presidential Advisory Committees
In February 1842 the House of Representatives asked the President to
explain "under what authority" he had established the commission investigating
the New York Customshouse.22 1 It is a question that has been repeated upon
the appointment of numerous other presidential advisory committees. No
careful explanation has been forthcoming, and Congress has never pressed for
a formal response. The question, in Justice Jackson's scheme, must be divided
into two parts: First, does the President have the power, in the absence of
congressional authorization, to appoint his own advisory committees? Second,
is the nature of the power such that the President has the right, in the face of
congressional objection, to unfettered consultation with his advisory
committees?
The answer to the first question is relatively straightforward. Following the
inquiry from the House of Representatives during the customshouse
investigation, President Tyler answered that his power derived from the Take
Care Clause, the State of the Union Clause, and the Recommendation Clause.
The response apparently silenced Congress, or at least prompted it to retreat
228. CONG. GLOBE, 27th Cong., 2d Sess. 214 (1842); see supra notcs 43-49 and accompanying tcxt
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to the question of funding, where Congress undoubtedly stood on more secure
ground.229
The more difficult question, whether the President has the right to consult
with advisory committees free from congressional interference, has never been
considered independently of the question of the President's power to appoint.
It is fair to state that until the passage of FACA it was the practice, and the
assumption by both Congress and the President, that if the President appointed
an advisory committee, it was his privilege to consult with the committee free
from congressional interference. The privilege was always subject, of course,
to Congress' control of the purse and its own powers of inquiry. In light of the
issues raised by FACA, the question merits a closer examination of the
President's powers as they relate to his advisory committees.
1. The Vesting and Take Care Clauses
The Constitution vests the powers of the government of the United States
in three bodies: Congress, comprising the Senate and the House of
Representatives; the President; and the federal courts, comprising the Supreme
Court and such inferior courts as Congress decides to establish. Unlike
Congress and the courts, which are collegial bodies, the President alone
exercises the executive power.230 The Founders considered and rejected the
proposal for a Council of Revision that would have divided the power of the
executive among more than one person.23t Indeed, at least one express
power, the Opinions Clause, 2  reinforces the notion that the executive power
229. See supra text accompanying notes 44-46.
230. Madison pointed out that by dividing the legislative power but concentrating the executive power,
the Constitution aspired to give, as nearly as possible,
to each department an equal power of self-defense. In republican government, the legislative
authority necessarily predominates. The remedy for this inconveniency is to divide the
legislature into different branches .... As the weight of the legislative authority requires that
it should be thus divided, the weakness of the executive may require ... that it should be
fortified.
THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 322-23 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
The term "separation of powers" does not appear in the Constitution but is "implicit in the clauses
that 'vest' the legislative, executive, and judicial powers of the federal government in Congress, the
President, and the federal courts, respectively." John Devlin, Toward A State Constitutional Analysis of
Allocation of Powers: Legislators and Legislative Appointees Performing Administrative Functions, 66
TEMP. L. REV. 1205, 1212 (1993).
231. THE FEDERALIST No. 70, at 424-25 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961), see I
FARRAND, supra note 12, at 94, 96-98, 138-40; 2 FARRAND, supra note 12, at 73-80, 367, 537-43.
Nothing in the Constitution commits any part of the executive power to the President's subordinates, except
in two cases: when Congress vests the appointment of inferior officers in the heads of departments, U.S,
CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; see Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988), and when "the Vice President and
a majority of ... the principal officers of the executive departments" certify that "the President is unable
to discharge the powers and duties of his office," U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 4, cl. I.
232. "The President ... may require the Opinion in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the
executive Departments, upon any subject relating to the Duties of their respective Offices .... Id. art.
II, § 2, cl. 1.
(Vol. 104: 51
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belongs to the President alone, 233  and an implied power, the removal
authority, gives the President a powerful tool for enforcing his judgments.2
It is not immediately clear whether the Vesting Clause is itself a
substantive grant of authority or whether it merely identifies the recipient of
other enumerated powers found in Sections 2 and 3 of Article II.23 If the
Vesting Clause serves an identifying function only, then what follows in
Sections 2 and 3 are for the President what the powers enumerated in Article
I, Section 8 are for Congress. Under this view, the Take Care Clause serves
as the general grant of power to the President to execute the laws.
If, however, the Vesting Clause is a substantive grant of power, then we
must explain the clauses following in Sections 2 and 3, particularly the Take
Care Clause. One explanation is that Sections 2 and 3 contain powers in
addition to the power to execute the laws, vested in the President in Section
1. The argument against this is that it seems to make the Take Care Clause
redundant.236 One response might be that the Take Care Clause in Section
233. Although Hamilton thought the clause a "redundancy." TIlE F-DRAUST No 74. at 447 (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961), and Justice Jackson thought it "inherent in the Executive if anything is," Youngstou.n
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579. 641 n.9 (1952) (Jackson, J.. concurrng), the Framers.
[hiaving empowered a single individual ... had to ensure that his power would not be mooted
by those below him who might effectively frustrate any meaningful exercise of his postCr by
refusing to communicate with him.
The agreed solution to both these problems was the adoption of the Opinion Clause. which
was designed to serve the purposes of a presidential council while allaying fears that such an
advisory group could shield the President from direct responsibility for executise branch actions
Susan M. Davies, Comment. Congressional Encroachment on Executive Branch Communcaton,. 57 U
CHI. L. REV. 1297, 1301-02 (1990) (footnotes omitted); see Saiknshna B. Prakash. Note. Hlad to the Chief
Administrator: The Framers and the President's Administrative Poters. 102 YALE LJ 991. 1004-07
(1993). As Professor Harvey Mansfield pointed out.
the purpose in assuring the President the written opinions of department heads on request %%as
not only to provide him with informed advice and to make them answerable to him for past
actions. It would also enable him to establish clear responsibility before he acted on a pending
matter himself or directed the department chief how to act on it-a protection of the principle
of hierarchy .... A President who can direct the exercise of any poaers committcd to a
subordinate can afford to take a relaxed view of the formal structure of the establishment of
which he is the pinnacle.
Mansfield, supra note 54, at 37.
234. Myers v. United States. 272 U.S. 52 (1926). But see Jonathan L. Entin. The Removal Poter and
the Federal Deficit: Form. Substance, and Administrative Independence. 75 KY LJ 699. 777-81 (1987)
(suggesting, as practical matter, that removal power is "modest").
235. See Joseph P. Verdon, Note, The Vesting Clauses. 77re Nixon Test. and the Pharaoi's Drean.
78 VA. L. REV. 1253 (1992), Michael L. Yoder Note. Separation of Powers: No Longer Simplh Hfanging
in the Balance, 79 GEO. L.J. 173 (1990). Compare Myers. 272 U.S. at 117 (Vesting Clause is "'ssentially
a grant of the power to execute the laws") and I WILLIAM W. CROSSKEY. PoLtMs AD niE
CONSTITUTION 379 (1953) (Vesting Clause is grant of authority followed by incomplete enumeration of
particulars) and Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes. Tire Stnctural Constitution- Untar" Erecutive,
Plural Judiciar. 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153. 1176-78. 1187 (1992) (Vesting Clause is substantive grant of
authority) and Prakash, supra note 233, at 995-97 (Founders considered Vesting Clause to be grant of
authority) with Theodore Y. Blumoff. Illusions of Constitutional Dectsionmaking- Politics and the Tenure
Powers in the Court, 73 IOWA L. REV. 1079. 1132-33 (1988) (Supreme Court prior to Myers held Vesting
Clause was not substantive grant) and Martin H. Redish & Elizabeth J. Cisar. "If Angels "ere To Gtnern "
The Need for Pragmatic Formalism in Separation of Powers 77Teory. 41 DL KE LJ 449. 483-84 (1991)
(Vesting Clause is not substantive grant of authority).
236. Redish & Cisar, supra note 235. at 484.
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3 imposes an additional qualifier, namely that the laws be "faithfully"
executed, suggesting the President may not thwart Congress by declining to
execute the laws at all.237 A second explanation is that the Take Care Clause
recognizes that the President cannot execute the laws unaided; his duty is to
see that the law is faithfully executed by others.238 A third explanation is that
all of the powers described in Sections 2 and 3 are inherent in the executive
power vested in the President, and those sections are not presidential powers,
but disabilities. Sections 2 and 3 describe the limits on the exercise of the
executive power in the same way that Section 9 of Article I limits the exercise
of Congress' enumerated powers.239 Thus, the President does not have the
power to appoint officers of the United States, except if the Senate consents.
The President, by virtue of the investiture of executive power, may issue
pardons, but Section 2 limits the pardon power to "Offenses against the United
States" and "except in Cases of Impeachment. '24 The Take Care Clause
imposes "an obligation of watchfulness," 24' a more imposing responsibility
than a simple duty to execute the laws; it is a duty on which the President may
be questioned and, in an extreme case, impeached. At the very least, the
President's "enumerated powers" describe and limit the executive power vested
in the President.
242
Whether the substantive grant of power to execute the laws appears in the
Vesting Clause or in the Take Care Clause,243  neither clause gives
substantive content to the law that is the President's duty to execute
faithfully. 244 The exercise of the Take Care Clause, unlike the exercise of
237. Chief Justice Taft saw the Take Care Clause as an implicit confirmation that the President would
require assistance in executing the laws, and used that premise to infer the removal power in the President.
Myers, 272 U.S. at 164. Lee Liberman takes the position that the Take Care Clause merely confirms the
executive power vested in the President, but that other powers-her example is the Commander-in-Chicf
power, U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. I-are enumerated. Lee S. Liberman, Morrison v. Olson: A Formalistic
Perspective on Why the Court Was Wrong, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 313, 316 (1989).
238. I Op. Att'y Gen. 624, 625 (1823); see Bruce Ledewitz, The Uncertain Power of the President
to Execute the Laws, 46 TENN. L. REv. 757, 797 (1979).
239. See Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 235, at 1196 & n.216.
240. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2; see United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 150, 160 (1833) (Marshall.
C.J.) ("A pardon is an act of grace, proceeding from the power entrusted with the execution of the
laws .... ).
241. Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 235, at 1198 n.221.
242. While the vesting of the legislative power in Congress was limited to the powers enumerated in
the Constitution, the executive power was "given in general terms strengthened by specific terms where
emphasis is appropriate, and limited by direct expressions where limitation is needed .... Myers v.
United States, 272 U.S. 52, 128 (1926); see also id. at 138-39.
243. Although Calabresi and Rhodes and Redish and Cisar seem to disagree over the relationship
between the Vesting Clause and the Take Care Clause, their analyses differ only because their ultimate
concerns differ. Calabresi and Rhodes argue that the Vesting Clause of Article ii more nearly resembles
the Vesting Clause of Article III-rather than the Vesting Clause of Article I-and this strengthens the
argument for a unitary executive. Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 235, at 1175-76. Redish and Cisar worry
that a substantive Vesting Clause will justify implied presidential powers. Redish & Cisar, supra note 235,
at 483. Calabresi and Rhodes do not necessarily disagree with this concern. See Calabresi & Rhodes, supra
note 235, at 1177 n. 119.
244. See Peter L. Strauss, The Place ofAgencies in Government: Separation of Povers and the Fourth
Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 573, 598 & n.88 (1984) ("[The President] is vested generally with 'the
[Vol. 104: 51
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other enumerated powers, is without meaning in the absence of congressional
legislation. "'The duty of the President to see that the laws be executed is a
duty that does not go beyond the laws or require him to achieve more than
Congress sees fit to leave within his power.' ' 245 Congress determines what
it is the President must faithfully execute, and it accomplishes the task in
varying degrees of specificity. The power to enact substantive legislation is
Congress' principal check on the President. The greater the specificity, the
greater the control Congress has asserted over the President's faithful execution
of the law. Whatever additional duty of "watchfulness" the Take Care Clause
imposes on the President, it is fundamentally unlike the additional, enumerated
presidential powers.
The Take Care Clause will not independently sustain the President's claim
of authority to appoint and exclusively regulate advisory committees. Though
his duties under the clause may be the occasion for the appointment of an
advisory committee, the clause alone cannot supply the authority to do so.
Either the power to appoint and exclusively regulate advisory committees is
located in other presidential powers or it must be implied from the general
vestiture of executive power.24 At most, the President's assertion of the
Take Care Clause is valid only as a defense to the charge that the President
has no power in the absence of congressional legislation to appoint and
exclusively regulate an advisory committee.247
The foregoing discussion also explains the lack of objection when
Congress directs the President to consult with an advisory body designated or
created by Congress." 8 Congress often instructs the President to consult with
various groups prior to taking some specified action. Typical of the provisions
executive Power,' but what that is in the domestic context does not readily appear.") (footnote omitted).
By contrast, the other presidential powers specified in Article II do have substantive content. EDWARD S
CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFMCE AND POWERS 1787-1957, at 5 (4th ed. 1957) ("ICertain specifically
granted 'executive' powers ... are, when properly defined, theoretically autonomous and hence not subject
to the legislative power.").
245. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer. 343 U.S. 579. 610 (1952) (Frankfurter. J . concumng)
(quoting Myers, 272 U.S. at 177 (Holmes, J., dissenting)): see also Little v Barreme, 6 U S (2 Cranch)
170, 177-78 (1804).
The Take Care Clause is also unique because of all of the President's powers enumerated in Article
II, the Take Care power is the only one that is routinely delegated. This fact is essential to the Court's
opinion in Myers: The Vesting and Take Care Clauses together imply "general administrative control of
those executing the laws." 272 U.S. at 164. The remaining powers, for the most part. are not delegated b,
the President. See 7 Op. Att'y Gen. 453, 464-65 (1855). The Attorney General's view finds support in the
Appointment Clause, which conceives of a role for "Heads of Departments" in the appointing of inferior
officers, suggesting that the President may not delegate his authority to appoint ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls, justices of the Supreme Court. and other officers of the United States
246. The modem defense of the continuing practice finds support in the Vesting Clause. from wshich
the President claims "some residuum of inherent constitutional authority to create offices or agencies" See
Limitations on Presidential Power, supra note 58. at 78 n.I.
247. My analysis does not diminish whatever claim the President has to presidential privilege See
infra notes 292-309 and accompanying text.
248. 1 recognize that I have focused on the friction between Congress and the President over the use
of presidential advisory committees. I briefly discuss congressionally established advisory committees here
to show under what circumstances there might be friction in the one case but not in the other
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is one in the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of
1985,249 which first authorizes the President to "ban the importation into the
United States of any good or service from any country which supports
terrorism" and then insists that the "President, in every possible instance, shall
consult with the Congress before exercising the authority granted by this
section and shall consult regularly with the Congress so long as that authority
is being exercised."'  Congress frequently demands that the President
consult with Congress or its committees.25 It has also directed the President
to consult with particular Cabinet officers, departments, federal agencies,"'2
foreign governments,153  states, 2 4  advisory committees,25  and generic
groups such as the public, industry, and labor. 56 The Take Care Clause, in
these instances, reaffirms that the President must consult with Congress in
order to faithfully execute the laws.
249. Pub. L. No. 99-83, 99 Stat. 190 (1985) (codified in scattered sections of 22 U.S.C.).
250. 22 U.S.C. § 2349aa-9(a) to -9(b) (1988).
251. E.g., 7 U.S.C. § 1738n (Supp. V 1993) (requiring President to consult with congressional
committees on Enterprise for Americas Facility); 10 U.S.C. § 113 (Supp. III 1991) (requiring President to
consult with Congress on appointment of Commission on Assignment of Women in Armed Forces); 19
U.S.C. §§ 2112(c), 2902(d) (1988) (requiring President to consult with Congress before entering into trade
agreement); id. § 3108(c)-(d) (requiring President to consult with Congress prior to modifying U.S.
negotiating objectives); 22 U.S.C. § 2272 (1988) (requiring President to consult with Congress on
furnishing certain assistance to Central American countries); id. § 2364(a)(3) (requiring President to consult
with committees prior to furnishing assistance under Arms Export Control Act); id. § 5353(b) (requiring
President to consult with committees prior to discussing uniform international banking standards with
foreign governments); id. § 5421(d)(2) (requiring President to consult with leadership of House and Senate
prior to designating nonprofit organization to receive federal funds); id. § 5724 (requiring President to
consult "appropriately" with Congress in determining status of Hong Kong); 50 U.S.C. §§ 1542, 1703
(1988) (requiring President to consult with Congress "in every possible instance" before committing U.S.
forces to hostilities or employing international emergency economic powers); id. § 2405(t) (requiring
President to consult with Congress prior to imposing or expanding export controls).
252. E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 6272(c)(3) (1988) (requiring President to consult with Attorney General,
Secretary of Energy, and Secretary of State on foreign policy interests related to international energy
supplies); id. § 965 1(a)(1)(G) (requiring President to consult with appropriate federal and state agencies,
affected industries, and claimants prior to submitting report on hazardous waste disposal).
253. E.g., 16 U.S.C. § 3173 note (1988) (requiring President to consult with Canada on Stikine River
region in Alaska); 22 U.S.C. § 1928 note (Supp. IV 1992) (requiring President to consult with NATO and
other nations to obtain agreement on defense cost sharing): see also 8 U.S.C. § 1188 note (1988)
(requesting that President appoint advisory committee to consult with Mexico and advise Attorney General
on alien temporary worker program).
254. E.g., 16 U.S.C. § 255 (1988) (requiring President to consult with Governor of Washington prior
to adding to Olympic National Park); 42 U.S.C. § 5191(b) (1988) (requiring President to consult with
affected states prior to determining that emergency exists); id. § 12651 (g)( I )(C) (Supp. IV 1992) (requiring
President to consult with governor of each state prior to conferring presidential teaching awards).
255. E.g., 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405(c) (1988) (requiring President to consult with advisory committees
prior to imposing export controls).
256. E.g., 19 U.S.C. § 2512(c)(3) (1988) (requiring President to consult with public, industry, and
labor prior to making report to Congress); id. § 3108(b), (d) (requiring President to consult with private
sector prior to entering into certain trade agreements, and with industry and labor prior to modifying
negotiating objectives); 22 U.S.C. § 4703(c) (1988) (requiring President to consult with institutions of
higher education on guidelines for granting scholarships to students from developing countries); 33 U.S.C.
§ 2711 (Supp. IV 1993) (requiring President to consult with affected trustees on actions to remove oil
discharge); 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405(c) (1988) (requiring President to consult with industry prior to imposing
export controls).
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In these examples, Congress has not commanded that the President adhere
to any advice given, including its own. Congress may legislate more carefully
or quite specifically so as to constrain the President's discretion, 7 but
having enacted a law that leaves some judgment to the President, Congress
may advise, but not command the President in the exercise of that judgment.
For instance, Congress could not pass a law granting the President certain
enforcement powers and then add that the President must consult with
Congress and do as it says.2" The effect would be to usurp the President's
duty to take care that the laws are faithfully executed.2 9
2. The Enumerated Powers
In his response to the House of Representatives, President Tyler defended
his information-gathering activities by citing, in addition to the Take Care
Clause, the Recommendation and State of the Union Clauses.2' Theodore
Roosevelt regarded advisory committees as a means of "informing himself
concerning 'the state of the nation.' '2 61 President Hoover relied on the
Recommendation Clause, and emphasized his need to inform himself in the
exercise of his power "to finally pass upon every act of Congress"-6 -- a
257. See Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes. 37 U.S (12 Pet.) 524. 610 (1838)
258. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986) (holding unconstitutional Gramm-Rudman-Hollings
provision binding President to recommendation of officer of Congress. Comptroller General) At the very
least the act of telling the President what to do in a particular matter would be subject to the bicameralism
and presentment requirements of Article I. Section 7. See INS v. Chadha. 462 U S 919 (1983), see also
Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 737, 753-56 (Stevens. J.. concumng).
259. Furthermore, some courts have suggested that Congress' command to consult is not judicially
enforceable. See Public Citizen v. National Advisory Comm. on Microbiological Cntena for Foods. 886
F.2d 419, 426-30 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (Silberman. J., concumng) (concluding that balanced '.iewpoint
requirement in § 5(b)(2) of FACA is not justiciable): Public Citizen . Department of Health & Human
Servs., 795 F. Supp. 1212. 1220-22 (D.D.C. 1992). Recently a distnct court refused to enjoin the President
from acting on advice obtained from an advisory committee even though the committee had failed to
observe FACA. Northwest Forest Resource Council v. Espy. 846 F Supp. 1009. 1015 (DD C 1994)
Nor will the courts review the advice, even where it is allegedly "'erroneous " Employ crs Group of
Motor Freight Carriers, Inc. v. National War Labor Bd.. 143 F2d 145. 151 (D C Cir 19441, cert denied.
323 U.S. 735 (1944); see United States v. George S. Bush & Co., 310 U.S 371. 379-80 (1940) (holding
that recommendations of Tariff Commission are not reviewable). Crosell '. Benson. 285 U S 22. 51-52
(1932) (holding that advisory nature of certain findings by masters does not interfere with Article Ill
responsibilities of courts); United States v. Los Angeles & Salt Lake R.R.. 273 U.S 299. 309-10 (1927)
(holding that ICC order did not affect legal status of carrier even though Commission's report might
become basis for action by Commission or by Congress); Standard Computing Scale Co % Farrell. 249
U.S. 571, 577 (1919) (holding that specifications not enacted into law are not subject to constitutional
challenge); see also Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan. 372 U.S. 58. 69 n.9 (1963). National War Labor Bd.
v. United States Gypsum Co., 145 F.2d 97, 97-98 (D.C. Cir. 1944). cert. denied. 324 U-S 856 (1945). cf.
L. Harold Levinson, Legislative and Execuine Veto of Rules of Administrative Agenctes Models and
Alternatives, 24 WM. & MARY L. REv. 79. 98-99 (1982) ("The advisory committee system is clearly
constitutional, because final legislative action is only by statute and the role of the committee is purely
advisory.").
260. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
261. See CORWIN, supra note 244. at 71.
262. See supra note 68.
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reference to presidential power to sign or veto legislation.263 Others
defending presidential practices have relied on the Take Care Clause, the
Recommendation Clause, the Opinions Clause, the foreign affairs power, and
an argument of necessity.
26
a. The Recommendation and State of the Union Clauses
No clause of Article II expressly grants to the President the power to
acquire information, through advisory committees or by any other means. Yet
the underlying theme of the President's claims, the predicate for the exercise
of all of these powers, is the need for information. A President's claim to the
power to acquire information or advice is partially justified by the Founders'
assumption that the President would have superior access to information. Two
clauses of Article II, Section 3 reflect that assumption. The first is the State of
the Union Clause, which requires that the President "from time to time give
to Congress Information of the State of the Union."'2 65 The Clause
presupposes that the President would have information regarding the state of
the Union and that the information would be known only to him, or at least
that Congress would not possess it.26
The second provision is the Recommendation Clause, which empowers the
President to recommend to Congress "such Measures as he shall judge
necessary and expedient."267 Under the Recommendation Clause, the
President has the duty to determine the need for and wisdom of new
legislation. The phrase "as he shall judge necessary" evokes Madison's
conception of Congress' right to judge whether legislation "is properly an
incident to an express power, and necessary to its execution. '268 By the terms
of the Recommendation Clause, Congress lacks the power either to command
the President to make certain recommendations or to forbid the President from
doing so.
Justice Story argued that these clauses "relative to the president's giving
information and recommending measures to congress" reflected an
263. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cls. 2, 3.
264. See supra notes 45-49, 62-65 and accompanying text; MARCY, supra note 16, at 10; see also
3 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 321, 322 (1979) (opining that Congress did not intend FACA to apply to advisory
body created by United States and another nation).
265. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
266. Raoul Berger suggests that the State of the Union Clause imposes a duty on the President such
that Congress may request performance of the duty at its convenience. RAOUL BERGER, EXECUTIVE
PRIVILEGE: A CONSTITUTIONAL MYTH 37-38 (1974); see also TEMPORARY PRESIDENTIAL ADVISORY
CoMMIssIoNs, supra note 34, at 5-6. A pre-FACA House report suggested that the President had a
"constitutional obligation ... [to] report to the Congress the state of all [advisory] committees and their
reports." The House Committee cited the State of the Union Clause and the Take Care Clause as the source
of the President's obligation. H.R. REP. No. 1731, supra note 104, at 6 & n.20.
267. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (emphasis added). The President's right to recommend legislation is
sustained by the power to convene Congress "on extraordinary Occasions." Id.
268. 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 12, at 567-68.
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understanding that the President "must possess more extensive sources of
information, as well in regard to domestic as foreign affairs, than can belong
to congress." '269 The Recommendation Clause draws from the President's
experience and his superior access to information relating to his other
considerable powers, including his powers as Commander in Chief, as the
executor of the laws, and as principal representative of the United States in
foreign relations. Any restriction on the President's access to advice would
impede not only his ability to recommend to Congress needed changes, but
also his ability to carry out his remaining duties.
Might FACA impede the President's access to information, thus
undermining his recommendation power? The question was raised in
Association of American Physicians,270 where the court characterized the
government's argument under the Recommendation Clause as "somewhat
artificial":
Discussions on policy-whether they take place in executive branch
groups or in pure FACA advisory committees-to some extent always
implicate proposed legislation. Whenever an executive branch group
considers policy initiatives, it discusses interchangeably new
legislation, executive orders, or other administrative directives. Thus,
virtually anytime an advisory group meets to discuss a problem, it
will implicate the Recommendation Clause, from which all executive
branch authority to recommend legislation derives. Accordingly, if the
269. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF TiE UNITED STATES § 807 (Ronald
D. Rotunda & John E. Nowak eds., Carolina Academic Press 1987) (1833). see JOtHN N POIEROY, A%
INTRODUCTION TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF TiE UNITED STATES § 697. at 466 (Ne". York. Hurd and
Houghton 1870); see also WILLIAM RAWLF, A VIEW OF TiE CONSTITUTIoN OF TIlE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 160 (Philadelphia, H.C. Carey and I. Lea 1825) ("Exereising his office dunng the recess of the
legislature... (the President hasi the best means of discovering the public exigencies "). C ELLIS
STEVENS, SOURCES OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 158-59 n.2 (reprint 1987) (2d d 1894)
("'The Constitution does not prescribe the form in which the President shall present the measures ",hich
he may recommend; nor does it vest the Congress with the power to do it, either by an express provision
or by any reasonable implication. It leaves the determination of the form. therefore, to the President
himself."') (citation omitted).
The Recommendation Clause, like the State of the Union Clause, has its ongin in the "'roal act of
communicating with Parliament." RAWLE, supra. at 158; see also 3 WILLIAM STUBBS. CONsTraTTO'%AL
HISTORY OF ENGLAND 477-80 (Oxford, Clarendon Press 1880). This may suggest a relationship betwccn
the Recommendation Clause and the Right of Petition Clause. The Recommendation Clause cmposers the
President to represent the people before Congress, by recommending measures for the reform of
government, for the general welfare, or for the redress of grievances. The Right of Petition Clause prevents
Congress from abridging the right of the people to petition for a redress of gnevances See Norman B
Smith, "Shall Make No Law Abridging... ": An Analysis of the Neglected. But Nearly Absolute. Right
of Petition, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 1153 (1986): Stephen A. Higginson. Note. A Short History of the Right To
Petition Government for the Redress of Grievances, 96 YALE Li. 142 (1986) The argument that the First
Amendment disables Congress, see Mark P. Denbeaux. 77e First Ward of the First Amendment. 80 Nw
U. L. REv. 1156 (1986); Alexander Meiklejohn, What Does the First Amendment Mean' . 20 U Cmil L
REv. 461, 465 (1953). implies that the First Amendment limits Congress' power to restrict the President's
recommendation power.
270. 997 F.2d 898 (D.C. Cir. 1993). The government argued that applying FACA to the Task Force
would violate the Recommendation Clause, but declined to argue that FACA was unconstitutional on its
face. Id. at 908, 912 n.12.
1994]
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application of FACA to groups advising the President or anyone else
in the executive branch were constitutionally problematic, insofar as
those groups were advising on proposed legislation, FACA would be
problematic with regard to virtually all policy advice.
271
The court of appeals' dismissal of the government's Recommendation Clause
argument was too facile. The court vastly overstated the dilemma, because the
Task Force was established for the declared purpose of recommending
legislation to Congress. Moreover, FACA is Congress' way of saying, "Mr.
President, disclose to us and the rest of the world the advice you have sought,
the information on which it is based, and your forthcoming legislation."
Premature disclosure, however, undermines the President's ability to propose
legislation, a power distinct from the privilege to support legislation already
proposed by him or by someone else. Premature disclosure exposes any
proposal to death by a thousand paper cuts.
Morton Halperin tells the story of the Gaither Report prepared for
President Eisenhower and the National Security Council in 1957.212 Public
release of the advisory committee's report, he suggests, would have bolstered
the arguments of those within the administration and in Congress who favored
increased defense spending. He concludes:
[While] the work of civilian ad hoc NSC committees is of value to
Congressmen and private citizens, such groups are primarily
instruments of the President and need to be evaluated in terms of their
possible contribution to the Executive decision-making process ....
The Committee Report provided clear, well-reasoned statements
of the problems of vulnerability and limited war, of the role of
dispersal and hardening, and of the problems and opportunities of
civil defense. It undoubtedly made a major contribution to the
understanding of these problems by top officials. The panel was able
to point out serious deficiencies where it found them because it was
not responsible for past policy action, and the President could receive
such advice because he anticipated being able to keep it private. 273
Public meetings of the Task Force on Health Care Reform would have
chilled the committee's willingness to advise the President, delayed the process
of advising him, and illuminated early and incomplete thinking about the
health care problem in a way that, in a political sense, would have prevented
the President from recommending the measures to Congress that he believed
necessary and expedient.
271. Id. at 908.
272. Morton H. Halperin, The Gaither Committee and the Policy Process, in THC PRESIDENTIAL
ADVISORY SYSTEM 185 (Thomas E. Cronin & Sanford D. Greenberg eds., 1969).
273. Id. at 207.
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The court ultimately recognized that constitutional "difficulties arise
because of the Task Force's operational proximity to the President
himself-that is, because the Task Force provides advice and recommendations
directly to the President. ' 274 According to the court of appeals, the problem
was not that Congress had interfered with the President's ability to recommend
appropriate legislation, but that, on balance, FACA interfered with the
President's "ability to seek advice directly from private citizens as a group,
intermixed, or not, with government officials."-2 7" The court did not, however,
draw a connection between these two problems; it failed to acknowledge that
interfering with the President's ability to seek advice might impede the
President's ability to recommend legislation. The Task Force provides
information and recommendations-pure advice capable of having enormous
impact if the President decides to accept it. In applying FACA to this example,
Congress has diminished-though not assumed-the power of the President to
recommend legislation and has thus violated the separation of powers. 76
In addition, if Congress imposes a duty on the President to consult with
it or some other group prior to submitting legislation, 77 Congress has placed
extra-constitutional conditions on the President's power to recommend
legislation. Congress, of course, has no duty to listen to the President,75 and
274. Association of Am. Physicians. 997 F.2d at 909.
275. Id. at 910.
276. The Supreme Court has vigorously enforced the separauon of powers when the powers committed
to one branch under the Constitution are usurped by a coequal branch. See Bosher v. Synar. 478 U-S 714.
727 (1986); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1. 128-29 (1976): Humphrey's Executor % United States. 295 U S
602, 629-30 (1935); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 48. at 308 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter cd..
1961).
The Court has also recognized potential separation-of-powers violations % hen the pokers. conferred
on one branch are diminished, though no other branch has assumed their exercise. See Commodity Futures
Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833. 856-57 (1986) ("Unlike Bowsher. this case raises no question
of the aggrandizement of congressional power at the expense of a coordinate branch. Instead. the separation
of powers question presented in this litigation is whether Congress impermissibly undermined, without
appreciable expansion of its own power, the role of the Judicial Branch."). The separation of powers is
violated nonetheless because the constitutional scheme has been upset; the relative balance among the three
branches has been altered. If, for example, Congress were to assign to a nonprofit organization the nght
to appoint members to the Federal Election Commission. it would be violating the separation of powers
no less than it would by assuming the task for itself, as it did in Buckley. In an indirect sense, Congress
would have increased its power relative to the President. because the President would hase less power than
he possessed before. See Schor, 478 U.S. at 865 (Brennan. J.. dissenting).
277. E.g., Trade Agreements Act of 1979. 19 U.S.C. § 2501 (1980). Congress provided.
Whenever the President determines that it is necessary or appropriate to amend, repeal.
or enact a statute of the United States in order to implement any requirement of. amendment
to, or recommendation under such an agreement, he shall submit to the Congress a draft of a
bill to accomplish the amendment, repeal, or enactment and a statement of any administrative
action proposed to implement the requirement, amendment, or recommendation. Not less than
30 days before submitting such a bill, the President shall consult with the Committee on Ways
and Means of the House of Representatives, the Committee on Finance of the Senate, and each
committee of the House or Senate which has jurisdiction over legislation involving subject
matters which would be affected by such amendment, repeal, or enactment.
Id. § 2504(c)(1); see also id. § 2512(d)(2). It is doubtful that provisions such as these are justiciable
278. See J. Gregory Sidak, The Recommendation Clause. 77 GEO. L.i. 2079. 2120-23 (1989)
[hereinafter Sidak, The Recommendation Clause].
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may impose its own rules or constraints on such proposals once they have been
made. 79 Just as requiring the President to consult with Congress or an
outside advisory committee prior to submitting legislation diminishes the
President's exclusive Recommendation Clause power, imposing conditions on
the President's decision to seek outside views also weakens his ability to
recommend legislation.
b. The Appointments Clause
While no President has ever mentioned the Appointments Clause as the
source of power for the exclusive control of presidential advisory
committees, Presidents have relied on the Clause when Congress attempts
to control an advisory committee established or utilized in support of the
President's appointment power. Suppose Congress ordered the President to
consult with an outside body-e.g., the ABA Standing Committee-prior to
nominating federal judges. Even though the President would not be bound by
the Committee's recommendation,28' this arrangement would violate the
separation of powers by encumbering, and thereby diminishing, the President's
right to nominate. From the President's perspective, the additional requirement
to consult with the ABA might be dilatory, merely bothersome, politically
devastating, or helpful. He might have chosen to consult with the ABA
anyway. No matter how the President sees it, however, the consultation
requirement is an encumbrance on the President's nomination power, a
requirement above and beyond obtaining the advice and consent of the
Senate.282
If we substitute the Senate Judiciary Committee (or the House Agriculture
Committee, for that matter) for the ABA Standing Committee, the example
becomes somewhat clearer. If Congress passed a law creating new federal
judgeships and required the President to consult with the Senate Judiciary
Committee prior to making the nomination, a court should have little difficulty
finding the law aggrandizing.283 Just as requiring the President to consult
279. See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. § 2504(c)(2) (1988) (providing that no amendment to statute that might
otherwise affect trade agreement "shall be implemented under United States law, unless" President submits
legislation in particular form, sends report to Congress on need for legislation, and submits bill to Congress
that "is enacted into law").
280. See CORWIN, supra note 244, at 70-71; MARCY, supra note 16, at 9.
281. My analysis does not question whatever power Congress has to define offices of the United
States, and to prescribe, in great detail, the qualifications for such offices. See Federal Election Comm'n
v. NRA Political Victory Fund, 6 F3d 821 (D.C. Cir. 1993); see also United States v. Cooper, 20 D.C. (9
Mackey) 104, 124-25 (1891); CORWIN, supra note 244, at 74-75, 362-65; Note, Power of Appointment
to Public Office Under the Federal Constitution, 42 HARV. L. REv. 426,429-31 (1929). Any constitutional
question raised by this practice is beyond the scope of this Article.
282. See Public Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 486 (1989) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
283. See John 0. McGinnis, The President, the Senate, the Constitution, and the Confirmation
Process: A Reply to Professors Strauss and Sunstein, 71 TEX. L. REV. 633, 638-46 (1993). My example
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with an advisory committee or with Congress (thereby interfering with his
choice of advisers) diminishes the President's power to nominate, prohibiting
or otherwise regulating the President's choice of outside advisers also
diminishes the President's constitutional authority to nominate.'
c. Other Enumerated Powers
The case for insulated presidential rights under the other enumerated
powers is not diminished by the fact that the Appointments Clause prescribes
a role for the Senate. Justice Kennedy in Public Citizen made a powerful
argument regarding the pardon power: "Congress cannot interfere in any way
with the President's power to pardon. The pardon power 'flows from the
Constitution alone.., and... cannot be modified, abridged, or diminished
by the Congress.'-2 5 As with the Appointments Clause, Congress has no
grounds for complaint if the President should seek advice outside the
government in the execution of his pardon power.
The use of congressionally established advisory committees in foreign
relations presents difficult questions, most of which are beyond the scope of
this Article. The interplay between the President's role as the "sole organ of
the Federal Government in the field of international relations,"2 ' and
Congress' power to regulate foreign commerce, to declare war, and to raise
armies and maintain a navy217 makes this a murky constitutional area. 2ss
finds some support in history. In May 1813 James Madison nominated Jonathan Russell to be Minister
Plenipotentiary to Sweden. 13 ANNALS OF CONG. 91 (1813). The Senate adopted a resolution on June 14
referring the nomination to a committee and directing the committee to confer with the President. Id. at 95
Madison initially accepted the invitation, then postponed the meeting repeatedly. Finally. on July 6. he
wrote to the Senate:
[Tihe Executive and Senate, in the cases of appointments to office and of treaties, are to be
considered as independent of and co-ordinate with each other. If they agree, the appointments
or treaties are made. If the Senate disagree, they fail. If the Senate wish information previous
to their final decision, the practice, keeping in view the Constitutional relaton of the Senate and
Executive, has been, either to request the Executive to furnish it. or to refer the subject to a
committee of their body to communicate, either formally or informally, with the head of the
proper department. The appointment of a committee of the Senate to confer immediately with
the Executive himself, appears to lose sight of the co-ordinate relation between the Executive
and the Senate, which the Constitution has established ....
Id. at 95-96. On July 9 the Senate determined by resolution that "it is inexpedient, at this time, to send a
Minister Plenipotentiary to Sweden." Id. at 98; see 2 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF TIE PRESIDENTS 1817,
supra note 2, at 151-61; CORWIN, supra note 244, at 361-62 n.16: see also LAURE,'CE H. TRIBE., GOD
SAVE THIS HONORABLE COURT 127 (1985) (discussing Senate's submission of petition to President Grant
recommending appointment of Edwin Stanton to Supreme Court).
284. But see infra notes 311-25 and accompanying text (noting that President's prvilege is subject
to whatever power Congress has over the purse).
285. 491 U.S. at 485 (quoting Schick v. Reed. 419 U.S. 256. 266 (1974)). But see Theodore Y.
Blumoff, Judicial Review, Foreign Affairs and Legtslative Standing. 25 GA. L REv. 227. 334 (1991)
(discussing Public Citizen and suggesting pardon power is unique among President's enumerated powers).
286. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp.. 299 U.S. 304. 320-21 (1936). The President's control over
foreign affairs is generally attributed to his status as Commander in Chief. as well as his power to make
treaties, appoint ambassadors. and receive ambassadors and public ministers. U.S. CoNsr. art. I. §§ 2-3
287. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 3, 11-13.
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Certainly Congress has a much stronger claim that it may require the President
to consult with groups prior to taking certain statutorily authorized actions
where Congress is clearly regulating foreign commerce. 89 Requiring
consultation with foreign countries as a condition precedent to taking some
specified action might be another matter.290 In general, this is one area in
which Congress has been especially tolerant of presidential use of informal
advisers and committees.' 1
3. Executive Privilege
The President's claim to executive privilege shares many of the same
separation-of-powers rationales I have offered for recognizing a presidential
right to consult outside advisers in private, but the privilege extends to
government officers and employees engaged in both advisory and operational
functions. In addition, it bears a distinct historical pedigree. While it is not my
purpose to revisit the constitutional status of executive privilege, the
complicated relationship among FACA, the Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA), and the Sunshine Act bears on executive privilege as it relates to
advisory, committees.
The Court generally has recognized a qualified executive privilege to
protect "the confidentiality of Presidential communications. ''2' The privilege
"derive[s] from the supremacy of each branch within its own assigned area of
constitutional duties" and is thus "inextricably rooted in the separation of
powers. 2 93 It is justified by the President's need for "complete candor and
objectivity from advisers" and the public interest in "candid, objective, and
288. See Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 32 (1972).
289, E.g., United States-Canada Free-Trade Agreement Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No.
100-449, § 103, 102 Stat. 1851, 1854 (1988) (requiring President to obtain advice from appropriate advisory
committees and United States International Trade Commission and consult with Senate Committee on
Finance and House Ways and Means Committee).
290. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 635i-6(f) (Supp. V 1993) (requiring President, prior to selling, reducing,
or canceling loan to foreign country, to consult with foreign country); 16 U.S.C. § 3173 (1988) (requiring
President to consult with Canada prior to submitting report to Congress); Pub. L. No. 102-190,
§ 1046(a), (c), 105 Stat. 1290, 1466 (1991) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 1928 note (Supp. IV 1992)) (requiring
President to consult with NATO and other nations to achieve equitable defense cost sharing, and directing
President to make "maximum use feasible" of Department of Defense and Ambassador-at-Large). Some
provisions nominally requiring consultation are not conditions precedent, but are more precatory in nature.
See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 301(0, 100 Stat. 3360, 3411, 3416-17 (1986), amended by Pub. L. No.
100-525, § 2()(4), 102 Stat. 2609, 2612 (1988) (expressing "sense of Congress" that President should
establish advisory committee to consult with Mexico and advise Attorney General on alien temporary
worker program).
291. See S. MISC. DOC. No. 109, 50th Cong., Ist Sess. 39-40, 103-05 (1888) (minority report)
(arguing that President did not exceed his constitutional powers where appointment followed common
practice). But see id. at 14-17, 35-36, 38 (majority report by Committee on Foreign Relations) (objecting
to President's appointment of plenipotentiaries to negotiate fishing treaty, and objecting to President's
withholding treaty negotiation documents from Senate). See generally WRISTON, supra note 5.
292. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705-06 (1974).
293. Id. at 705, 708.
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even blunt or harsh opinions in Presidential decision making."" Hamilton
described the need for "secrecy[] and dispatch," qualities that would
characterize the operations of a single executive and would be lost "in
proportion as the number [of executives] is increased."29'5 From the need of
a unitary executive to seek the counsel of others and direct the action of his
subordinates,296 the Court has found in the Constitution a limited presidential
power to protect the President's communications through executive privilege
and to enforce his orders through removal.
The Court twice reviewed the question of executive privilege and, though
acknowledging that such a privilege exists, in both cases it denied the
privilege. The confrontations between Congress and the President in
Nixon 1297 and Nixon 11298 took place because of the unusual circumstances
of Watergate. More modest confrontations between the two branches over the
general disclosure of presidential communications have been largely avoided
because the principal open government acts, FOIA and the Sunshine Act, do
not apply to the White House. 299 Additionally, these acts recognize some
294. Id. at 706, 708.
295. THE FEDERALIST No. 70, at 424 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossitcr cd. 19611
296. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52. 163-64 (1926).
297. In United States v. Nixon, the Court based its recognition of executive pnnmlegc on history and
necessity, not on the text of the Constitution. 418 U.S. 683. 705-06 nn. 15-16 (1974) (NLton I) The Court
rejected President Nixon's invocation of executive privilege in a criminal context, but it went to great
lengths to explain that it did not have to decide "between the President's generalized intcrest in
confidentiality and... congressional demands for information." the threat of which wsas more likely to
cause presidential advisers to "temper the candor of their remarks." Id. at 712 & nn. 19-20
298. In Nixon v. Administrator of General Services. the Court upheld the Presidential Recordings and
Materials Preservation Act, Pub. L. No. 93-526. 88 Stat. 1695 (1974) (current version at 44 U S C § 2111
(1974)), under which the GSA would assume custody of President Nixon's papers and tape recordings 433
U.S. 425 (1977) (Nixon I). The Court again rejected a "'broad. undifferentiated claim of public interest
in the confidentiality"' of presidential communications. Id. at 427 (quoting Nixon I. 418 U S at 706) The
Court found no historical basis for claiming the privilege with respect to all presidential communications
and thus no "expectation that the confidences of the Executive Office are absolute and unyieldig" N" n
II, 433 U.S. at 450. The Act was a "limited intrusion" by government archivists and respected the
President's right to assert privilege with respect to particular records. Id. at 452. 455
299. FOIA applies to an "agency." defined as "any executive department, military department.
Government corporation, Government controlled corporation, or other establishment in the exccutise branch
of the Government (including the Executive Office of the President), or any independent regulatory
agency." 5 U.S.C. § 552(a), (f) (1988). By specifically including the "'Executive Office of the President."
which encompasses offices such as the Office of Management and Budget. the Office of Policy
Development, and the Office of Science and Technology Policy-which both advise the President and have
other responsibilities-Congress implicitly excluded the White House Office. which includes the President's
closest advisers and their staffs. See Kissinger v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press. 445 U S 136.
156 (1980); H.R. REP. No. 1380, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 14-15 (1974). But cf. United States v Clarndge. 811
F. Supp. 697 (D.D.C. 1992) (holding that Tower Commission was an "agency" for purposes of 18 U S C
§ 1001). Compare Meyer v. Bush, 981 F.2d 1288 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (holding that FOIA does not reach
President's Task Force on Regulatory Relief, comprising Vice President and certain Cabinet members) and
National See. Archive v. Archivist of the United States. 909 F.2d 541 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (holding that FOIA
does not reach Office of Counsel to President) and Rushforth v. Council of Economic Advisers, 762 F2d
1038 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (holding that FOIA does not reach CEA) and Pacific Legal Found v Council on
Envtl. Quality. 636 F.2d 1259 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (holding that FOIA does not reach CEQ) with Energy
Research Found. v. Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Bd.. 917 F.2d 581 (D.C Cir. 1990) (holding that
Board is agency for purposes of FOIA and Sunshine Act). The Sunshine Act incorporates FOIA's definition
of "agency." 5 U.S.C. § 552b(a)(l) (1988).
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form of executive privilege .3' For example, exemption 5 of FOIA exempts
"inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be.
available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the
agency. ' 30 ' The Sunshine Act does not contain an exemption similar to
FOIA's exemption 5, but does exempt meetings that, if opened to the public,
would result in the premature disclosure of information "likely to significantly
frustrate implementation of a proposed agency action." 302 On their own
terms, FOIA and the Sunshine Act do not apply to advisory committee
materials because advisory committees are not "agencies."3"3
FACA, of clourse, incorporates FOIA and the Sunshine Act, making
advisory committee documents available for public inspection and committee
meetings open to the public.3 But FACA incorporates FOIA and the
Sunshine Act in such a way that the protections afforded the executive do not
survive. While FOIA and the Sunshine Act do not cover the White House,
they do cover presidential advisory committees. Intra-agency and interagency
memoranda need not be disclosed under FOIA's exemption 5, but advisory
committees cannot use exemption 5 because they are not "agencies.""3 5
Similarly, where open meetings would result in the premature disclosure of
advisory committee proposals, the advisory committee cannot avail itself of
exemption 9(B) of the Sunshine Act because it is not an "agency. 306
This gap in the insulation Congress has offered the President is evident in
Association of American Physicians. The court concluded that the Health Care
Task Force consisted exclusively of federal employees and was, therefore,
exempt from FACA.30 7 While most of the individuals constituting the Task
Force are also in executive departments that are subject to FOIA and the
300. See Marblestone, The Relationship Between the Sunshine Act and FACA, supra note 175, at 67.
301. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (1988); see NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132 (1975).
302. 5 U.S.C. § 552b(c)(9)(B).
303. See Marblestone, The Relationship Between the Sunshine Act and FACA, supra note 175, at 69
n.29, 79-80; see also Washington Legal Found. v. United States Sentencing Comm'n, 17 F.3d 1446 (D.C.
Cir. 1994) (holding that advisory group created by Sentencing Commission is not subject to FACA where
Sentencing Commission is not executive branch agency); National Security Archive, 909 F.2d at 541
(denying request under § 10 of FACA for records of Tower Commission on grounds that request was
misdirected to Counsel to President, who is excluded from FOIA).
304. Federal Advisory Committee Act § 10(a)(1), (b), (d). FACA, as originally passed, made the
exemptions of the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1966), applicable to the open meeting
requirements. It was amended in 1976 to substitute the exemptions of the Government in the Sunshine Act,
5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1976). See H.R. REP. No. 1441, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 25-26 (1976).
305. Wolfe v. Weinberger, 403 F Supp. 238, 241-43 (D.D.C. 1975) (holding that exemption 5 does
not apply to advisory committees); Gates v. Schlesinger, 366 F. Supp. 797, 799-800 (D.D.C. 1973), appeal
dismissed, No. 74-2013 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 23, 1975); see Nader v. Dunlop, 370 F. Supp. 177, 178 (D.D.C.
1973); H.R. REP. No. 1441, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1976); see also Forsham v. Harris, 445 U.S. 169
(1980) (holding that records held by private organization funded by federal agency do not become agency
records subject to FOIA).
306. James T. O'Reilly, Advisers and Secrets: The Role of Agency Confidentiality in the Federal
Advisory Committee Act, 13 N. KY. L. REV. 27, 34 (1986); see Disclosure of Advisory Committee
Deliberative Materials, 12 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 87 (1988) (prelim. print).
307. Association of Am. Physicians & Surgeons, Inc. v. Clinton, 997 F.2d 898 (D.C. Cir. 1993); see
Federal Advisory Committee Act § 3(2)(c)(iii).
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Sunshine Act, the Task Force was also not an "agency" for purposes of FOIA
or the Sunshine Act.30 ' Had the Task Force's materials been subject to
FOIA, they probably would have been exempt from disclosure as intra-agency
or interagency memoranda; Task Force meetings probably could have been
closed to the public to protect the premature disclosure of proposed agency
action. By contrast, had the court ruled that the First Lady was not a full-time
federal employee, the Task Force would have been subject to FACA, and
consequently to the public disclosure provisions of FOIA and the Sunshine
Act. None of the privileges in those acts, however, would have followed. No
deliberative process privilege or premature disclosure privilege would have
been available because the Task Force was not an agency. The Task Force
would have had to open its meetings to the public, and its records would have
been subject to FOIA.3°
In this example, whether the Task Force is a working group insulated from
the public disclosure laws or an advisory committee subject to the public
disclosure laws turns solely on whether the body advising the President
includes at least one person who is not a full-time government employee. Yet
the consequences for the President's health-care program are equally serious
whether he seeks advice from members of his cabinet or from outside advisers.
From the President's perspective, it is the substance of the advice, rather than
its sources, that he wishes shielded from premature disclosure.
Ironically, while FACA protects from disclosure conversations between the
President and his advisers, or even among his advisers, it exposes
conversations between the President and outside persons serving as advisers.
This gap in the statutorily created executive privilege can be remedied easily
through legislation. Until it is, however, courts will have to confront assertions
of executive privilege or, more dramatically, the constitutionality of FACA.
B. Limits on Congressional Authority over Presidential Advisory Committees
Prior to the passage of FACA, the most important sources of congressional
control over presidential advisory committees were the Spending and
Appropriations Clauses. FACA, however, is not a restriction on spending,'
and Congress must find its source of authority in some other provision. In this
308. See Meyer v. Bush, 981 F.2d 1288 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (holding that President's Task Force on
Regulatory Relief, comprising Vice President and certain Cabinet members, is not an "agency" for purposes
of FOIA).
309. See Association of Am. Physicians & Surgeons. Inc. v. Clinton. 837 F Supp 454, 456 (D DC+
1993) (inquiring whether any participant's "status as a private citizen [on the Health Care Task Force]
would ... disqualify that group or sub-group from exempt status under IFACAI-).
310. FACA does not contain any spending restrictions per se. See Federal Advisory Committee Act
§ 2(b)(5) (stating that Congress and public should be kept informed of cost of advisory committees). id.
§ 7(d) (stating that Director of OMB shall establish guidelines for compensation of advisory committee
members). But cf. H.R. REP. No. 1731. supra note 104. at 12-13 (expressing Congress' concerns over
expenditure of funds associated with proliferation of advisory committees).
19941
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Section, I discuss the limitations of the Spending and Appropriations Clauses
and then turn to the Necessary and Proper Clause as a possible source of
congressional authority to control presidential advisory committees.
1. The Spending and Appropriations Clauses
The Spending and Appropriations Clauses provide that "Congress shall
have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the
Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United
States,"3 and "No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in
Consequence of Appropriations made by Law."3 ' In general, "any exercise
of a power granted by the Constitution to one of the other branches of
Government is limited by a valid reservation of congressional control over
funds in the Treasury."3 13 Congress must, however, provide funds for the
compensation of the President and the federal judiciary. 4 Beyond that, there
is some controversy as to what extent Congress must fund the executive
branch. 15  Congress has recently asserted its complete control over
government spending, claiming that the Appropriations Clause gives it
"exclusive control of funds spent by the Government, and ... give[s] the
democratically elected representatives of the people an absolute check on
Executive action requiring expenditure of funds., 316 The Office of Legal
Counsel (OLC) has suggested, however, that Congress "could not deprive the
President of [functions expressly authorized by the Constitution] by purporting
to deny him the minimum obligational authority sufficient to carry [his]
power[s] into effect. 33 7
311. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. I.
312. Id. § 9, cl. 7.
313. Office of Personnel Management v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 425 (1990); cf. United States v.
Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 313 (1946) ("Congress under the Constitution has complete control over
appropriations.").
314. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 1, cl. 7; id. art. III, § I; see Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868, 906,
907 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring).
315. Compare Charles L. Black, The Working Balance of the American Political Departments, I
HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 13, 15-16 (1974) (asserting that Congress could reduce President's staff to one and
auction White House) and Thomas 0. McGarity, Presidential Control of Regulatory Agency
Decisionmaking, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 443, 473-74 (1987) (noting that Congress can defund President) and
Stith, supra note 56, at 1348, 1360-63, 1388 n.221 (asserting that President cannot finance any activity in
absence of congressional authorization) with J. Gregory Sidak, The President's Power of the Purse, 1989
DUKE L.J. 1162, 1184-94 (1989) [hereinafter Sidak, The President's Power of the Purse] and Sidak, The
Recommendation Clause, supra note 278, at 2103 & n. 14 (arguing that Congress cannot refuse to fund
performance of certain of President's constitutional duties-referring to Recommendation and Treaty
Clauses).
316. SENATE SELECT COMM. ON SECRET MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO IRAN AND THlE NICARAGUAN
OPPOSITION & HOUSE SELECT COMM. TO INVESTIGATE COVERT ARMS TRANSACTIONS WITlH IRAN, REPORT
OF THE CONGRESSIONAL COMM. INVESTIGATING THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR, H.R. REP. No. 433, S. REP.
No. 216, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 412 (1987).
317. Authority for the Continuance of Government Functions During a Temporary Lapse in
Appropriations, 5 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 1, 5-6 (1981); see also 6 Op. Att'y Gen. 26, 28 (1853) (noting
that President's obligation to act is "wholly independent of question whether there is, or is not, adequate
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The strength of the President's claim to the purse is tied to whether the
funds support his Take Care duties or his enumerated powers. Suppose
Congress decided not to fund antitrust enforcement. Since Congress has the
power to abolish the law creating the President's obligations in the first place.
Congress can defund his enforcement activities, and defunding becomes a
means of temporarily relieving the President of his constitutional obligations
under the Take Care Clause."' If Congress can relieve the President of his
duties to enforce the law by abolishing the law, Congress does not encroach
upon the President's duties by refusing to fund advisory committees supporting
his Take Care functions.
The same reasoning would not apply to spending controls that in effect
preclude the President from exercising his enumerated powers. The President
derives these obligations from the Constitution, not from Congress. It is
unlikely that Congress could void the President's enumerated powers entirely
by making it illegal for him to expend any money, for example, to recommend
legislation to Congress or to negotiate treaties.319 Congress can, however,
defund presidential advisory committees. While the President might consider
them essential, advisory committees serve no operational function; thus
defunding them cannot prevent the exercise of the President's enumerated
powers. Defunding the President's use of advisory committees may result in
ill-informed actions by the President,320 and may diminish his ability to
obtain information he thinks important for Congress, but it does not prevent
the President from fulfilling his enumerated duties. Even if the committees are
advising the President on matters within his enumerated powers, the President
would have difficulty demonstrating that a lack of advisory committee funding
prevented him from exercising his constitutionally assigned tasks. Congress'
power under the Spending Clause claims primacy here.: t
appropriation by Congress").
318. Cf. 6 Op. Att'y Gen. 26, 28 (1853) ("An appropriation of money b) Congress is an implied
authority for the President to do the thing, provided it can be done within the limits of the appropriation -)
My example is only an extreme case of current constraints. The DOJ. for example, has limited funds for
enforcing the nation's antitrust laws. The budget allocated to the Antitrust Division limits the number of
attorneys hired. Given the limited number of staff, the Attorney General must make some hard choices as
to which matters to pursue and which cases to settle.
319. See Sidak, The Recommendation Clause. supra note 278. at 2100-03. see also Sidak. The
President's Power of the Purse, supra note 315. at 1195-97 (suggesting that any unappropriated
presidential spending in furtherance of textually demonstrable duty is defensible). Stith. supra note 56. at
1351.
320. For example, the Russell Amendment defunded "'agenc[tesil or instrumentalitlicsl" established b)
executive order after one year, a restriction the executive branch regarded as substanti.e in effect An OMB
study noted that "Itihis restriction has erected a virtual compulsion to limit the tenure of Presidential
advisory commissions to no more than one year.... ISluch limitation in time may badly cramp a
commission's schedule and may make even longer-range inquines for the President impossible
TEMPORARY PRESIDENItIAL ADVISORY COMMISSIONS, supra note 34. at 19.
321. See Sidak, The Recommendation Clause. supra note 278. at 2105.
My analysis so far has assumed that Congress uses its purse, as it did in the Act of 1842 and in the
Tawney and Russell Amendments, by closing it completely to certain activities. More problematic is
whether Congress may use its taxing and spending powers to purchase cooperation or even coerce
1994]
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If the President relies on outside committees that do not receive federal
funds, however, Congress cannot cite the Spending Clause to limit the
President's power. Presidents have circumvented Congress' spending
restrictions by using unrestricted funds allotted to the President, seeking
outside funding, or utilizing privately funded groups as advisory committees.
In the cases of the Act of 1842, the Tawney Amendment, and the Russell
Amendment, Congress seems to have invited that result. Indeed, if Congress'
stated concern-the wisdom of the expenditure-is the true issue, then it
should have no objection to privately funded advisory committees.322
Congress would either have to forbid the President from spending any funds
for his own maintenance while dealing with privately funded advisory
committees,3 23 or it would have to find other means of regulating the
advisory committees directly. The former might well violate the Compensation
Clause,324 which was intended to give the President some degree of
independence from Congress, and the latter would raise First Amendment
concerns. 325 Whatever concerns Congress might have about unauthorized
presidential activities, and whatever power it can assert to forbid such
activities, Congress has no basis for claiming control of the process of
obtaining or rendering advice so long as federal funds are not used in support
of the advisory committee.
2. The Necessary and Proper Clause
The more difficult question is whether Congress may regulate advisory
committees that do not derive financial support from the public purse. This
Subsection demonstrates why the Necessary and Proper Clause (sometimes
called the "Sweeping Clause") is not sufficient to enable Congress to claim
exclusive control over advisory committees staffed and funded outside the
government.
compliance with congressional desires-that is, to control the President in the same way that it controls the
states, see South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987), or controls others, see Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis,
301 U.S. 548 (1937); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936). See Thomas R. McCoy & Barry
Friedman, Conditional Spending: Federalism's Trojan Horse, 1988 Sup. CT. REV. 85, 125-26 (noting that
following Dole the Court has "effectively abrogated the notion that Congress is a government of delegated
powers," and that "the constraint is illusory").
322. See Sidak, The Recommendation Clause, supra note 278, at 2103-06 (arguing that Congress
cannot object to presidential recommendations that have zero marginal cost); see also Stith, supra note 56,
at 1385 n.206 (noting that Congress has means other than Spending Clause to control private spending of
private funds). But see id. at 1357 n.66 (noting that donated funds are subject to appropriations restrictions
if spent in name of United States, even where funds do not pass through Treasury).
323. See Stith, supra note 56, at 1361-62 ("[The President) may not spend one minute to make one
phone call to solicit private funds (for use of the government or directly for a third party) for an activity
explicitly denied appropriated funds.").
324. U.S. CONST. art. II, § I, cl. 7.
325. See infra notes 344-58 and accompanying text.
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The Necessary and Proper Clause grants Congress the power to pass
executory laws that are necessary and proper to its own powers, the powers of
the President, the federal courts, and other officers or departments listed in the
Constitution. 26 Congress' power to make "laws ... for carrying into
Execution" and the President's power to execute the laws are not the same,
despite the similarities in the constitutional clauses creating these powers. This
is not an instance of overlapping or "blended" powers.
Since McCulloch v. Maryland, the Necessary and Proper Clause has been
recognized as an independent source of congressional authority, although it is
not a judicially enforceable limitation on Congress' power. '27 The Court has
looked elsewhere for constraints, 328 and has identified two. First, Congress
has no power under the Necessary and Proper Clause when it has been
expressly disabled under another constitutional provision, as in Section 9 of
Article I or in the First Amendment. For example, the Constitution flatly
prohibits Congress from enacting a bill of attainder or an ex post facto law"-
and makes any attempt by Congress to do so ultra vires. Second, Congress has
no power when it has been implicitly disabled because the President, the
federal judiciary, or the states have been expressly empowered. Congress'
novel appointments provision in Buckley v Valeo was outside its powers, not
because the federal government lacked power to make the appointments, but
because the exercise of the appointment power by Congress would have been
inconsistent with its exercise by the President, to whom the Constitution
committed that power.330 A question under the bill of attainder or ex post
326. Congress "shall have Power . . To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for
carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers. and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the
Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof." U.S. CONST art. 1. § 8. cl 18
The phrase "Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States" includes the
powers vested in the President. The parallels between the terms "Execution." "Power." "'vested." and
"Government of the United States" in the Necessary and Proper Clause and the terms "executi!.." "Pos er."
"vested" and "President of the United States" in the Vesting Clause of Article 11 arc too obvious to allow,
any other conclusion.
327. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 419-20 (1819); see also United States v Gettysburg Elc R) , 160 U S
668, 681 (1896). But see Blumoff, supra note 235. at 1174 (arguing that Necessary and Proper Clause
disables Congress from exercising power residing in other branches): Gary Lawson & Patncta B Granger.
The "Proper" Scope of Federal Power: A Jurisdictional lnterpretation of the Sweeping Claut .43 DUKE
L.J. 267, 271-72 (1993) (noting that term "proper" is a "textual guardian of principles of separation of
powers, principles of federalism, and unenumerated individual rights"); Liberman. supra note 237. at
331-32 & n.124, 355-56 (suggesting that there are limitations on Congress' power under Necessary and
Proper Clause); Prakash, supra note 233. at 1009-11 (discussing limitations on Necessary and Proper
power).
328. "Congress has plenary authority in all areas in which it has substantive legislati 'c jurisdiction.
so long as the exercise of that authority does not offend some other constitutional restriction " Buckley v
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 132 (1976) (citation omitted); see also Nixon v. Administrator of Gen Servs.. 433 U S
425, 498-500 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring); LAURENCE H. TRIBE. AMERICAN COSTrTI,ONAL LAW
§ 5-1, at 297 (2d ed. 1988).
329. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9. cl. 3.
330. As the Court stated in Buckle':
Congress may undoubtedly under the Necessary and Proper Clause create "offices" in the
generic sense and provide such method of appointment to those "offices" as it chooses, But
Congress' power under that Clause is inevitably bounded by the express language of Art- I1.
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facto clauses is a matter of whether the governmental power exists, while an
Appointments Clause question is a matter of the proper allocation of a power
that exists within the government.
The failure of the Court to find any internal limitations on Congress'
power under the Necessary and Proper Clause may be more a consequence of
the context of the cases coming before the Court than a lack of doctrinal
scrutiny. Madison maintained that Congress itself should be the judge of the
need for and propriety of a power.331 His view is reflected in McCulloch's
familiar formula: "Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the
constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted
to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of
the constitution, are constitutional., 32 But the context of Madison's remarks
has been overlooked. He (like Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch) was
defending the use of the Necessary and Proper Clause to expand Congress'
enumerated powers and, consequently, the powers exercised by the federal
government vis-A-vis the states. Hence, "[i]ts terms purport to enlarge, not to
diminish the powers vested in the government. ' 333 Madison, like the Court
in McCulloch, was concerned that Congress should have sufficient means to
carry into execution its own powers, as well as those powers of the President
and the federal courts. Madison and McCulloch did not address whether-and
to what extent-Congress may employ the Necessary and Proper Clause to
restrict powers claimed exclusively or concurrently by the President.
Congress must be the judge in the first instance of what is necessary and
proper to carry into execution its own enumerated powers when it seeks to
enlarge the areas under government control. Congress may also judge what is
necessary and proper for the execution of the President's authority when
Congress seeks to expand or facilitate the President's authority. But it is a
different matter for Congress to enlarge its own power by bringing under its
control an area that has traditionally belonged to the President.334 In one
§ 2, cl. 2, and unless the method it provides comports with the latter, the holders of those
offices ... may ... properly perform duties only in aid of those functions that Congress may
carry out by itself, or in an area sufficiently removed from the administration and enforcement
of the public law as to permit their being performed by persons not "Officers of the United
States."
424 U.S. at 138-39.
331. 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATS, supra note 12, at 567-68.
332. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819).
333. Id. at 420.
334. See Lawson & Granger, supra note 327, at 334 (arguing that, in using its Necessary and Proper
power, Congress "must respect both the specific allocations of power prescribed by the Constitution...
and any unenumerated but 'proper' principles of governmental structure"). Myers v. United States and
Nixon I are examples of the Court considering a presidential claim of necessity against an assertion of
congressional power. A strict view of the Necessary and Proper Clause would suggest, however, that such
a determination belonged to Congress and that these cases were incorrectly decided. See Liberman, supra
note 237, at 339-40; William W. Van Alstyne, The Role of Congress in Determining Incidental Powers
of the President and of the Federal Courts: A Comment on the Horizontal Effect of the Sweeping Clause.
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1976, at 102, 112-18.
[Vol. 104: 51
HeinOnline -- 104 Yale L.J. 118 1994-1995
1994] Advising the President
instance Congress is made the judge of the outer limits of its own authority,
in the other Congress is the judge of the President's authority. McCulloch does
not answer the question of what happens when Congress narrows rather than
expands a power historically exercised by the President and claimed by him
to be necessary and proper to the exercise of his other constitutional
powers.335
The Necessary and Proper Clause, together with the Appointments Clause,
is the source of Congress' power to create executive departments." The
President has generally conceded that there is a need for congressional
legislation authorizing additional offices," 7 while continuing to assert his
right to appoint informal advisers. Similarly, Congress, while maintaining its
exclusive power to create offices, has largely abandoned its claim to exclusive
power to create advisory committees. Even in FACA the President's power of
appointment is unquestioned and, apparently, conceded. Section 9(a) provides
"[n]o advisory committee shall be established unless such establishment is-( I)
specifically authorized by statute or by the President."'' Since Congress
could have authorized the President in FACA to appoint advisory committees
for his own use, but did not, 339 section 9(a) can only be taken as evidence
of congressional acquiescence. At the same time Congress has acknowledged
the President's power, it has exercised the concurrent power to appoint or
designate members of advisory committees, a power that might be denied
Congress under a stricter view of the Appointments Clause. ' Thus,
Congress has occasionally claimed a role in the appointment of advisory
335. But see Van Alstyne, supra note 334, at 118-20 (Congress has power to determine all prestdential
powers not expressly granted).
336. The Necessary and Proper Clause implements the Appointments Clause, wshich recognizes that
"other Officers of the United States." whose appointments are not provided for in the Constitution. might
be "established by Law." U.S. CONST. art. II. § 2, c1. 2; see Buckley v. V'aleo. 424 US. I. 138-39 (1976).
CORWIN, supra note 244, at 70. Other provisions also recognize that departments or offices, not created
by the Constitution, would be established. See. e.g., U.S. CONST. art. 11. § 2. cl I (Prestdcnt "'may require
the Opinion in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments. upon any subject
relating to the Duties of their respective Offices"); id. amend. XXV. § 4 (refemng to "the pnncipal officers
of the executive department or of such other body as Congress may by law provide") Congress might also
claim authority from its enumerated powers to create departments or agencies dealing with the subject
matter of those powers (for example, post offices or patent offices). Id. art. 1. § 8. cls 7. 8
Congress can create offices, but whatever offices are created or authorized draw their executie
authority from the President because the executive power is vested in the President. and he alone remains
responsible. See Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 235, at 1184 n. 158.
337. See, e.g., Limitations on Presidential Power. supra note 58. at 76. The OLC asserts. hosseser. that
the President has some inherent authority to create executive offices. Id. at 78 n. I
338. Federal Advisory Committee Act § 9(a) (emphasis added).
339. Congress has occasionally issued an open-ended authonzation to the President to appoint advisor)
committees for carrying out specific programs. The authonzations are sporadic and are most frequently
found in the area of foreign relations. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
340. See Federal Election Comm'n v. NRA Political Victory Fund. 6 F3d 821 (DC Cir 1993)
(holding unconstitutional designation of two officers of Congress as ex officto, but nonvoting, members of
FEC). Rejecting the argument that the members were "constitutionally harmless." the court found that "their
mere presence as agents of Congress conveys a tacit message to the other commissioners" that behed "a
mere 'informational or advisory role.' Id. at 826-27.
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committees, 34 and individual members of Congress may serve on formally
constituted advisory committees without violating the Incompatibility
Clause.342
Beyond the questions of appointing or funding advisers, Congress has little
basis for regulating the President's outside advisory committees under the
Necessary and Proper Clause. 3 It is doubtful that Congress has an
independent basis in its own powers, other than the Spending Clause, for
regulating presidential advisory committees. Nor are the President's
enumerated powers a proper basis for FACA. In a broad sense, everything the
President does while in office may be said to be an exercise of the powers of
his office, and thus nominally subject to Congress' Necessary and Proper
power. But that notion carried to its logical conclusion would have the
President serving at congressional sufferance, a conclusion at odds with the
idea of divided government.
3. The Right of Petition
Congress fares no better if it attempts to regulate advisory committees
directly. The lower courts, perhaps recognizing the implications of such direct
regulation, have tried to explain that FACA only reaches the President's use
of outside advisory committees, and not the committees themselves.3 4 That
explanation misreads FACA. Unlike the Administrative Procedure Act,345
FOIA," the Privacy Act, 7 and the Government in the Sunshine Act," 8
which govern the conduct of federal agencies, critical sections of FACA apply
directly to advisory committees. FACA could hardly state the proposition more
clearly: "The provisions of this Act or of any rule, order or regulation
341. For example, of the National Economic Commission's twelve members, two citizens were to be
appointed by the President, two senators and three citizens by the President pro tempore of the Senate, and
two representatives and three citizens by the Speaker of the House. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, § 2102, 101 Stat. 1330, 1330-34.
342. U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 6, cl. 2. As the House of Representatives concluded, appointment to an
advisory committee is not an "office under the United States," since the "mere power to investigate some
particular subject and report thereon, or to negotiate a treaty of peace, or on some commercial subject, and
report without power to make binding on the government, does not constitute a person an officer." H.R.
REP. No. 2205, 55th Cong., 3d Sess. 49 (1899). The House Report concluded that members of Congress
could accept positions on various commissions without relinquishing their seats. See H. Lee Watson,
Congress Steps Out: A Look at Congressional Control of the Executive, 63 CAL. L. R v. 983. 1001-02
(1975). But cf Wendy E. Ackerman, Separation of Powers and Judicial Service on Presidential
Commissions, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 993 (1986) (suggesting that judicial service on commissions raises
separation of powers concerns).
343. See Lawson & Granger, supra note 327, at 274-75 & n.24.
344. See Center for Auto Safety v. Cox, 580 F.2d 689, 693 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Washington Legal
Found. v. American Bar Ass'n Standing Comm. on the Fed. Judiciary, 648 F. Supp. 1353, 1359 (D.D.C.
1986).
345. 5 U.S.C. § 551 (1988).
346. Id. § 552.
347. Id. § 552a.
348. Id. § 552b.
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promulgated under this Act shall apply to each advisory committee except to
the extent that any Act of Congress establishing any such advisory committee
specifically provides otherwise."' ' 9 While some provisions of FACA are
addressed to the President,35 the GSA,35' or agency heads," 2 the open
government provisions so controversial in FACA are addressed to the advisory
committees themselves.353 An advisory group "utilized" by the President
would ignore these regulations at its peril.3'5
Even if we assumed FACA were necessary and proper to the "carrying
into execution" of the President's powers, the existence of congressional power
over the President would not support regulation of private entities, at least not
without raising serious questions under the Right of Petition Clause."
349. Federal Advisory Committee Act § 4(a); see Association of Am. Physicians & Surgeons. Inc %
Clinton, 997 F.2d 898, 903 (D.C. Cir. 1993) ("FACA places a number of restrictions on the advisor)
committees themselves.").
350. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. app. § 5(b)-(c) (directing President to create advisory committees with
balanced viewpoint); id. § 6 (directing President to file annual report)
351. Id. § 7 (directing the GSA to create Committee Management Secretariat and granting it power
to promulgate pay, travel, and expense guidelines); id. § 13 (charging GSA with dut) to tile reports with
Library of Congress).
352. Id. § 5(b)-(c) (directing agency heads to create advisory committees sw th balanced VtesI point).
id. § 8 (directing agency heads to establish administrative guidelines and appoint an ad% sory committee
management officer); id. § 11(b) (directing agency heads to make transcripts of agency proceedings
available); id. § 12 (directing agency heads to maintain records of funds required for advisor) committees
and to provide support services for advisory committees)
353. Id. § 10(a)(l) ("Each advisory committee shall be open to the public "). id § 10(b) (adsisory
committee's records "shall be available for public inspection and copying at a single location in the offices
of the advisory committee or the agency to which the advisory committee reports"); ul § I 0(e) (no ads tsor)
committees shall conduct any meeting in absence of designated officer or employee of federal gos eminent).
id. § 1 (a) (advisory committees must make transcripts of advisory committee meetings publicly available.
cf id. § 10(f) (advisory committees may not meet without approved agenda and advance approval of federal
officer or employee, excluding presidential advisory committees from agenda requirement)
354. While in many cases FACA's open meeting requirement is convenientl) enforced against an
agency, in Washington Legal Foundation the plaintiffs sought. intrer ahia. the ABA Standing Committee's
records. Washington Legal Found. v. American Bar Ass'n Comm. on the Fed. Judiciary. 648 F Supp 1353,
1355-56 (D.D.C. 1986). It is unlikely that the DOJ held any of the ABA'S records Had the district court
ultimately held FACA applicable to the ABA Standing Committee. and the Act constitutional. the
Washington Legal Foundation would have been entitled to public inspection and copying of "'records.
reports, transcripts, minutes, appendixes, working papers, drafts, studies, agenda. or other documents u hich
were made available to or prepared for or by" the Standing Committee. Federal Advisor) Committee Act
§ 10(b). The DOJ would have had no means of enforcing the court's order The court night hase ordered
the DOJ to cease using the Standing Committee in the future unless it produced its records, but the DOJ
would not have had the means to compel the ABA to produce past records had it refused
The district court in Washington Legal Foundation believed that § 8(b) placed the responsibilit. for
maintaining the records and carrying out the disclosure provisions of § 10(b on a designated "Ads isor
Committee Management Officer," who would be an agency employee. See 648 F Supp at 1360 That
section, however, applies only to "advisory committees established by that agency" Federal Advisory
Committee Act § 8(b). In the case of the ABA Standing Committee. appointment of a Management Officer
would not have brought the Committee's past records under agency control
355. U.S. CONST. amend. 1; see Marblestone. The Coverage of FACA. supra note 175. at 131 n 64.
Markham, supra note 175, at 575 & n.87; James T. O'Reilly. Committees and Compeotton Restoring
Industry Input to Federal Advisory Committees. 41 BUS LAW. 1293, 1316 & n 151 (19861 (noting right
of petition problem). Some members of Congress have expressed the same concern See supra note 95 and
accompanying text; see also Public Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice. 491 U S 440, 466 n 13 (1989)
(noting potential First Amendment problems). Political scientist David Brown. speaking of White House
conferences as advisory meetings, has suggested that these are "a 20th century version of the constitutional
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Advisory committees do not themselves exercise any executive authority;356
nor is the act of rendering advice inherently governmental. While it may be an
act undertaken by government officials, not all advice-giving, even when the
recipient is a government official, is a governmental act. Nor is the advice
itself an exercise of government power until it is acted upon by the President
or by someone exercising authority delegated by the President. Once advice is
acted upon, however, the full responsibility for the exercise of authority is
borne by the President, not by those who have advised him. 357 Advisory
committees do not become a part of the government simply by advising it,358
and Congress cannot demand committee compliance with FACA as the price
of obtaining access to the President because it would represent the securing of
a waiver of the Right of Petition as a condition to its exercise.
C. The President in the "Zone of Twilight": An Implied Power To Consult
with Advisory Committees
Ultimately, almost all of the historical arguments made by presidents in
defense of their advisory committees have been arguments based not on text,
but on necessity. The problem is, as the statements by Presidents Roosevelt,
Taft, and Hoover demonstrate, and as the court in Association of American
Physicians observed, that almost any advisory committee can be loosely
right of petition." Brown, supra note 21, at 339.
356. "Where no governmental power is at issue, there is no strict constitutional impediment to a
'branchless' agency, since it is only '[aIll legislative Powers,' Art. I, § I, '[tlhe executive Power,' Art. II,
§ 1, and '[tihe judicial Power,' Art. III, § I, which the Constitution divides into three departments."
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 423 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia's example of a
"'branchless' agency exercising no governmental powers" is "an Advisory Commission charged with
reporting to all three Branches, whose members are removable only for cause and are thus subject to the
control of none of the Branches." Id.; see also 26 ANNALS OF CONG. 753 (1814) (statement of Sen. Gore)
(distinguishing official envoys appointed in 1812 by President Madison to negotiate treaty with Great
Britain from Gouverneur Morris' mission to England on behalf of President Washington; Morris held "no
public character ... no letters of credence, commission, power or authority whatever, whereby he could
bind the nation").
357. See Franklin v. Massachusetts, 112 S. Ct. 2767 (1992) (finding that President's transmission of
apportionment reports to Congress-not Secretary of Commerce's report on census-was final agency
action, but holding that President is not subject to APA); see also William P. Rogers, The Right To Know
Government Business from the Viewpoint of the Government Official, 40 MARQ. L. Rev. 83, 89 (1956).
Even the resolution, ultimately rejected by the Founders, that would have established a privy council
comprising the President of the Senate, Speaker of the House, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and
various cabinet secretaries provided that the council's duty "shall be to advise [the President] in matters
respecting the execution of his office ... but their advice shall not conclude him, nor affect his
responsibility for the measures which he shall adopt." I ELLIOT's DEBATES, supra note 12, at 257; 2
FARRAND, supra note 12, at 367; see also id. at 539. This concept is reinforced in the Appointments
Clause, which makes the Senate a body advisory to the President. The Senate's check on the President is
not its power to advise, but the right to withhold its consent.
358. See Conflict of Interest-Status of an Informal Presidential Advisor as a "Special Government
Employee", I Op. Off. Legal Counsel 20 (1977) (individual who advises President regularly on informal
basis is not government employee for conflict of interest purposes).
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justified by the need for information or advice in support of some presidential
function. It would be impossible to prove otherwise. '"9
The power of the President to seek outside advice can be implied from the
structure of Article II, and it is not moderated by any Article I power of
Congress. The existence of such presidential authority is not necessarily lost
when Congress opposes its exercise, even though it is at this point that the
powers of the executive are reduced to their minimum, their lowest ebb. The
resolution of this conflict must look to the textual basis for the claim to
exclusivity, the need for exclusivity, and the alternatives available to each
branch.
In the exercise of his Take Care responsibilities, the President's
consultations are regulated by Congress in two circumstances. First, when
Congress prescribes consultations as a part of the President's Take Care
responsibilities, the requirement does not infringe upon his judgment and,
indeed, becomes part of the President's duty to faithfully execute the law. It
is when the advice is made binding on the President that he has been relieved
of his Take Care responsibilities in violation of the separation of powers.'
Second, when the President appoints his own advisory committees in support
of his Take Care responsibilities, and Congress funds the committees, then
Congress may place some restrictions on the committees. In this context, the
Take Care Clause is the occasion for the exercise of the implied power, but it
exists concurrently with Congress' spending power. Finally, when the President
utilizes outside committees that do not receive federal funds, any command
from Congress respecting the President's use of the committee is tantamount
to prohibiting the consultation. Regulation of presidential consultation cannot
be justified by the Spending Clause, and it is beyond the scope of the
Necessary and Proper Clause because it interferes with the judgment reposed
in the President by the Constitution without appreciably fulfilling Congress'
own duty to facilitate the execution of the laws.
The President, in the exercise of his enumerated powers, has even greater
independence. Yet, even with respect to the President's enumerated powers,
Congress always retains its power over the purse and is under no obligation
to fund presidential advisory committees. The advisory committee, as a
repository of pure advice and no executive authority, has no claim to even
minimal congressional funding. Once Congress acquiesces to funding,
however, it is limited in the constraints it can place on the use of advisory
359. See 26 ANNALS OF CONG. 755 (1814) (statement of Sen. Gore) ("Necessity alirays authorizes
what it requires .... ); THE FEDERAuST No. 44. at 285 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed. 1961) ("No
axiom is more clearly established in law, or in reason, than that whcrever the end is required, the means
are authorized; wherever a general power to do a thing is given. every particular power nccessary for doing
it is included.").
360. See, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986) (finding unconstitutional directie to Presidcnt
to carry out Comptroller General's budget reduction recommendations).
19941
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committees' funds. Finally, as with the Take Care Clause, where the President
seeks the advice of outside advisers who do not receive federal funds,
Congress has no power to object under the Spending Clause or under the
Necessary and Proper Clause because this would impinge on the President's
ability to carry out his constitutional duties.361
What are the consequences of recognizi ig an inherent power vested in the
President to seek advice free of congressional regulation? My first observation
is that the scope of any potential claim is very limited. Any claim the President
can make probably does not include the hundreds of advisory committees that
are agency-established. This category includes the numerous scientific and
technical committees that advise, for example, the Department of Energy and
the Department of Health and Human Services.362 Nor, for the reasons I have
explained, could the President assert such control over the bulk of
congressionally created advisory committees, which are typically established
to advise the President in his Take Care functions. The remaining committees,
those presidential advisory committees established by the President on his own
initiative that are federally funded, are relatively few,363 and the number of
outside advisory committees established or utilized by the President that are
not federally funded is likely to be even fewer.
Second, the claim for such an implied power pales in comparison with
other presidential powers inferred from the text. For example, the power to
appoint and consult advisory committees is relatively insignificant when
compared with the President's power over foreign affairs.3 4 On the other
hand, the power to seek outside advice free of congressional control is
undoubtedly a valuable power. The vigor with which presidents have exercised
and defended it, and the lengths to which they have gone to avoid Congress'
spending restrictions, are testimony to the value placed upon it by the
361. As Carl Marcy concluded nearly 50 years ago:
[Ais long as Presidential commissions confine themselves to fact-finding, advice and legislation,
and engage in no affirmative executive, legislative or judicial action on their own account, cases
cannot arise and the courts cannot interfere with their activities. If the commissions are
voluntary, funds are supplied from outside sources, and no federal employees are used,
Congress short of impeachment, can do nothing.
MARCY, supra note 16, at 9.
362. See, e.g., Use of Advisory Committees by the Food and Drug Administration: Hearings Before
a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Gov't Operations, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974); TWENTY-FIRST
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 13, at 48-55; see also SENATE COMMITrEE ON GOV'T
AFFAIRS, 95TH CONG., I ST SESS., ENERGY ADVISERS: AN ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEES
DEALING WITH ENERGY (Comm. Print 1977).
363. Although a 1970 House report put the number of presidential advisory committees at 198, H.R.
REP. No. 1731, supra note 104, at 10, that number apparently included intra-agency committees as well.
The latest report prepared by the GSA listed 57 presidential advisory committees, of which Congress
directly established 32. TWENTY-FIRST ANNUAL REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 13, at 8; see also
id. at 41-42.
364. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936) (holding President's degree of
discretion in foreign affairs greater than that in domestic affairs); Redish & Cisar, supra note 235, at
483-84.
[Vol. 104:51
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President. Restrictions such as FACA undoubtedly encumber both the
President's willingness to use advisory committees and the willingness of
advisory committees to serve the President. The Court recognized in United
States v. Nixon a "valid need for protection of communications between high
Government officials and those who advise and assist them" because "those
who expect public dissemination of their remarks may well temper candor with
a concern for appearances and for their own interests to the detriment of the
decisionmaking process." '365 The Court added, "[a] President and those who
assist him must be free to explore alternatives in the process of shaping
policies and making decisions and to do so in a way many would be unwilling
to express except privately." FACA's requirements that advisory
committees have a balanced viewpoint, open their records to public inspection,
and open their meetings to public participation increase the cost of using
advisory committees, and suggest that presidents will rely less frequently on
advisory committees. Similarly, these requirements discourage privately funded
committees from participating in the process of advising the President. The
empirical evidence for this proposition is admittedly anecdotal, but the ABA's
Standing Committee is a good example. 67 If the Standing Committee's
stated position-that it would have withdrawn its services rather than submit
to FACA-is accurate, it may suggest that the cost of openness, at least from
the President's perspective, is too high.
Moreover, even when the President decides to appoint or consult an
advisory committee under the conditions set forth in FACA, the President may
not receive the full and frank views of the committee. What the President
receives is not the committee's advice, but its press release, those things that
the committee is willing to tell the President in public. Or, even if the advisory
committee offers its candid views to the President, the public record and
sunshine requirements may skew the public debate in ways that a different
process would not. As the story of the Gaither Report demonstrates, advisory
committees are sometimes used to sway a divided Administration. Public
disclosure affects what is, to that point, an inchoate decision and may
precipitate a decision that might not have been reached through a more
circumspect process. Information that might skew an internal debate frequently
flows out of divided administrations as the two sides talk to each other through
the press. But these political wranglings ought to be the President's to manage
and resolve. FACA's open government requirements systematically interfere
with the President's management of his own advisory committees. These
requirements must be seen as a normative value independent of whatever value
365. 418 U.S. 683, 705 (1974).
366. Id. at 708.
367. The process not only affects private groups, but bodies composed of state and local officials as
well. See supra note 172. State and local officials have complained to Congress that FACA inhibits their
meetings with federal officials. See WEGMAN. supra note 23. at 9.
1994]
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we might assign to the substantive policy questions before the advisory
committee.
The conflict I have described between Congress' interest in public
disclosure of advisory committee reports and processes and the President's
interest in fully informed, candid advice will often be a false one; the interests
of the President in receiving the views of an advisory committee will often be
fully compatible with the open government provisions in FACA. But that is an
ad hoc judgment that the President is much better situated to make. At some
point the President's ipse dixit should suffice to demonstrate the need for
confidentiality.
368
Third, recognition of an implied power over advisory committees is
sufficiently limited so that it would not encroach on powers plainly belonging
to Congress.369 As I have shown, the President has virtually no claim to
resist congressional regulation of advisory committees supporting his Take
Care duties. Congress controls the advisory committee process with respect to
such duties by virtue of its own enumerated powers and the Necessary and
Proper Clause. And Congress, irrespective of any power the President can
assert over advisory committees, retains control over any federal monies that
might be expended. Furthermore, Congress' stated interests in enacting
FACA-control of a growing number of advisory committees, control of costs,
balanced representation, open meetings-are almost completely met through
FACA's jurisdiction over congressionally established advisory committees,
agency-established advisory committees, and all other federally funded
advisory committees.
More important, Congress has numerous tools to use as checks on the
President's advisory committees. Congress can establish clear guidelines for
the policy area in which the advisory committee is working. Such guidelines
can serve as Congress' broadest and potentially greatest check on the
President, because they go to the heart of the President's authority, the Take
Care power. While institutionally difficult for Congress to establish, they
remain Congress' most potent tool. Congress can also exercise control over the
368. Presidents may choose, and have chosen, to constrain their own use of advisory committees. See,
e.g., Exec. Order No. 11,007, 3 C.F.R. 182 (Supp. 1962) (constraining use of agency advisory committees):
Exec. Order No. 11,671, 3 C.F.R. 388 (1973) (constraining agency and presidential advisory committees).
Presidential recognition of the need for advisory committee management does not justify, nor does it invite,
congressional management.
369. Because of the nature of advisory relationships, asking whether "the delicate balance of power
among the three branches of government will be upset" if FACA is strictly enforced places an impossible
burden on the President. Stephen L. Carter, The Constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution, 70 VA.
L. REv. 101, 113 (1984). Unlike the case for removal authority, there is no way for the President to prove
in any given case that congressional interference in his advisory relations will actually prevent him from
exercising his duties. No one can know in advance whether an advisory committee will turn up anything
useful or whether FACA would actually interfere with the advisory committee's work. The asserted need
is presidential ipse dixit. But for that reason, as well as the fact that Congress would have no means of
proving the contrary, resolution of the question should favor expanding the scope of information to which
the President has access.
[Vol. 104: 51
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President's discretionary funding of advisory committees. This too is a
powerful tool because it takes from the President the power to fund his own
advisory committees; it is also one that Congress has never asserted very
effectively. Powerful as it is, though, it is ultimately limited to the extent that
it still leaves available to the President private funding for his appointed or
privately established committees.
Congress can attempt to preempt the President by establishing advisory
committees for him. It is unlikely that the President would establish a second
committee in an area in which Congress had already legislated. For example,
Congress objected vociferously for years to the OMB's use of the Advisory
Council on Federal Reports. Had Congress simply enacted legislation creating
a substitute body, it likely would have displaced the objectionable Advisory
Council. 37" Alternatively, Congress can seize the initiative from the President
by codifying the creation of his independently established commission, in
essence adopting it as its own.371 These are, admittedly, cumbersome
processes, but they are nevertheless avenues available to Congress.
Congress might also seek the reports prepared by the advisory committee
directly from the President. Although this raises the usual concerns over
separation of powers and presidential privilege, it is certainly no more onerous
or intrusive than FACA. Moreover, presidents generally have been disposed
to release advisory committee reports. It is typically in the President's interest
to release such advice, even if it is not always in his interest to have the
advisory committee's processes probed. The report becomes subject not only
to substantive criticism of its advice, but also to whatever criticism there may
be of the committee's procedures, composition, lack of openness, failure to
secure public participation, and so forth. Any President who declines to open
the advisory committee process must bear this cost. Finally, Congress holds a
potent tool in its power to call members of the advisory committee to testify
before Congress. Although Congress may not ask the advisers what they told
the President, it may ask them for their views on the substance of the
372issue.3 7
370. This is, in effect, what Congress did in 1974 when it created the Federal Papersorii Commission.
Pub. L. No. 93-556, 88 Stat. 1789 (1974) (repealed 1977). Although the Commission did not legally
preempt the Advisory Council on Federal Reports, the Advisory Council was teminated three years later,
after 33 years in existence. See Commission on Federal Papenvork. Hearing Before a Suh -omm, of the
House Comm. on Gov't Operations. 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 17-19 (1974) (statement of National Small
Business Association) (discussing need for federal commission and cooperation bet %cen %mal business and
Advisory Council on Federal Reports): see also supra note 194.
371. One example is the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission. sthich the Secretar)
of Defense originally chartered in 1988. In 1990 Congress codified the Commission's role See National
Fed'n of Fed. Employees v. United States, 905 F.2d 400. 402-03 (D.C. Cir. 1990). REPorT OF TitI
DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION. H.R. Doc NO I11. 102d Cong. Ist Scss
17-18 (1991).
372. Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067. 1084-85 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (Wilke). J. concumng)
1994]
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V. CONCLUSION
As Congress had recognized for almost two centuries, the President has the
inherent power to seek the views of outside advisers. It is a power grounded
generally in the Vesting Clause, and more particularly in the President's
enumerated duties-especially the Recommendation Clause, which assumes the
President's unique need for access to superior sources of information. Although
the Spending and Appropriations Clauses, together with the Necessary and
Proper Clause, are a limited source of authority for Congress to regulate
publicly funded advisory committees established by Congress or the President,
Congress' authority over advisory committees not supported from such funds
is limited. FACA violates the separation of powers to the extent that it
regulates the President's use of outside advisory committees funded at their
own expense. FACA both aggrandizes Congress' relative powers over the
President and diminishes the absolute powers of the President.
This implied power secures a constitutional enclave within which the
President may obtain outside advice free of congressional control. It is
constitutional elbow room for the President to seek the advice he believes
relevant, and from a source he considers competent to render it. It is advice
that the President values, in John Tyler's words, "for [his] own information,"
and for which he reserves the right to "deem it best [when] to communicate
the entire report to Congress, or otherwise make it public . . . .""' It is an
enclave to which presidents have not hesitated to retire and that, until the
passage of FACA, Congress had reluctantly, but consistently, respected as
ground the Constitution reserved to the President.
373. CONG. GLOBE, 27th Cong., 2d Sess. 476 (1842) (Letter from President John Tyler to George
Poindexter (Feb. II, 1842)).
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